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THE BEGINNING OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR: MODERN HISTORIOGRAPHY

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## FOREWORD

The tragic beginning of the Patriotic War of 1941-1945 will probably remain one of the most painful issues for Russian historiography for a long time to come. This was connected not only with the colossal losses suffered by our country during the four war years, but also with the painful process of rethinking the Soviet past, which began a quarter of a century ago and continues to this day. In a divided Russian society, any dispute about the past almost inevitably turns into a dispute about values, which is not surprising, since historical memory is considered one of the key elements of national identity. The memory of the war is no exception. In the scientific community, discussions about the events of 1941 take place somewhat differently than outside of it, but this does not make it any less acute.

"A radical rethinking of the history of the first months of the Patriotic War began even in the years of Perestroika after the first censorship bans were lifted. During this period of nanbolse, lively discussions concerned the previously secret protocols to the Soviet-Terman dialects dated August 23 and September 28, 1939 from the event The events of 1941 were actively discussed in the main reasons for the catastrophic defeats of the Red Army in the first months of the war, Stalin's mistakes in preparing to repel aggression and in organizing

Mtsev, the problem of personal responsibility for the start of hostilities, which was supposed to be for the Soviet Union.

In the 1990s, the situation in the historical science changed significantly due to the "archival revolution" (and in essence, during this period, researchers had a qualitatively new source base for studying the history of the Patriotic War) and the emergence of new methodological approaches (military historical anthropology, the history of everyday life). ), as well as in connection with the "unplanned discussions" about the goals of the Soviet foreign

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her and her policy in her early years, which provoked the pashumsvisy publication of books by V.A. Suvorov. vysko- quiet singing Reed wound not nested. Questions, These circumstances made possible the appearance of numerous works devoted to the history of Soviet Visa policy, the basics of strategy, strategic planning, and propaganda. with a significant amount of newly scattered materials requiring comprehension, and on the other hand, with a clear incompleteness of "ar. Khiva Revolution", since many important archival funds still remained in secret storage.

The processes described above are also carried out in the last goals. New problems have also arisen. The poignant nature of the political and economic reforms of the 1990s was the reason why

What

At the turn of the millennium, Russian circles once again dominated the authoritative trend, manifested themselves, in part, in the encouragement of nationalist ill. This resulted in the fact that the memory of the war once again became a bargaining chip in official propaganda, and the "archival revolution" laughed at the repeated "asek" speeches of the Rada of Lokumeites, some of which had already been published by that moment. In addition, there was a clear shortage of qualified specialists in the field of quality research on the history of the Patriotic War,

journalistic nature. "Foreign historiography of the Patriotic War has also undergone serious changes over the past 25 years.

'Soviet archives, as well as publican 'accessible documents, significantly updated the source base (in previous years, when studying the war on the Eastern Front abroad, researchers were forced to limit themselves to the use of German sources, without

and the end of the Cold War helped to overcome some

established stereotypes. At the same time, in recent years, we have definitely observed a decline in the interest of foreign historians to the Soviet era. Nevertheless, the literature on the history of the USSR, including the history of the Patriotic War and the period preceding it, has been enriched by a number of fundamental works that need to be paid attention to.

The approaching sad anniversary of the beginning of the war is a good reason to once again "look back", to review the achievements of recent years, to outline the paths for further research. This was the motive for the preparation of the proposed collection. The goal of the team of authors was to provide the reader with a concise, but relatively complete picture of modern historiography on the eve of the Patriotic War and the anniversary-autumn campaign of 1941. devoted to such problems as Moscow's intervening policy in 1939-1941, vols. the construction of the Soviet armed forces in the same period, the reaction of the Stalinist leadership to the deterioration of Soviet-German relations and incoming information about the impending aggression against the USSR, the fighting in June-December 1941, the reasons for the failures of the Red Army.

The specified chronological frames were chosen deliberately. The first six months of the war on the East Front were hardly the most dramatic period of the Soviet-German confrontation, and the battle near Moscow not only marked the collapse of the Barbarossa operation and the blitzkrieg strategy, but, according to a number of researchers, became, along with the entry into the war of the United States and some other events, the beginning of a break in the hall of the Second World War as a whole. "At the same time, the roots of the defeats of the Red Army in the initial period of the war in many respects go back to great goals. Not the last turn - in the period of the Soviet-German partnership, based on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Treaty of Friendship with the Border of September 2, 1939. which led to our reference to the events of 1939 - the first half of 1941.

" see about this question: Mejtikae M. I. The problem of pernolence no wounds of the Second World War 7 Vopr ister - M 202, Aa S.Ch. twam whose consolation bola rasoirenn saroveiskay van lo masitabon world continuing soca 159 pa labs 1

The collection opens with a general review of the entire literature on the above issues. This is followed by abstracts of the most interesting Russian studies. Kimga V.A. Nevshzhina "If tomorrow we go on a campaign...": Preparation for war and ideological propaganda in the 30s and 40s

gg" is dedicated to the history of Soviet military propaganda in the prehistoric period; aitor ana" `lizes its organization, as well as the evolution of concepts that were introduced by propaganda into the mass creation of Soviet citizens and in monography. November 1939 June 1941" examines Soviet foreign policy during the period of Soviet-German "friendship", reveals its motives and results. The work of M.I. Melgyukhov "Stalin, Lost to the Pope, the Fight for Europe, 1939-1941" represents an attempt, infrequent for Russian historiography, of a comprehensive analysis of the foreign and domestic policy of the USSR in the period under study in the general context of the outbreak of World War II. The work of the Soviet `framework on the eve of Hitler's aggression is described in the monograph of the American researcher D.E. Murphy "What Stalin knew: the secret of 'Barbarossa'". Peru JA. Lukacs (USA) owns the kiiga "Iso 1941: Hitler and Stalin", dedicated to the personal relationship of two dictators. Fighting on the Soviet Terman front in June December 1941 g. are considered in detail in the work of D. M. Glantz "Barbarossa". Hitler's invasion of Russia, 1941. In Kiig V.V. Abaturov "1941: On the Western Direction" analyzes the battles on the flax sector of the Eastern Front in 1941 and in lesser degrees = in 1942, Work by D.B. Khazanov "The Struggle for Dominance in the Moonlight" is devoted to the actions of the Air Forces of the parties in the summer and autumn of 1941, the author describes the air booms of the first weeks of the war, the actions of aviation in the Kiev defensive operation and in repelling the German offensive on Leningrad, the Luftwaffe raids on Moscow, shows the reasons for the Soviet pilots' failures. In the monastery of J.P. Migarji (USA) "War of annihilation: military operations and genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941", dedicated to the incursions of the invaders on the Soviet territory, also shows the influence of the moods that prevailed in the Nazi leadership, and the situation that developed at the front, on the attitude of the Germans to Soviet prisoners of war and to the local population. Similar tasks are solved by the German historian H. Hartmann in his collection "The Wehrmacht in

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vaine in the east: Front and rear, 1941-1942 tg ": using the example of five Terman divisions, it shows how the everyday life of Pemsh soldiers and officers, as well as the institutional features of the German army and the situation on the front and in the occupied regions influenced the content, character and masitab of the heavy presta. Finally, when the Wehrmacht military personnel on the territory of the USSR commit a crime, the problem of the responsibility of German soldiers for crimes is also affected, Nakhomets, the work of the English explorer R.K. Braytvizita "Moscow in 1941: the city and its inhabitants in the Aromi War" dedicated to the growing anxiety of Muscovites in the first months of the Soviet-Cherman confrontation,

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## THE BEGINNING OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR IN MODERN HISTORIOGRAPHY

(Abstract review)

Prehistory of the Patriotic War of 1941-1945 t. m. The history of the first few months continues to be the focus of attention of researchers both in Russia and abroad. The proposed review shows the main trends, approaches and points of view that exist in the works devoted to this period, published in Russian, German and English over the past ten years. In the recently published collection "USSR, Eastern Europe and the Second World War, 1939-1941" edited by SZ. Case (20) shows the evolution of the domestic historiography of the events of 1939-1941 during the first post-Soviet decade. "The main part of this is reports on round tables on this issue, held at the Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (formerly the Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences) in 1989-1990 and 2000-2002 vols. In addition, the collection includes a solo review article by Sluch, dedicated to the reflection of the Soviet foreign policy of 1939-1941 in the domestic history of the Perestroika period (1985-1991). there are also certain difficulties that impede further scientific research.

The "archival revolution" was replaced in the second half of the 1990s by new restrictions on the access of researchers to archival materials. Published collections of documents, despite their significance, are still quite fragmentary and contain only a small fraction of the information needed by historians. In the new conditions of the development of domestic historiography, according to the mission of Chance,

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peculiar extensive character: the desire to "digest"

historical science. In a situation where entire layers of documents are still inaccessible to researchers, a number of important questions about the prehistory of the Patriotic War involuntarily remain the subject of conjecture and speculation; so, it still doesn't seem to matter

the policy of the Stalinist leadership, since the available documents allow us to study in some detail only his diplomatic activity and, to a lesser extent, the content of intelligence reports. The study of Soviet foreign policy 1939-1941, concludes Sluch, is still far from completion.

The selection of sources for this abstract review turned out to be an unusual undertaking. If in the case of foreign literature the most difficult task was seponsk, since in the central libraries of the country there are very few of the latest foreign publications and a rare book is available at least in two libraries at the same time, then in Russia in recent years a lot of books have appeared, dedicated to the beginning of the Patriotic War and its background. The problem, however, is that a significant (if not

not academic

amateur research, as well as journalism. Amateur works, however, are very different - from representing practically no interest to very good ones, claiming to be at a serious scientific level. At the same time, we have to admit that among academic publications there are works that are more about the quality of each specific kinga, thus,

must be judged solely by its content. In view of the above circumstances, it seems necessary to consider, in addition to strictly academic works, some of the most successful amateur studies, in which one can also find a lot of interesting information and curious observations.

"Research topics

The central problems of the prehistory and the beginning of the Patriotic War remain the Soviet

foreign policy and military

'construction in the early period, the course of military operations in the summer - 'April 1941', the causes of the Red Army's mischief in the first months of the war. The discussion continues on the goals of the military preparations of the USSR in the first half of 1941 ("the problem of a preemptive strike") ). Among the topics that have appeared relatively recently are the problems of historical events and those close to them: the history of pors disviosity, the ideas of the Soviet political and vosin elite about a future war, the military-doctrinal guidelines of the Stalinist leadership, and the history of Soviet propaganda. One of the most comprehensive studies on the eve of the Patriotic War is the monograph by M.I. Meltyukhov "Stalin's Lost Chance" (14). In kilge A whole complex of problems is considered: international relations in Europe in 1920-1930, with the goals and the brewing of a new world war; foreign policy of the USSR in 1939-1941; the military policy of the Soviet Union in the same period, Soviet expansion in 1939-1940: the growth of Soviet-German contradictions in 1940-1941; preparation of the USSR for a war with Germany (including operational-strategic and mobilization plans, "construction

armed forces): the balance of forces on the Eastern Front by June 22, 1941, etc. at the historiography of these problems.

The British researcher C. Bellamy set himself the goal of writing a new survey work on the history of the war on the Eastern Front, taking into account the latest research and new sources that became available in Russia and other former Soviet republics as a result of the "archival revolution" of the 1990s. The result was a voluminous work "Absolute War: Soviet Russia in World War II" (25), ten out of twenty of which are devoted to the events of 1939-1941.

The work of J. A. Lukacs (USA) "June 1941 goals: Hitler and Stalin" (327) is devoted primarily to the personal relationship between Stalin and Hitler. Lukacs insists that both dictators pursued a completely rational and pragmatic policy. Using abstract ideological constructions (communist and Nazi) only as a means to achieve their goals.

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In fact, it made possible the conclusion in 1939 of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which at that time was considered by both parties as a mutually beneficial agreement. The German attack on the USSR in 1941 was also dictated by pragmatic motives: Hitler, according to Lukacs, sought to force Britain to peace and keep the United States from intervening in the war, removing the Soviet Union from the international arena - their last potential for survival. In Ezrol, Blue's excessive doubt in regards to Germany turned out to be fatal. DK, Robert (Israeli Panov University, Cork) "Stalin's Wars: From the World War to the Cold War, 1939-1953" (36) is devoted to Stalin's foreign and military policy in the late 1930s and early 1950s. The author seeks to consider the events under study © from the point of view of the Soviet dictator himself, to understand his motives and to clarify the personality assessments existing in the scientific community. The first chapters of the book are devoted to the Soviet-German pact, the events of 1939-1941, the beginning of the Fatherland

L.A. Bezymensky in his book "Stalin and Hitler before the fight" (4), written at the intersection of several genres (monograph, documentary essays, memoirs: the work even contains fragments of interviews taken by the author himself from some participants in the events described), tries to find the answer to the most painful question: why did Stalin still believe in the preparation of the Germans for a treacherous sudden attack from the USSR. Kinga analyzes in detail the various aspects of Soviet-German relations before and especially after the Molotov = Ribbentrop Pact, as well as the reaction of the Soviet leadership to the deterioration of these relations and to the German military preparations in 1940-1941.

M. Breckmeier in the book "Stalin, the Russians and Their War" (27) tried to illuminate the history of the Patriotic War through the prism of the personal attitude of all participants and witnesses to it. affected, therefore one hundred books can be considered "as an addition and, probably, as a correction to the conception of this period that has developed in the past years" (27, p. XI). The first part of the book is devoted to the prelude period (August 1939 - June 22, 1941). The author, in particular, tries to remember to what extent the USSR was ready for war, whether the German attack was really unexpected, why our country was caught in a rage.

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bad, what was Stalin's position at that time. The second part describes the events of the war years - from the first frontier battles to the capture of Berlin. The third part of the "People and the System" deals with various issues of social, cultural history, the history of everyday life during the war period and subsequent years (women in the war, warfare, Gulag, partisan movement, methods of warfare, victims of war, military generation id). In the last, fourth, part, the life of a provincial town during and after the war is shown using the example of the city of Szolnoka.

King RK, Broithwaite (Great Britain) "Moscow in 1941" (26) is also devoted to questions of the history of everyday life. The author describes in detail various aspects of the everyday life of Muscovites during the summer-autumn of 1941, including supply problems, the famous panic of October 16-19 in connection with the threat of the capture of Moscow by the Germans, invoking the main situation. Kinga also examines raids on the capital by German bombers, the work of Soviet air defense, the reasons for the failure of the Luftwaffe. Separately, the reaction of the population to the outbreak of war and events on the front is analyzed, and the tragic fate of the Moscow militia is shown. Braithwaite also touches upon the general context in which the processes under study took place: the course of hostilities in the summer-autumn campaign of 1951, especially in the Moscow direction: Lenin, the reasons for the failures of the Red Army in this period, the responsibility of the political leadership and Stalin personally for insufficient

preparation of the country and the army for war, the significance of the battle of Moscow.

The monograph of the American researcher J. P. Migarji "War of annihilation" (34) is devoted to the relationship between the general situation on the Eastern Front during 1941 and occupation policy. Nazis, including crimes against prisoners of war and civilians. H. Hartman (Germany) also solves similar problems and sings "The Wehrmacht in the War in the East" (31), writing a layer on the material of five divisions of the German army that invaded the territory of the Soviet Sozh in 1941-1942.

Among the most comprehensive works on the history of the first years of the Patriotic War, among the non-traditional cadences, apparently, the book of DM should be ranked. Glalitsa "The Colossus of the Renaissance" (30; translation into Russian of the language parts and I - 7, parts III - 6) - the second part of the trilogy dedicated to the Soviet armed forces on the eve and

"see abstract 1 life compilation in

e period of the Great War (the first part - "The Downfall Colossus" = was published in 1998. The monograph is dedicated to the "intensive period of the war. from June 22, 1941 to the end of 1943 1. those. The author first of all asks the question of how the Red Armin, which on the eve of the war was a "colossus with feet of clay", and in the first months of the war suffered a number of crushing defeats, managed to revive again, half a Phoenix , n to defeat the Wehrmacht.

Kinga consists of three large parts. In the first of them, "The Red Army in the War, 1941-1943 ps," the course of hostilities is traced throughout the period studied by the author and the knowledge of Soviet military art is given; Glantz pays special attention to the "forgotten" battles that did not receive enough under the "Best osvskliya" in historiography. In the third part - "Leaders and Vedmys" - the bodies of strategic management, the knife, the officer corps of the Red Army, the position and everyday life of the Rada are considered. composition. The final 14th chapter of the third part contains the author's general outbursts.

HOUSE. Glantz will highlight several reasons for the successful revival of the Cropsormeian chcolossus. To the most important advantage, the constant modernization of the structure of the Red Army and the gradual accumulation of combat experience. to carry out both defensive and offensive operations with the utmost efficiency. zhinvih meat grinder 1941 1982 t 'and accumulated residual experience in leading troops in various. situations. Other factors that contribute to the success of Soviet searches are also analyzed in the king (improvement of supplies, development of weapons and equipment, improvement of the system of "strategic management, supplies by lepleliza, etc.). Negative circumstances are also taken into account, objectively reducing the effectiveness of the actions of the Red Army and allowance for increased losses (many of these factors were associated with the characteristics of the Stalinist totalitarian system)

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In the work of another American historian, E.F. Zimke "The Red Army, 1918-1941: From the avaiarl of the world revolution to an ally of the United States" (38) examines the history of the Red Army from its birth to the beginning of the Patriotic War. The author, in particular, describes in detail the process of creating the Red Army, the actions of the "Reds" in the Civil War, the evolution of Soviet military policy and the disagreements between the leaders of the Bolsheviks on military issues in

fashion, Soviet military construction in the 1920-1930s. The king and the events of 1939-1941 Fri are considered in detail, Zimke analyzes the history of the battles at Khalkhia-Gol and Zimpei of the Fii Nidia war, compares the combat effectiveness of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, considers the military plans of the USSR and Germany, practical measures taken in the Soviet Union in connection with the approach of war. The position of the Red Army at the beginning of the Patriotic War, the researcher assesses as hopeless. In his opinion, border battles, a command crisis, and the rapid advance of Nazi troops deep into Soviet territory testify to this. The US entry into the war on December 7, 1941 and the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition were of great importance for the victory over fascism. America and the Soviet Union did not enter the war of their own free will. After the German-Soviet cooperation was interrupted in 1933, Stalin's foreign, Eastern, economic policy was based on the expectation of a world war in which the calitalist countries would exhaust each other, after which the time would come for the Red Army to lead the struggle of the world proletariat. against capitalism and colonialism, but Hitler's aggression in June 1941 confused all the cards. Stalin, realizing the new alignment of forces very soon, defined the outbreak of the war as patriotic, domestic. Such a character gave him a cart. possibility of cooperation with bourgeois countries. Zimke also expresses a number of original considerations on the history of the Second World War as a whole, for example, he proposes to distinguish between the World War and the Soviet-German war, which had their own key components. Noting the monstrous size of Soviet losses, significantly exceeding German ones, he concludes that the question of who won the last war remains open.

Questions of methodology.

From the point of view of methodology, a significant part of the pkeledovals, especially domestic ones, still refers to purely eventual history = political (history of international relations) and vosina and yy coperativio- <tralegic" version

+ loss) but this is typical for amateur works on history. Among the non-somie non-sense, the choice of new topics for research, as well as a more pleasing linkage of existing knowledge on various aspects of prehistoric and anal history of the Patriotic War

Among the relatively new topics of research, one should note the history of everyday life (26,27, 310), as well as the evolution of prel. the ideas of the Soviet political and military elite about a future war and the relationship of these ideas with the practical work of the post-Soviet political leadership in preparing for the Buluti war, © the basic and operational training of the Red Army (2). The history of Soviet propaganda adjoins the last question, the teaching of which allows, among other things, to trace the military poktrinal dogwoods of the Soviet leaders in their assessment. shaping the international situation through those ideological forks that were promoted by official propaganda in different periods (14. p. 314-340; 19.

A good example of a comprehensive approach to the problems studied is the book by M. I. Melpomov (14), in which the analysis of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is closely linked with the analysis of its foreign policy and the general context of the outbreak of the Second World War. Such a move. Unfortunately, harshness remains in Russian historiography, more often, as before, there are studies entirely devoted to either cherry-picture or military issues.

It is natural that the works on the history of my Patriotic War written and our country, nsiobsa pokanavaki studied events: the events are mainly from the Soviet point of view, lida kah a ub-



ications of German historians. correspondence, contains a caustic look at the past war. Researchers from third countries, it would seem, are in a better position and have more opportunities to create a holistic image of the war on the Eastern Front from the standpoint of an outside observer. Nonetheless,

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as noted by E. Maudsley (University of Glasgow, Scotland) in his film "Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War, 1941-1945" (93), a significant number of foreign. works on the history of the Fatherland-War is written mainly on the basis of documents of one of the parties and, accordingly, also reproduces either the German or the Soviet point of view and the studied events. Model himself in his study tries not only to rethink the history of the Soviet-German confrontation and its place in history of the Second World War as a whole, using the fruits of the "archival revolution" in post-Soviet Russia, but not to overcome at least an hour. (Maudsley himself uses mainly Soviet sources) the described division of Western historiography into the "Soviet" and "German" schools. .

This difficult problem can be mostly solved by C. Bellamy, who in his work (25) really considers the Soviet-German war from the point of view of a third party. In the book, the event history is described in a generalized way: the course of military actions and their results, diplomacy, and in a lesser degree, the actions of reconnaissance and partisans. Logistics issues are also discussed in detail, including their impact on the outcome of individual operations and campaigns. Of the non-event issues, the author touches only on the role of women in the Patriotic War. An interesting feature of the study is Bellamy's desire to consider the events under study in a broader historical context - not only the Second World War as a whole, but also in the general context of the world history of wars; in the course of the narrative, the author quite often compares individual events and processes with similar examples from previous and later wars and military conflicts, up to modern ones.

#### The Soviet Union's Vieshnje Policy in the Great Pernod

The most detailed Soviet policy of 1939-1941 is considered in the monograph by A.O. Chubryan "The Eve of the Tragedy" (24) For 15 eyes, the author analyzes the history of the Soyot Terman partnership of 1939-1941, including the accession to the USSR of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, the Baltic states, Bessarabins and Northern Bukovina, the Soviet-Finnish conflict, the growing

"See the abstract of 55 pastures of the national team.

The work is distinguished by a rigorous analysis of available sources, a thorough analysis of the most complex diplomatic games and maneuvers, an integrated approach to the problem under study, and attention to the consideration of a variety of, sometimes conflicting factors that influenced the described events. . Chubaryan's personal research position also belongs to the undoubted merits of the book - especially if one takes into account the increased activity of authors in recent years who seek to justify such steps by the Soviet Soyu as the Molotov = Ribbsitrop pact and the subsequent "voluntarily" forced "annexation" of the Baltic states, which were allegedly forced measures designed to delay the involvement of the USSR in a major war. to strengthen the security of the Soviet borders, etc. In contrast to this, Chubaryan consistently substantiates the immorality of the actions of the Soviet leadership, which considered itself entitled to decide the fate of neighboring peoples and states, ignoring their own position and interests. It is also impossible to note the exceptionally tolerant attitude of the author towards his opponents. Although Chubaryan rejects the hypothesis that the USSR in the spring and summer of 1941 1. was preparing to attack Germany, all one hundred critical remarks about the supporters of this toorin are extremely correct and restrained.

L.A. Bezamensky (4) is also inclined to justify Stalin's policy. Although he believes that the Soviet dictator was really afraid of the war and tried to delay his death, the conclusion

treaty with Germany in 1939. and even more so the secret protocol on the division of Eastern Europe, in his opinion, cannot be considered a forced measure: on the contrary, in the then prevailing situation, Stalin quite consciously chose rapprochement with Germany as the most beneficial decision for himself

OV. Vishlev, in his book *On the Eve of June 22, 1941 Gosh: Documentary Essays* (\$), on the other hand, analyzes Soviet-German relations in 1939-1941, and tries to defend the Stalinist leadership from the criticism that it has received in recent years. He is trying to prove, for example, that the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was motivated by concern for ensuring the security of the Soviet Union in the conditions of an impending world war, and that the pact itself (including the secret protocol) is nothing reprehensible, since it does not contain explicit insults to the parties. carry out aggression against Poland or

the Baltic states and, in principle, is not something new to them in the diplomatic practice of that time. Vishlev emphasizes the complex, conflicting nature of Soviet-German relations. The fact that in the mass year of 1941 Stalin stubbornly refused to put the troops of the western military districts on alert, the author will explain by his confidence in the possibility of delaying the outbreak of war with the army. In the face of a contrived international situation, Vichy argues, the "leader" found himself in a hopeless pit, which practically stopped the possibility of working out any adequate solutions. Since documents from the German archives are actively used in Kinta, the first two chapters are most often presented by the first two chapters, illustrating a look at the situation 1939-1941 t. noah armin. The second chapter describes the lezinformation campaign organized by the Soviet side in May-June 1941 and the highly contrived activities carried out by the Germans in order to cover up preparations for an attack on Soviet Soy.

Similar ideas are developed by AS Orlov in the essay "Stalia: in the prelude of war" (16). Orlov argues that the USSR pursued a purely peace-loving policy during these goals. Western countries (in a glorious way, Aya and France). deviating from the proposals of the Soviet government: the creation of a collective security system in Varop, indulged in every possible way with the insult of the Versailles Treaty. and France, trying to appease Hitler, made all sorts of concessions in order to ward off the war from the Soviet Union and send the German exclamation to the east, since Bolshevism was more feared than Nazism, but Stalin, according to the author, paprotio, understood the threat of Hitlerism and

tried to avoid the war, or at least get out of the way at the beginning, in order to bring the Soviet armed forces and industry to it. It was © for this purpose that on August 23, 1939, a non-aggression pact was concluded with Germany.

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In the dissertation of A.L. Safrazyan (18), based on a wide documentary base (locumsites of the RGASPI, GARF, AVP of the Russian Federation, locumentary publications, Soviet and foreign press of the 1930s, memoirs - Soviet and German), the influence of communist ideology on the Czech Republic is considered. Stalin's policy in the 1930s - early 1940s, primarily on Soviet-Termian relations in 1939-1941. The author does not agree with the idea of Stalin and Hitler as pragmatic politicians and insists and the Third Reich was ideologically determined. This did not rule out pragmatic solutions, the most significant of which was the Soviet-German pact of 1939, which was a geopolitical compromise between Soviet and German expansionism. However, it was precisely the incompatibility of this compromise with both Nazi and Soviet ideology that predetermined "its fragility and fragility. At the same time, simplified "class" interpretations: the Nazism in the Soviet Union, based on pas

Marxist doctrine in the Se-Stalin version did not allow the Soviet leadership to assess the degree of influence of ideology on the foreign policy of Berlin. The consequence of this was the underestimation of the military danger on the part of the Reich and the failure of the negotiations in Berlin in November 1940. provisions of the Germans about the new division of spheres of influence. By rejecting these proposals, instead of involving German diplomacy in their discussion, the USSR missed the most serious opportunity to postpone the war with Germany, convincing Hitler of the impossibility of further peaceful coexistence of the two totalitarian regimes, V.N. Svishchev, in his monograph "The Beginning of the Great Oil War," insists that the USSR pursued a peaceful policy in the 1930s, suggesting that European states develop a system of collective security, but did not find a response from them. Meanwhile, Hitler came to power in Germany, and the threat of war increased dramatically. According to the researcher, according to the SSBE non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union dated. August 23, 1939 was necessary for both states. As for the secret protocols, the Congress of Parody Deputies of the USSR has already condemned their conclusion, recognizing them as legally untenable and invalid from the moment of signing. However, in 1939. "they existed and coordinated the actions of the governments of the USSR and Germany in the international arena" (19.1. 1, p. 254),

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Germany received freedom to expand its aggressive plans, while the pact allowed the Soviet Union to win time to strengthen its defense capability.

M.I. also touches upon the issues of Soviet military policy. Meltpokhov (14). Ohm insists that in the 1920s and early 1940s, the USSR actually pursued an expansionist policy, hiding behind the slogan of "world revolution". Conclusion of an agreement with Germa.

mei s 1939 me was associated with the desire to strengthen the security

Soviet frontiers: Stalin simply considered the terms offered by Hitler to be more advantageous than those offered by Britain and France. From the summer of 1940 contradictions began to grow in Soviet-Termai relations, and after the Berlin talks in November of the same year, which showed the impossibility of a new mutually beneficial compromise, the parties launched direct preparations for war.

Preparing the Soviet Union for War

The most detailed and comprehensive preparation of the USSR for the war with Germany is described in the work of M.I. Meltyukhov: on pro. zhzheshshi several essays (chapters), he examines the construction of the Soviet armed forces in the late 1930s - early 1940s, Soviet strategic planning in 1939-1941 pt. the activities of the Soviet intelligence of the pacapuce of the German papadepia mtd. (14, p. 221-340)

A number of other publications, Russian and foreign, are devoted to certain issues of Soviet military policy. Yes, DE. Murphy (USA) in his book "What Stalin knew: the secret of Barbarossa" (35)' analyzes the work of Soviet intelligence on the eve of the Patriotic War and the reaction of the political leadership to these reports. Om comes to the conclusion that Stalin actually saw

he wanted to see la and one hundred subordinates showed smug

For the most part, just what he wanted to see. As a result, although

information about the military preparations of the Nazis came to Moscow

in sufficient quantities, Stalin assuredly assured that Hitler would not attack the USSR in 1941.

"Similar ideas are developed by L. Bezymensky (4).

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he considers the circumstance that the Soviet dictator in the totalitarian system he himself created inadvertently found himself in a kind of informational vacuum and lived in his own world, which had little in common with reality, which made it impossible to adequately respond to emerging challenges,

C. Bellamy, analyzing the events that preceded the outbreak of the Patriotic War, also comes to the conclusion that on the Soviet side there was not so much an intelligence error as a careless political interpretation of the reports. We can talk about intelligence errors rather in relation to Germany, since the Germans clearly underestimated their future enemy (as did the Japanese before the attack from the USA). Thus, the attack of the Third Reich on the USSR was not truly sudden either on a tactical or a strategic level. Scorsa can speak of institutional surprise, since by June 22, 1941, the Soviet troops had not yet completed the planned rearmament and organization measures, which were planned to be completed by about 19427. 025,160).

MI. Melgyukhov, on the contrary, comes to the conclusion that the information that came to Moscow about German military preparations was rather fragmentary and, contrary to popular notions, allowed for various interpretations. "The German and Soviet secret services," he concludes, were better able to hide their secrets than to reveal others' (14, p. 244).

In the work of DB. Loshkova (12, 13) analyzes the axial trends in the training of command personnel of the Red Army of the middle level in 1939 - the first half of 1941. The author examines, in particular, the state of the command staff of the Red Army on the eve of the war, the consequences of repressions in the armed forces, the system of training command personnel, the evolution military propaganda, including after Stalin's speeches on May 5, 1941 to graduates of the nona academies,

The book by I. Short (Ministry of Defense of Great Britain) 'Stalin's Line' and "Molotov's Line": Soviet Fortifications on the Western Frontier 1928 1941 vol. - at the beginning of the 1940s and received in modern literature the conditional names "Stalin's line" (fortified areas on the old border, built in 1928 1939 11.) and Molotov line "(fortified areas, building

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"hya in 1940 - the first half of 1941 on the new border). In the pre-war Soviet strategic voyages, these defensive structures played an important role, since under their cover it was supposed to mobilize the main forces of the Red Army and deploy them to go into command. fortified areas, contrary to dovosin calculations, were quickly enough to break through the German troops

Short describes in most detail the construction of Soviet border fortifications, the design of their construction, the types of defense structures. The very idea of constructing a line of fortified areas along the border, according to the author, looks, < on the one hand, to the development of Russian military thought of the early twentieth century. and, on the other hand, to the experience of the Civil War, the First World War, Russia quite actively developed a system of border fortresses, which, however, in the conditions of military operations turned out to be effective. Late, during the Civil War, the Soviet side practiced formations in different sectors of the front: tele-fortified areas, however, © using only field fortifications. In the 1920- years, it was decided to build a system of more powerful fortified areas (UR) along the Western borders © with long-term fortifications. in view of the complete threat from Germany, Conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbsitroia pact

led x to the fact that in 1939-1940 the western border of the USSR moved further to the west, and the Third Reich became the immediate falcon of the Soviet Union. Under these conditions, in 1940, it was decided to build a new line of fortified positions along the new borders: "on: June 22, 1941, that robot was still far from complete.

A separate section of Short's book is devoted to the fate of the "Stalin Line" and the "Molotov Line" in the first weeks of the Patriotic War. By the beginning of the Nazi aggression, the fortifications of the new frontier had not yet been completed, moreover, their construction was carried out practically on the basis of a visa from the future enemy. Tactical surprise also played its role. As a result, the "Molotov line" was quite quickly penetrated by the Wehrmacht units, although in some areas the Soviet troops still managed to occupy the defensive structures in time and put up strong resistance and

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spring. The "Stalin Line", contrary to the widespread opinion, was not destroyed in 1940-1941, but the fire points were mostly disarmed and mothballed. In the conditions of the outbreak of war, the Soviet state has already failed to bring them back on alert and occupy them with troops.

Research by V.A. Artsybashev (2. 3) is devoted to the performances of the Red Army's command staff (mainly senior and senior) about the initial period of the future war, their evolution during the inter-zonal period and implementation in the practical activities of the command department (development of porous documents, organization of military games, exercises and maneuvers, operational and strategic planning). The author, therefore, seeks to explore the non-event basis of the Soviet front construction. He also touches upon the question of the adequacy of the existing ideas about the initial period of the war and their influence on the outcome of the combat operations of the Red Army in June-July 1941. Artsybashev comes to the conclusion that the Soviet revolutionary and political leadership, apparently, did not completely abandon the concept of "crawling into the war", which was already outdated by that time, as a result of which the Red Army was not ready to repel a surprise attack by the Germans, in which the main forces of the Wehrmacht, mobilized in advance and deployed on the Soviet border, immediately took part.

Mopography of V.A. Nevezhin "If tomorrow on a hike." (15) Dedicated to the activities of the Soviet propaganda organs in the 1930s = early 1940s

did Stalin go for Germany? Goals remain a subject of lively discussion

Soviet

in the first half of 1941. Since important documents on this issue still remain classified, historians willy-nilly have to concentrate their main efforts on comprehending sources that have already been put into circulation, primarily documents that were declassified during the archival revolution" 1990 -s. and also on the analysis of the Soviet military policy in the complex context with other problems on the eve of the Patriotic War. Among the authors who do not agree that the Soviet

"see abstract no 48 that Boris

The Union was planning an attack on Germany, - V.A. Artsybashev (2), L.A., Bezymzsky (4), O.V. Wishls (5), A.S. Orlov (16), V.A. Rupov (17), A.O. Chubaryan (24), DE. Murphy (35)

According to misao A.S. Orlova, USSR in 1939-1941 vols. did not prepare an aggressive war against Germany, and the well-known draft strategic plan of May 15, 1941 was not approved by Stalin, those.

the appearance of this document only testifies to the fact that, therefore, the authors proposed to carry out, for the purpose of self-defense, "pre-emptive! a blow (and not a superior one) to the country of the Nazi invasion army, which was ready for attack and war. The purpose of such a strike (unlike a preventive one) is not to defeat Germany, but to thwart "the enemy's offensive" (16, p. 391). And in any case, "inflict a major defeat on the Wehrmacht with those forces that were in

border districts, with that degree of readiness they had was not possible" (16, pp. 392-393). The author explains this by the fact that the USSR was preparing for war, based on outdated strategic concepts, while only Germany mastered the new methods of unleashing and waging war in 1930. As a result, "our plan provided for 10-15 days, or even 25-30 days, to conduct active defense, giving time for general mobilization. Time that the enemy did not give. And besides, this type of hostilities was hardly practiced, all attention was paid to the second stage of the offensive against the enemy" (16, p. 394).

L.A. Bezymensky (4) also rejected the hypothesis that the USSR was preparing for an attack on Germany: in his opinion, the Soviet Union was not ready for war, and Stalin could not have been unaware of this. V.A. Runov considers the construction of fortified areas ("Molotov Line") to be one of the proofs of the purely defensive intentions of the USSR

and the new state border (17, ©.21).

Conducted by M.I. Meltyukhov's analysis of the so far published Soviet strategic and operational plans for 1940-1941 vols., (14, p. 281-313), on the contrary, shows that all of them © from the very beginning were sustained in an offensive spirit and designed not so much to repel aggression, but to start a war on the initiative of the USSR. This applies to the greatest extent to the plan of May 15, 1941. In the wake of 1941, the covert deployment of Soviet troops in the Western Theater confirms that this plan was approved by Stalin and will be put into effect. At the same time, the analysis of a number of materials, mainly propaganda

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character, illustrating the general mood of the Soviet leaders on the eve of the war, shows that the Kremlin was afraid of the military power of Germany and were quite confident in the combat capabilities of the Red Army (see 14. p. 314-340).

"It should also be borne in mind that, as V.A. Artsybashev shows in his dissertation, the Soviet strategic plans to fight until March 1941 inclusive were built on the basis of the concept of entering the war" and from the initial period of the war provided for the defensive actions of the covering troops. Only the May strategic plan of 1941 envisaged the invasion of enemy territory by the main forces of the Red Army, secretly mobilized and deployed on the frontier of the United States in peacetime (2, Ch. III). The plea of the "Molotov Line" in the United States does not mean that Moscow did not plan attacks on the Nazi Reich.

K. Bellamy (25) also touches on the controversy on the question of the goals of the Soviet leadership's military preparations in 1939-1941 in his book, especially since V.A. Suvorov knows him personally. Analyzing Suvorov's concept in the light of recent research and taking into account newly declassified documents (first of all, of course, the Soviet strategic plans of 1940-1941, which were still secret at the time when *The Icebreaker* was being written), Bellamy in principle agrees © with the fact that the intensive preparation of the Soviet Union for an offensive war is confirmed by a number of circumstantial evidence, as well as with the fact that the beginning of secret mobilization in the USSR must be recognized as the adoption on September 1, 1929, of the law on universal military service, which allowed Stalin to sharply increase the number of Red Army. He also insists that the May draft of the strategic plan of 1941 was drawn up at the General Staff on Stalin's instructions and partly

went into action in May-June 1941. Nevertheless, he is inclined to a much less radical interpretation of the events of 1939-1941, than Suvorov, assuming that Stalin did not intend to fall on Germany in 1941, because he could not not realizing that the Red Army was not ready for such a war, Belostalskiy, concluding an agreement with Germany in August 1939, counted on the fact that the war between the Third Reich and Western democracies would lead to their mutual exhaustion and thereby creates the necessary prerequisites for the Soviet invasion of Europe (as Suvorov assumed), then after the defeat of France in 1940

these hopes were clearly dashed. Thus, concludes Bellamy, it can be assumed that for 1942 Stalin really planned an attack on Germany and the already mentioned note of Zhukov and Timoshenko dated May 15, 1941 contained a preliminary plan for such an operation, but in 1941. In fact, he had to, as far as possible, remain above the war, for which, according to the author, he did not really shy away. True, the book admits (allegedly from the level of unverified hypothesis) and suggests that on 21-22 August 1941, Soviet military nevertheless tried to realize precisely the May strategic plan, and look at the completely unsuitable situation for this, due to the fact that there was simply no alternative plan in the event of German aggression.

According to J. Lukács (32), Stalin, counting on using the outbreak of the war in Verona to further expand the territory of the USSR, however, sought to maintain neutrality for as long as possible, assuming that time would work for him.

In connection with the question of the Soviet military preparations in the first half of 1941, the problem of applying the term "preventive war" was also discussed. The discussion on this issue is fueled by the irrelevance of this very understanding, largely by the fact that the thesis about the superior war against the USSR at one time was actively used by Hitler's propaganda, as a threat. As a result, many authors are still too lazy to praise V. A. Suvorov in an attempt to justify the Nazi aggression against our country, while in fact the author of *Ledokol Scors* accuses the Stalinist leadership of provoking the attack of the Germans by its expansionist policy and in this way bears its share of responsibility for the tragedy of 1941-1945. In addition, the appearance in the open press of Soviet strategic plans, especially the May plan of 1941, raised the question of the applicability of the term "preventive war" to the actions of the USSR itself.

One of the possible solutions to the described problem was suggested by M.I. Melguzhov: the Nazi aggression against Soviet Soki cannot be considered a Prussian nuclear one, since the Soviet military attacks in the first half of 1941 were preparations for a preemptive strike in order to disrupt the German second attack, since Berlin was not expected attacks from the USSR in 1941. nor did Moscow fear an attack by the Germans in the coming months (4.379).

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A number of authors propose to distinguish between such concepts as a passive blow and a preemptive strike. In the most complete form, this approach is presented in the monograph by C. Bellamy. Under the term remedial war (*rgc-strýuema*), he understands "actions aimed at preventing or repelling the 'near and destructive prose'", while under preventive war (*rgekemike zim*) he means "actions aimed at preventing the materialization - a threat that still exists" (25, p. 102; Bellamy cites the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 as an example of a preventive war). At the same time, the King emphasizes that if preemptive war "has a solid pedigree in the international arena, then it is 'less favorable' to preventive war (25, p. 102). Thus, the German attack on the USSR cannot be considered a preemptive strike, since the Nazi leadership does not expect. gave rise to attacks from the Soviet Union in 1941, the Soviet strategic plan of May 15, 1941 also cannot be considered a preemptive strike plan, since Stalin was sure that Hitler would not attack the USSR until the war between Germany and Great Britain continued. At the same time, the concept of preventive war is quite applicable to the actions of both the Hitlerite and the Stalinist leadership. Such an approach makes it possible not only to overcome terminological confusion, but also to resolve the ethical conflicts that arise when discussing the "problem of preemptive strike", since preemptive war in the sense that Bellamy puts into this concept is, from the point of view of international law, an action that is at least dubious. and, consequently, cannot be considered a justification for the Nazi aggression: these are against the USSR.

The most detailed combat operations in the summer-autumn campaign of 1941 are described in the book DM. Glantz "Barbarossa" (29) In his work, he seeks, first of all, to clarify the causes of the defeats of the Soviet troops in June-November and the failure of the operation "Barbarossa" in November-December 1941. Glantz examines the Soviet and German strategic plans before the war (quite briefly), the state of the Red Army on the eve of German aggression, the main

In the summer - autumn of 1941

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In the book E, Models (33) lasta brief military-historical overview of major operations and battles on the Eastern Front in 1941-1945; the monograph is divided into parts devoted respectively to the periods of success of the Wehrmacht (1941-1942) and the Red Army (1942-1945). Okhobos place in it is occupied by numerous sections in which the author analyzes in detail the reasons for the successes and the failure of both warring parties in certain operations and campaigns. The main reasons for the victory of the USSR (and the anti-Hitler goat in general) in World War II Maudsley considers the superiority of the Allies in manpower: wah, the numerical superiority of their armies fell to the Wehrmacht, as well as their more powerful and efficient economy. The strategic leadership of the Allies, in her opinion, was also more effective than in the Oe countries, despite the Wehrmacht's slow pace. chesky and oporativpom levels. At the same time, the relative stability of both the Nazi and Stalinist regimes and the comparable high barefoot spirit of both belligerent armies determined the protracted nature of the war. The author also considers it extremely important that the fact that Nazi Germany is fighting against. "The Soviet Union had a pronounced ideological character, and elo largely predetermined its development. The peculiarities of pastoral ideology were, in particular, conditioned by a clear pelo-assessment of the "racially pepoliocene" enemy, on which the "Barbarossa" plan was based. Ileologically motivated there was also the concept of a "war of annihilation", which led to the fact that the support of the Pem people by the local village during the war years was lower than one might expect. Repressions in the Red Army in 1937-1938 are not attributed by the author to the causes of the catastrophe of 1941 and the success of the Red Army in that period were, in her opinion, due to other factors (for example, Stalin's confidence that Hitler would not dare to fight on two fronts)

1 Border Battles ® June 1941 vol. after the second volume of the monograph by V.N. Svishek, The Beginning of the Great Fatherland. bathroom war" (19). The author follows and describes in detail the bond on the five fronts. Contrary to the assertions about the successful actions of the Soviet fleet at the beginning of the war, the cange shows failures (especially in the defense of Liepaja) and significant losses. The events on the Western Front are considered in particular detail.

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a special paragraph is devoted to the defense of the Brest Fortress. In the first volume of his work, Svishev will highlight several of Stalin's main mistakes that led to the unfortunate start of the war with Germany for the Red Arinchal: an incorrect forecast of the attack on the main Ular by the Germans (it was assumed that it would be inflicted in the southwest; confidence that the war could be delayed until 19421: unpreparedness for the fact that the attack will be carried out without declaring war. In addition, the experience of military operations in Europe in 1939-1940 was not properly taken into account, and on the contrary, as the author claims, repeating the words of Zhukov, the experience was "too canonized the first world war "(19.7. 1, p. 421)" A great miscalculation and lack of plans to cover the border, - he continues, - was that they did not ensure the divisions of the first echelon occupying the defensive positions assigned to them near the border at sudden attack of the enemy. The enemy almost without hindrance to the Persian army captured almost all the fortified areas, with such difficulty created by the people's fiefs. The divisions of the first echelons, having received orders, after quick gatherings, often without artillery, moved along the border and entered the battle separately in random places" (19, 7.10, p. 424). Causes of the disaster padiogo



the front, according to Missin San: tsva, were: "a sudden attack is better than the enemy: poor communication; operational formation of the troops of the front; low aviation activity; ineffective combat admixture of powerful armored troops; the absence of anti-aircraft artillery in the troops, which called for collection in the area 115 km east of Minsk, from where [it] did not return; supplying the enemy with serviceable bridges across numerous rivers; deployment of the 6th and 42nd rifle divisions in the Brest Fortress; shortcomings of hand-flight by the DG troops. Pavlov, VI. Kuzisov, A. A. Korobkov" (9. vol. frott. Particular attention is paid to the reasons for the failures of the Red Army: according to the author, they "mainly were the result of mistakes and miscalculations in the preparation of the country to repel aggression. The political leadership of the USSR openly flirted © with a potential aggressor, which misdirected and demoralized a significant part of the leadership of the Red Army The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff, ignoring the real development of the military-political situation, did not provide

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readiness of the western military districts to repulse the aggression of the enemy" (17, 6.417).

The theme of military actions in the western strategic direction will be continued by the work of the same name by V.V. Abaturova (1)'. Kinga covers the period © June 1941 to December 1942. The author examines in detail the course of such operations as the border battle of the Western Front, the Battle of Smolensk, the battle near Moscow, the battles on the Rzhev-Vizemsky ledge in 1942. They knew their results, the reasons for the successes of the Wehrmacht and the Red army, analyzes the mistakes of the Soviet teaming.

"It should also be noted the trules of A.V. Isasva. The monograph "From Dubno to Rostov" (9) analyzes the military operations of the Red Army in the southwestern strategic direction from June to December 1941. The later king "Five circles of hell. The Red Army in "boilers" (10), which is mainly devoted to the largest Wehrmacht operations to encircle Soviet troops in July-August 1941, has much in common with previous work and develops the main ideas. Isaev, in particular, in detail considers such events as the tank battle near Brodami, the boom on the outskirts of Leningrad, the encirclement of the troops of the South-Western Front near Kiev, the beginning of Operation Typhoon (the disaster near Vyazma), the Soviet counteroffensive near Tikhvin and Rostov. Both studies included combat documents of the Soviet troops (both published and archival), memoirs of participants in the events, as well as German documentary

publications and memoir literature. The strength of the work of A.V. Esasva is, first of all, a scrupulous examination of the factite material: in two books and a number of the most important "on the front. The author actively draws on German sources, which is an important tag on the way to overcoming the well-known one-sidedness that is characteristic of our historical literature. In the book "From Dubno to Rostov" (9) The example of the South-Western and Southern fronts very clearly shows the mechanics of the border battles of the Red Army, including the reasons for their successful outcome for the USSR, despite the fact that the Red Army has the superiority over the Wehrmacht in terms of the number of aircraft and especially tanks. reasons for the defeat of Soviet mechanisms

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of the roving corps, the author will first of all highlight their ineffective organization and the ash-light priming, which made the huge armored armadas an easy target for enemy tanks and artillery

At the same time, Isaev's general conclusions, especially those of an appraisal nature, look less convincing, because, despite the positivist approach "from facts to conclusions" he declares, he relies so much on factual material as on a number of well-established Soviet stereotypes; among the latter should be named, first of all, stubbornly defending the car

Tori is a disdainful and distrustful attitude towards defense, which supposedly by definition means a complete transfer of the initiative to the enemy and puts the defending side in a knowingly helpless position. It is interesting that Isaev is persistently trying to explain the failures of the Red Army in 1941 mainly by objective factors - first of all, by a too belated decision to start a strategic deployment and by the fact that the active use of large tank formations by the Germans allegedly completely deprives the Soviet side of any possibility to predict in advance the direction of the enemy's eye strike in the next battle and made the encirclement of Soviet troops near Kiev, Vyazma, Brash and others. practically inevitable, "The main cause of both the catastrophes of the zygust of October 1941 and the collapse of the "blitzkrieg" on the outskirts of Moscow, the author concludes, is primarily a consequence of the effective actions of the enemy" (10, p. 389). Isaev is clearly trying to remove from the Stalinist leadership a significant part of the responsibility for the outcome of the first battles of the Patriotic War. This is facilitated by his

inattention to non-

'history - first of all to the vosino-doctrinal lips

tips of the Soviet military-political leadership, the mentality of the theta of the fighters and commanders of the Red Army and its influence on the general style of actions of the Soviet troops. The author does not attach significant importance to Stalia's stubborn desire to surrender the already doomed Kiev to the Germans, moreover, he justifies his hundredth position, affirming, "the loss of a political face with the surrender of Kisk was absolutely not worth the advantages that the surrender of KiUR" and the construction of defense strictly according to frontier of Disir" (9, p. 597). Besides, he's a fact. chesky ignores the vicious "routing" military doctrine

3 knelskny fortified area. - Note ref. h

The USSR with its lack of understanding of the significance of defensive and retreating actions (including strategic defense, mobile defense and timely withdrawal of troops from under attack), as well as the not-so-perverse ideological directive "not to give the enemy an inch of land without a fight" - although it was precisely this that became one of the main riches, for example, the defeat of the Soviet troops near Vyazma. Continuous formation of new units and formations throughout the summer-autumn campaign of 1941: instead of the divisions that perished in more and more cauldrons, the esomienio, which played its part in the failure of the Barbarossa plan, seems to Isasw not as a primitive strategy of "throwing the enemy with corpses", but rather as a modern technology of "permanent mobilization",

One of the heaviest defeats of the Red Army in 1941 - the Vyazemsky disaster - is dedicated to the work of the same name. L. Lopukhovsky (11). The book was born from the natural desire of the son to know the fate of his father, who was listed as missing in October 1941 by Paul Vyazma. The result was a lobrotnos scientific study based on archival documents (Soviet and German) and eyewitness accounts. The author believes that the encirclement near Vyazma is one of the most terrible tragedies of the Patriotic War, comparable in scale and consequences to the defeat of the Western Front in June-July 1941 1 and the Kyiv cauldron. As a result of gross miscalculations by the Soviet commanders (this, according to Lopukhovsky, was the reason for the later suppression of the extent of the defeat), four armies, 37 divisions, nine tank brigades, 31 artillery regiments of the RGK were in the ring; irretrievable losses of the Red Army exceeded 380,000 people

The actions of certain types of armed forces of mrol search

The work of J. Driga (#) is devoted to a short period (the second half of 1940 - the first half of 1941) of the history of the tank troops of the Red Army, when their highest organizational unit was the mechanized corps. The book is the only

iklopedia mechanized corps. It provides information on the organizational structure, command staff, the formation of tank units and formations, the availability of equipment and weapons, and describes in detail the combat path of each mechanized corps. The author pays special attention to

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actions of mechanized corps in the first years of the war, their participation in the battle for Dubno, Lutsk, Broly in June 1941, the Lepsi counterattack (July 1941). The appendices contain brief biographies of the commanders and information about the departments of command and control of the tactical troops. these are the divisions of the cavalry and other persons, related to mechanized corps, including less important catfish, whoever. Russian history of tank troops To the main pricha bast. The smashing of the Soviet mechanized corps by the Germans in a frenzy of 1941, in addition to the favorable barking of Krasaya Arzon, the congestion also attributes the incompleteness of the formation of mechanized corps to the strategic situation in the Western Theater. the inefficient organization of ropetainic units and adhesions (other armies faced this problem at different times), the Germans' failure to mobilize mechanized corps, as well as the inability of commanders at all levels of ef. effective to use such units and send in battle, especially defense and during retreat

The monograph by D. Khazanava "The Battle for bo 19415 C", the basis of the ora was made up of little-colored orchoan materials and vospo: aniya of the Patriotic War. is dedicated to the struggle for tospodstvo in the air la zozhom and ssvsraom faaingh soveneno: the Toryap front in the summer of 1941 The story is told against the backdrop of transanose battles, spreading on the ground on the distant and blunt fields to Kisvu and Lelishgral. Sun on the South-Western Front during the border battle, hostilities @ Right-Bank Ukraine and the Kiev Defense Operation. The second part describes the Terish plans for the capture of Lennigraa and the destruction of the Baltic Fleet,

played before and at the beginning of the war, bosses

to eat in the sky over the Northern capital in the field in August 1941 and the results A separate ava is dedicated to the Svityabrsky note - "in pemcea pa Lepiigral and the massive Luftaffe and Kronitalt © with the aim of destroying the main forces of the Baltic photo will come to the conclusion that a special review of the successes achieved so far, which put the defenders of Cromitalt in a plight, nevertheless, they managed to take advantage of their opportunities: in the future, such bugs did not repeat such bugs

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In the next monograph, D.B. Khazanoka "The Struggle for Dominance in the Air" (22)! In addition to these events, air battles in the first weeks of the Patriotic War, the first air raids of the Red Army on Finland and Romania, and the reflection of German raids on Moscow are also considered.

The main reasons for the failure of the Soviet Air Force in the summer wasp campaign of 1941 against Khazapov's miemia included even the lack of German strikes on Soviet airfields in the first years of the war and the lack of the latest aircraft in Soviet air units, and the low combat skills of pilots, the inability of commanders and staffs to establish interaction of aviation © with ground troops and to concentrate all efforts on the necessary directions. The dispersal of forces was also facilitated by the division of aviation into front-line and army aviation. "The main advantage of the enemy," the author writes in a bold manner, "was

to as aviation equipment, in clear control, good interaction of units and connections between each other and with ground forces" (22, ©. 512-513). The certain weakness of the Soviet industrial base also played its part.

"The events of 1941 are also touched upon in the monograph by E. Brooks (International Institute for Strategic Studies, Great Britain) "Air War over Russia" (28), dedicated to the confrontation between the Luftwaffe and the Red Army Air Force in 1941 1945. The author, in particular, does not consider the excess of aircraft of outdated designs to be the cause of the failures of Soviet aviation in the first period of the Patriotic War. Rather, in his opinion, it played a role

the inability of the Soviet command to effectively use the available strength.

The war on the Baltic Sea is considered in the monograph by A.L. Chernysheva "1941 in the Baltic: a feat and a tragedy" (23). The author scrupulously analyzes the military operations of the Baltic Fleet, the reasons for its successes and failures, the results of the operations carried out, and analyzes the mistakes of the Soviet homaplovatnya. First chapter laugh. the history of the Baltic Fleet in the interwar period, including the restoration of the naval forces of the Baltic Sea after the Civil War and their gradual build-up in 19205 (January 11, 1935, it was renamed the Beautifully Illuminated Baltic Fleet). The state of the fleet on the eve of the Nazi aggression is also analyzed. In subsequent chapters, the author considers the beginning

"see abstract from 109 marry compilation 5

military operations in the Baltic, the defense of Libana, Riga, the Mooisunleki Islands, the breakthrough of the main forces of the fleet from Tallinn surrounded by pomps to Kronstadt, its participation in the defense of Leningrad and the Orann Seabaum bridgehead, the Luftwaffe raids and Kronstadt in September and, finally, the evacuation of the Hanko guard zone on October 23, December 1941. The main reason for the difficult situation in which the Baltic Fleet found itself in 1941 was the deep retreat of the Red Army, in a short time more than all its bases beyond the turn of Leningrad and Kronstadt; moreover, as a result of the successful arrival of emisvs, not only the northern - Finnish - coast of the Gulf of Finland, but also the south - Estonian coast, turned out to be under the control of the enemy, which greatly complicated the fleet's flight. Another serious problem was the acute shortage of minesweepers, despite the fact that "the only naval theater of the Second World War was not mined so "densely" as the Gulf of Finland" (23, ©. 363). There was also no means to fight © mapite mips - devices for demagnetizing suls and demagnetized minesweepers. Under these conditions, other problems of the Baltic Fleet became especially acute: the general weakness of the ship composition, the lack of a number of special ships, unfinished bases, gaps in combat training. and errors of command. Nevertheless, the author emphasizes that, despite the exceptionally difficult conditions and heavy losses, the Baltic Veil managed to achieve a number of obvious successes in 1941: a hundred combat core, ships of the eye, were saved. Provided effective ogian support to the defenders of Leningrad, the evacuation of the Hanko garrison was relatively successful

Was Krasin

(Rmenia ready for war?

The question of whether the Krasizia army was ready for war with Germany in 1941 remains the subject of lively discussions, especially in the context of disputes about the "problem of superior ular". were not subject to special analysis. Under these conditions, any judgments on our subject suffer from inevitable subjectivism. This problem is pointed out, in particular, by M.I. Melpokhov, according to whom "the question of the real combat capability of the Red

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mission on the eve of the war, it is waiting for its own researcher "(14, p. 335)" It should also be taken into account that our assessments of the combat readiness of the Red Army in 1941 are based, among other things, on our knowledge of the course and results of military operations in 1941- 1945 and, consequently, should not at all necessarily coincide with the assessments that were common in the Kremlin and among the Soviet military leaders in the pre-war years. The Red Army is not ready for war, and, the speaker, could not plan an attack on Germany; this point of view is defended, for example, by L.A. Bezymensky (4) and A.S. Orlov (16, e. 391-393) , and also, with some

reservations, C. Bellamy (28) "DE. Murphy (35). V.N. Svishchev (19, vol. 1), on the contrary, considers it wrong (and even harmful) to try to present our country as unprepared for war, weak, backward and poorly armed. In his opinion, he proves that by 1941 the Red Army was not inferior to the Wehrmacht in terms of technical equipment, and in many respects (first of all, in the number and quality of aircraft and tanks) even exceeded a hundred. At the same time, the country's defense capability was severely undermined by repressions in the army: "As a result of repressions, such qualities as initiative and a creative approach to business were only weakened by the leadership, but there were also natural feelings of lack of confidence, suspicion of their colleagues, fear and high demands to the civilians" (19, vol. 1, p. 381). The author also considers the lack of qualified commanders by June 1941 to be the result of repressions. Loshkov (12) also disputes the idea that the USSR was not ready for a war with Germany: in economics, and in Tochi. Physically and morally, the level of readiness for a major war by June 1941 was quite high, and propaganda among the army commanders in 1939-1941 was organized in a "bashing" spirit. In his opinion, it is necessary to recognize the political and strategic miscalculations of Stalin on the eve of the beginning of the SS, as well as the fundamental shortcomings of the Stalinist system, in which the solution of all the most important questions was closed to one person, in his opinion, as the reasons for the failures of the Red Army in the first months of the war. V.A. Runov in his work (17) first of all notes that it is not enough to have a strong army in order to defeat the enemy - one must also possess the art of war, which, as shown in

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book, the Soviet commanders at the beginning of the war did not have: "The rightful beginning of the Great Fatherland! be considered not only from the standpoint of the presence and balance of forces and means, as many modern researchers do, but also from the side of the presence of the supreme art of using them in battle and opera (17, p. 9). doing comparative anal

team preparation. composition of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, he draws attention to their

a strong difference: "In the Hermapian Aryn, over 85% of the military commanders of the highest ranks had an academic education, 90% of the officers in the ranks of the company-regiment were graduates of ox schools" (17, <. 413). In the Red Army, on January 1, 1941, only 7.1% of commanding officers had a higher education, "55.9% had a secondary education, 24.6% had an accelerated education, 12.4% had no military education" (17. p. 413). The low qualifications of foreign tank pilots and the inexperience of commanders are also noted. Very negatively

pompous in two directions: around the question of interpreting its goals and motives (whether Stali was a communist, pragmatic-pacationalist, traditionalist, etc.) and around questions of a purely evaluative nature (whether Stalin's intervention and military policy were justified or erroneous, criminal, immoral or, on the contrary, met at least the interests of the population of the USSR), Naturally, the answers to these questions are often determined not only (and not even so much) by the factual

settings of individual authors.

J. Lukacs, in particular, belongs to the number of researchers who consider the Soviet "leader" more of a pragmatist-nationalist, or rather a Marxist fanatic. In his work (22), he comes to the conclusion that Stalin in the 1930s and early 1940s was guided not so much by communist as by etatiist ideology; this position, in turn, prejudiced his turn to nationalism and imperialism. A similar point of view is also defended by M.I. Meltyuokhov (14), according to whom the determining motive in Stalin's actions was the former

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primarily national political considerations, while communist ideology played a secondary role,

A.L. Safrazyan (18), on the contrary, insists that the policy of both the Soviet Union and the Third Reich was conditioned precisely by ideological considerations; this did not include pragmatic solutions (for example, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact), but only as a temporary measure on the way to achieving the final goal. DE. Morphy (39) also suggests that Stalin's desire "to achieve the exhaustion of the capitalists of the imperialists in the howling manifestation of communist ideology, and not the pragmatic Queneau,

A number of authors, for example, O.V. Vishlev (5) and A.V. Isaev (9, 10), openly justify Stalin's policy. Among its actual defenders is M.I. Meltyukhov, according to whom there was nothing reprehensible in Soviet expansionism (including the Molotov Ribbsitrop Pact) (14, p. , pp. 370-371), and the victory of the USSR as a result of an attack on Germany would be a boon for the whole world (14, p. 382),

Some authors criticize only individual decisions of Celia. Thus, S. Orlov (16) agrees that the secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact are "immoral, illegal and invalid." Nevertheless, on the whole, the non-aggression pact with Germany, according to him, was a boon for the USSR, since it moved the country's borders further to the west. Balancing the Stalinist regime with the Nazi Orlov considers it unreasonable. V.N. Svshchev in his work notes that it was Stalin who was primarily responsible for the repressions in the army, which greatly undermined the defense capability of the USSR on the eve of the war. In addition, to the reasons for the failures of the Red Army in the summer-Ossiis campaign of 1941, he dated. bears a whole range of political and strategic mistakes made by the "leader". Nevertheless, according to Swiszek, "Stalin's guilt in mass repressions in response to party, state and military cadres does not detract from his hundredth role in creating the world's first socialist state and achieving victory in the Great Patriotic War, which turned out so badly" (19, vol. 1, p. 383). "This duality of the personality of Iosif Vissariopovich," the author continues, "is a manifestation of the features of that 'difficult time'" (19.1. 1, pp. 383-384).

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AO. Chubaryai, analyzing the Soviet policy in 1939 - the first half of 1941, consistently substantiates the immorality of the actions of the Stalinist leadership. In his work (24) he argues that Stalin's decision to conclude an agreement with Germany was not dictated by the fear of being drawn into a major war; against. The motives of the Soviet side were quite cynical: Hitler, seeking at any cost to ensure the neutrality of the USSR in the upcoming German-Polish war, offered Moscow deliberately more seductive conditions (the division of Eastern Europe and the return to the zone of Soviet influence of territories that were previously part of the Russian Empire). ). than she could get out of the negotiations with Britain and France. The treaty < Germany in such a situation simply seemed to Stalin the most profitable and reliable. Analyzing the process of concluding agreements on mutual assistance with the Baltic countries, the author shows the extremely harsh, ultimatum nature of Soviet demands, the absence on the Soviet side of any desire for a mutually beneficial compromise. He also notes that the elections to the parliaments of Estovin, Latvia and Lithuania, held under Soviet pressure in the summer of 1940, followed the Soviet model, those. on a non-alternative basis, with one candidate, which largely predetermined their favorable results for the Soviet side. The book also mentions that among the main arguments discussed in Tallinn, Riga and Kaunas in 1939-1940 in favor of the adoption of co. The actual impossibility of the eye also belonged to the Soviet requirements. to create armed resistance to Soviet pressure, and the transition to the Soviet zone of influence and subsequent accession to the USSR was perceived as a choice of the lesser of two evils in comparison with the danger posed by Germany. Using numerous examples, Chubaryan shows that the pro-German orientation of Soviet foreign policy in 1939-1940 was clearly excessive; such measures as the conclusion of a treaty of friendship with the Nazi Reich, the curtailment of anti-fascist propaganda, moreover, the transition to public justification of Nazism as an illusion and the reorientation of the communist parties to actual support were even necessary from the point of view of

The USSR in the rampant World War II. On the contrary, while establishing increasingly close ties with Germany, the Soviet Union to a certain extent became a hostage to its policy. missing the opportunity to "balance" the improvement in a timely manner

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relations © her with the development of ties with the Anglo-French bloc and the "USA. In the aftermath, this only played into the hands of Hitler, who

after the defeat of France in 1940. he no longer needed Soviet support as much as in 1939 and could afford to act, taking into account the position of the USSR.

A similar point of view is shared by L.A. Bezmensky (4). The DE also assesses Stalin's policy very critically. Morphy. (9). DM. Glantz in his kimge "Barbarossa" considers the Soviet "offensive" doctrine as one of the reasons for the catastrophic defeats of the Red Ditch in the summer-autumn of 1941. (29, p. 16,206).

J. Roberts, describing in his work (36) misses, do! given by Stalin on the eve and at the beginning of the Patriotic War, he also notes "the ability to learn from his mistakes: by the autumn of 1942, he began to listen to his toners much more willingly, which allowed him to continue the war with greater success, if not in the previous months. This, and also the fact that Stalin, in spite of all sorts of miscalculations, nevertheless managed to avoid the complete defeat of the USSR in the war with Germany in 1941, prompts the author to give the Soviet dictator as a military leader a generally positive assessment. Moreover, Roberts believes that in the conditions of the totalitarian system created by Stalin, only Stalin himself could truly effectively lead the Soviet Union in a total war. The author specifically stipulates that such assessments should be regarded as a justification for the Stalinist crimes, but allow a deeper understanding of the very phenomenon of the Stalinist system, its complex and contradictory nature and equally complex and contradictory consequences.

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Nevezhin V.

"IF TOMORROW ON A CAMPAIGN...": PREPARATION FOR WAR AND IDEOLOGICAL PROPAGANDA IN THE 30s-40s;  
M: YAUZA: EKSMO, 2007. - M7.

(Abstract)

doctor of historical sciences professor V.A. Nek zkan (Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences), written on the basis of a large array of previously published archival materials. devoted to the activities of Soviet propaganda organs before German attack on the USSR. The author refers to his goals as an attempt to "expand and concretize the idea of the organizational foundations of Soviet propaganda of the second half of the 1930s - early 1940s, to show the real significance of the leading personnel and key performers involved in it, who controlled, ruled and carried out the campaign: the main action to prepare the population for the war" (6.39-40). The book consists of an introduction, six chapters and a conclusion.

1. The first chapter analyzes the historiography of the problem, times

In the Soviet period and discussions at the turn of the XX-XXI century, research tasks are defined. Speaking about the Soviet period of the historiography of the topic under study, Nevezhin notes that until the early 1990s, the decisive influence from the content of studies of the process of the USSR's ideological preparation for war was exerted by "unlimited political and ideological domination of the ruling Communist Party" (p. 15). He gives the period of Soviet historiography by stages: 1) before 1940 — until 1950s; 2) 1956 - mid-1960s; 3) 1965-1985; melting was developed in domestic historiography, according to  
— 1991 The emergence of a serious scientific interest in

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the end of ideological control. Even at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, works continued to be produced in which "the strength of the party of the late 1990s in the ideological sphere was considered exclusively from positive positions" (p. 27).

The 1990s became a turning point in the national history

historiography, since "the departure from the political arena of the CPSU led to

'overcoming the ideological control of the ruling party over the nebulous studies, including the fall of historical science' (ibid.). The process of formation of post-Soviet historiography began, which was distinguished by the presence of pluralism in methodology and new approaches to the presentation of the events of the 1930s. The question of the role of Soviet propaganda in the ideological preparation of the "USSR for war" began to be truly studied only in the second half of the 1990s, when "thanks to the introduction into circulation of new and deeper analysis of already known sources, as well as in - in the atmosphere of pluralism of the 1990s, the process of revising the previously established views of the past began" (p. 38).

In the second chapter, V.A. Nevezhin gives a general description of the propaganda of the second half of the 1930s, analyzes its main structures and the role of the "human factor" in it - leaders and performers. The Soviet propaganda system was rigidly centralized. In August 1939, the relevant structural units of the Central Committee were merged into the Propaganda Directorate and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (UAP), which was supposed to lead propaganda and agitation in the USSR and engage in theoretical training of party and government officials. Initially, the department consisted of five departments, but later its structure became more complicated, and the number of employees increased. By decision of the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1939, in district committees, city committees, district committees, regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics created military departments.

The "political and propaganda potential of the periodical press" was highly appreciated (p. 54). In order to strengthen censorship, the press department of the UPA was enlarged, which, in addition to performing the functions of control over print publications and publishing houses, supervised the work of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) and the Main Directorate for Literature and Publishing Houses (Glanlit). In January 1938, it was approved about 1600 censors of district pallets and about 230 censors of city, regional and republican newspapers. A special institute of political editors was created,

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who checked the work of psizors. "The greatest means of mass agitation" was considered cinema. Raliovshchanis also played an important role. The ruling regime also attached great importance to the leadership of literature and art. It was the writers, for whom Stalin was unfailingly great, "in many respects contributed to his exaltation" (p. 60).

Much attention was paid to political work with the personnel of the armed forces. Its general leadership was at the behest of the Political Directorate of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (PU RKKA), which had a publishing base. As the author notes, "the army periodical press played a leading role in popitico-propaganda work" (p. 62). Since May 10, 1937, the institute of military commissars existed in the army, serving in all military units. And as part of the department of leading party bodies of the PU of the Red Army, there was a special department for studying the political and moral state of the commanding staff

Stalin personally exercised control over the party's propaganda, and one hundred personnel policy was associated with the goal of eliminating the potential threat from his ideological opponents (for example, through repression) and establishing himself as the sole dictator. In the 1930s and early 1940s, propaganda structures adopted the fundamental statements and instructions of Stalin, as well as the speeches of his closest collaborators. So, one of the axis conductors of Stalin's ideas was the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V.M. Molotov, prominent figures were M.I. Kalinin, A.A. Zhdanov, A.S. Shcherbakov. A wave of political repression, writes V.A. Nevezhin, si contributed to the pagistanization of "seeing the wisdom of blue fear." When boys and responsible persons "suddenly disappeared" from their posts, propaganda structures were replenished with educated people, but completely incompetent in the field of propaganda, or even poorly educated and uncultured. State censorship also did not escape repression. And in 1938, the problem of non-community of the political composition of the Red Army was raised, which is directly related to the "cleansing" of the army ranks in 1937-1938. Under the Stalinist regime, there was a specific perception of propaganda attitudes. She

depended not only on

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different from the intellectual level and the life experience of their minds. Sometimes those people who were supposed to spend their lives on party instructions found "a gap between propaganda declarations and everyday realities, were imbued with somienie and gradually turned into "politically unreliable" (p. 7). Nevertheless, the system of pro- tada prepared by Stalin and his comrades-in-arms created "the conditions for the stable functioning of the tiyio-propagailist machine" (p. 88).

The third chapter analyzes the metamorphoses of the "general resurrection" against the background of the words and deeds of the Bolshevik leadership. The author cites the position of Stalin, according to which the probability of unleashing a war of the capitalist countries against the USSR was not excluded. Stalin viewed the war "as a way out of the political and economic crisis for capitalism" (p. 91). Based on Stalin's position, the entire foreign world (the capitalist encirclement) posed a threat to the USSR. In connection with this, the Soviet leadership was aware of the need to strengthen the defense capability of their country. But, according to the author, with the benefit of

In favorable conditions, the possibility of launching offensive military operations against the "capitalist encirclement" at the initiative of the Soviet side was not ruled out (p. 114).

In 1938, 1939<sup>11</sup>. Krasnaya aryna passed combat tests near Asra Khasai and on the Khalkhin River. Goal. The events at Lake Khasan are interpreted differently in historiography. According to one version, Tokyo accused Moscow of violating the state border in the Far East and began hostilities; on the other, the Soviet side led to the unleashing of an armed conflict with Japan. The Soviet troops succeeded in defeating the Japanese, but, as Ator notes. The propagandist significance of the events at Lake Khasan was sometimes overly exaggerated" (ŷ. 121).

In mid-1939, a new Soviet-Japanese conflict broke out on the Khalkhin-Gol River (the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic), Japan intended to capture the eastern ledge of Mongolian territory, located between the border with China and the Khalkhin-Gol River. In May 1939, the Chiopians invaded MIR territory. Since March 12, 1936, the Soviet-Mongolian protocol on mutual assistance was in force, on the basis of which the Soviet Voni contingent entered the territory of Mongolin and began to fight against the Japanese. On the eve of the conflict, Soviet political workers were glad

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were repressed, the leading positions of the political department during the war remained vacant. Despite this, the head of the RKKA 13 PU, Mehlie, urged not to weaken propaganda work in the units. However, the lack of qualified translators, translators-refersites and officers-oriental officers was acutely appalled. The main drawback was that the propagandist officers were not familiar with the national psychology of the enemy troops, they had no idea about the degree of their redigosity and devotion to the monarch"(p. 130)

The fourth chapter is devoted to the Soviet propaganda of 1939-1940, concerning Poland and Finland. According to the secret protocol: stake to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the USSR and Germany took on the issue of the opportunism of preserving the independence of the Polish state. After the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. The USSR "began to prepare for practical steps to develop the range of the "spheres of state interests" specified in this protocol in Eastern Europe" (p. 156). The author notes that even before the occupation of the Red Army of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus on September 17, 1939, Soviet propaganda structures "received instructions from the top leadership on the key in which the Aitipol political and ideological campaign should be conducted" (p. 160). Soviet propaganda needed to create a dual image of Poland. The reactionary Polish government, hostile to the USSR, had to be contrasted in the minds of Soviet citizens by Ukrainians and Byelorussians oppressed by them, who were waiting for Moscow's help. The sharp difference between the "depressed" (Poles) and the "oppressed" (Belarusians, Ukrainians) nations was especially emphasized. Largely due to propaganda, the personnel of the Red Army agreed to fulfill the order to release the "guttred brothers" - Belarusians and Ukrainians. "Isagress in states, about "war provocateurs", who "are accustomed to stoking the heat with the wrong hands", etc. ite (ŷ. 168),

According to the author, the "hard sobering up" of the USSR occurred in connection with the Soviet-Finnish war. In the conditions of the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet Union and Finland formally declared their neutrality. At the same time, the annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus to the USSR, as well as prisoners

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In Moscow in early 1939, treaties © by Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia upset the balance of power in the Baltic in favor of the USSR. And Germany considered. redundant" intervention in the Soviet-Finnish Lela. Stalin, trying to get concessions from xx, offered Helsiiki to sign an agreement, evil

agreements with other Baltic states. Om would mean the creation of Soviet military bases and the deployment of Voris contingents on the territory. rhetoric of Finland, so the proposal was rejected. This and other initiatives of the Soviet government led to the breakdown of the Soviet-Finnish negotiations, the Soviet-Fin war, anti-Soviet campaign in Finland and anti-Finnish campaign in the USSR. The main "message" for the deployment of a wide campaign in Finland was Molotov's appeal to Soviet citizens on November 29, 1939, in which he claimed that the government of Finland pursued a policy hostile to the USSR, organized provocations on the border, etc. Propaganda slogans changed depending on the situation on the Finnish front. If the Red Army found itself in a difficult situation, offensive slogans changed to liberation ones. Having suffered huge losses in this war, the Stalinist leadership was able to turn the tide and on March 12, 1940 concluded a peace treaty with Finland. Already after its signing, in the speeches of Stalin's associates and in propaganda materials, "regret about the loss was expressed that the Finnish territory was not completely occupied" (p. 212). Victory against Finland was a serious test not only of the Red Army's ability to fight, but also of the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda. The "viciousness of the former attitudes about the military weakness of a potential enemy, the calculation for lightning-fast combat actions "little blood on foreign territory" was manifested, "the ideas of ideological support for the "export" of the revolution to Finland failed" (p. 215).

The fifth chapter analyzes the activity of the Soviet pro-state bodies in the wake of the German attack on the USSR. In March-April 1940, the Central Committee of the VKI (6), together with the military and political leadership, launched a broad campaign to study the experience of the Winter War. In the course of these events, great attention was paid to the problems of propaganda, agitation and ideology, People's Commissar of Defense Marshal K.E. Voroshilov was forced to admit that the military department was not sufficiently serious about all measures related to the preparation of military operations.

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And Stalin considered that "adapting to the difficult conditions in which the Red Army campaign against Finland unfolded was prevented first by the "shock psychology" that arose as a result of euphoria from the Zimol campaign of 1939." (p. 217). He noted that modern warfare requires politically literate, persistent and yawning political workers.

The work on summarizing the results of the Winter War was carried out by a number of commissions, including the commission of the Chief Military Chairmanship Voroshilov, created on April 21, conclusions were drawn that the Red Army has a weak history, especially Russian, the study of the experience of the armies of a possible opponent, theaters is unsatisfactorily delivered military action, etc. It was proposed to "get rid of" the cult of citizens' war", to eradicate the idea of the invincibility of the Red Army, to fight in every possible way "with arrogance, hatred moods" (p. 226).

Since the autumn of 1940, and especially after Molotov's trip to Berlin, the relations of the USSR with Germany became increasingly tense. The speeches of Stalin's comrades-in-arms aimed at understanding the complexity of the situation that had come together. Since the summer of 1940. Propaganda structures began to procure Zimol materials more actively. Talk began about the approaching war, there were rumors that the troops participating in the festive May Day parade would go to Minsk, Leningrad and from the Polish border" (p. 270).

The sixth chapter is devoted to the Soviet political and ideological campaign of May-June 1941. On May 5 of this year, Stalin attended a reception of representatives of the high command of the Red Army and the RKVMF, professors and graduates of the Eastern universities. He delivered in magpies: a minute speech devoted to the international situation and an assessment of the state of the combat capability of the Red Army with a brief description of the Wehrmacht. Stalin argued that "the process of rearmament of the Red Army was completed, as a result of which it became a modern army" (p. 273). He also listed the weaknesses of the Wehrmacht and the shortcomings of its military opponents. Part of his speech dealt with assessments of the further prospects for a world war. Stalin stated, in particular, that despite

Germany's successes are undeniable, the "great struggle" awaits. When asked about the invincibility of the German army, the leader answered sharply in the negative. He described the prospects for the further course of the war for Germany as bleak. At the end of the speech

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Stalin summed up his statements regarding the reasons for the success of Germany's actions in Europe. He made it clear that "it is necessary to exaggerate the strength and power of the German army, which won victories mainly due to military weakness and was prepared to fight its own against the first line = Fraitsin" (p. 277),

V.A. Nevezhin comes to the conclusion that Stalin is "in his own. speeches to the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army clearly sought to hide irritation (to say the least) from the military victories of the German army" (p. 279). His speech was a "message from above", which served as a signal for the termination of the political and ideological campaign under the slogan of an offensive war. An important role was also played by the publication of the "TASS Denial" dated May 9, 1941, which cited reports from foreign media about the military formations of the Red Army on the western borders of the USSR and it was argued that in reality no transfers of Soviet troops to the western borders were made. A continuation was the publication of Stalin's letter with an assessment of Engels' article "On the foreign policy of Russian tsarism", which emphasized the "falseness" of Engels' statements about the desirability of Russia's defeat in the coming armed clash with Germany. Measures were also taken to organize the filming of films on military subjects, etc. The author says that the smear campaign of 1941 did not take on large dimensions and did not reach its goal. He writes that strict secrecy was followed in the most difficult international situation" (p. 311). Ultimately, the kan was interrupted by the outbreak of war. Projects of directive materials

In conclusion, V.A. Nevezhin comes to the conclusion that "at the end of the 1930s - the beginning \_ of the 1940s, vols. an important milestone in the development of the Stalinist system as a whole and its propaganda mechanism in particular" (p. 312). During this period, propaganda was used as a kind of "transmission belt" between the political elite and society to solve important internal and external political problems of the country. The structure of the propaganda organs was very complex, but centralized and subordinated personally to Stalin. In the mid-1930s, a course was chosen for confrontation © with German Nazism, including in the ideological sphere. Odma

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However, in connection with the "friendship" between the USSR and Germany, the latter was portrayed in open propaganda as a potential enemy of the Soviet Union. On the eve of the German attack, a gap was revealed to the chalk by the "defensive" attitudes of the military leadership and the "offensive" attitudes propagated by the propagandist. The new political and ilsological campaign that began in May 1941 was interrupted by the German attack on the Soviet Union, and the propaganda offensive slogans "at the end of the lquia of 1941 were replaced by purely defensive ones" (p. 316).

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'Chubaryai A.O.

THE EVE OF A TRAGEDY: STALIN AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS: SEPTEMBER 1939 - JUNE 1941  
M: SCIENCE, 2008. - 476 p.

(Abstract)

Monograph of the Director of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences A.O. Chubaryaia is dedicated to one of the most complex and eponymous periods of Russian history — the eve of the Patriotic War.

wars 1941-1945 tg. Chubar'ai considers the goal of his research to be the introduction of new sources into circulation, rather a new interpretation of the material already accumulated by scientists, since most of the works on the issues under consideration that have appeared in recent years seem to him, although extremely valuable, but still excessively politicized and, as ollo-`ronpimi, The coverage of events in Kint begins in September 1939. when the Second World War broke out and the practical implementation of the provisions of the Soviet-German pact © the division of Eastern Europe between the Nazi Reich and the Soviet Union began. The author will return to this document in one way or another throughout his work, since until June 1941 "the shadow of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact hovered over all events, which practically determined Soviet policy during this period" (p. 16).

Olma, one of the main difficulties in studying Soviet politics in the late 1930s and early 1940s is, according to the author, that the key decisions in this area, as far as can be judged from the available evidence, were made by a narrow circle of people in led by Stalin without protocols and were not formalized in writing. Even when there were 'formal meetings of the Politburo', its decisions usually contained 'too general formulations; the details of their preparation, discussion and adoption remain available to researchers,

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Nevertheless, astvavast Chubaryan, "many zigzags of Soviet policy and the direct intentions of the leadership can be revealed from specific statements and actions of Stalin, Molotov and Soviet diplomats (p. 18).

The source base of the study was primarily the documents of the Soviet higher party and state bodies; The funds of the RGASII, GARF, the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, as well as myogochichiye 'documentary publications are used in the work. In addition, the author draws on various foreign sources, primarily documents from the diplomatic departments of Germany, Great Britain, France, and the USA. Documents of the Comintern constitute a separate group of sources. Sources of personal origin are also used; the author will highlight the diaries of G.M. Dimitrov, containing an extremely interesting material about the Soviet political "kitchen" in the period under study; used in the work and extensive memoir literature

\_Kiiga consists of a detailed vasion and 15 chapters, divided into two parts. The first part covers the period from September 1939 to the beginning of spring 19407. First of all, it traces in detail the process of developing a new political course of the USSR after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbeitrop Pact on August 23, 1939. The author analyzes the development of political and economic relations. relations between the Soviet Union and Germany, shows a sharp turn in the world from the turn in Soviet policy, The further development of relations between the USSR and Western democracies in the new conditions of the autumn of 1939 is also considered. Ukraine and Western Belarus, the conclusion of mutual assistance agreements with the Baltic republics, negotiations on the status of Turkey, the events of the Winter War.

According to the author, the persorication of Soviet foreign policy towards an agreement by Germany was outlined at the turn of 1938-1939 under the impression of Munich, which sharply increased Stalin's distrust of Great Britain and France and gave rise in the USSR to fear of collusion between them and the Third Reich. Initially, apparently, it was only a matter of adjusting the political course in order to "balance" contacts with Britain and France by developing relations with Germany. The ideological side of the problem from the very beginning was not given significant importance. "Stalinism," notes the author, "was characteristic

applied and very pragmatic approach to ideological ideas. As numerous examples show, Stalin easily changed ideological priorities if they did not correspond. There were one hundred general and often very practical plans for aspirations" (p, 26). The "signal" to Hitler was Stalin's speech at the 18th Congress of the CPSU (b) in March 1939. However, at a reception in Berlin in January of that year, Hitler "publicly and defiantly" talked to the Soviet ambassador, in contact with whom he did not enter into this " (p. 25) The desire for rapprochement. thus, it was boisterous as Germany prepared for the war with Poland. The situation changed in the summer of 1939, when Germany, in anticipation of harassing Poland, stepped up pressure on the USSR, trying to conclude a treaty as soon as possible on the most favorable conditions for it. Stalin continued the talks with Great Britain and France, however, according to the author's mission, none of the parties made sufficient efforts to bring them to a successful conclusion as soon as possible. Moreover, since the USSR was already in active negotiations with Germany on economic issues, it is unlikely that it would even admit the possibility of entering into a military alliance against Germany. It is interesting that the insistent demands of the Soviet sides about the passage of Soviet troops through the territory. in Poland and Romania, those. Even then the USSR was striving to strengthen its positions in Central and South-Eastern Europe, although historians do not yet have more definite data. In this situation, the question is no longer about "balancing" relations with England and France with relations with Germany, but about choosing between them, moreover, the Germans, it seems, did not hide from the Soviet side that they would fall to Poland very soon. At the same time, Hitler offered the "Soviet Union the actual division of Eastern Europe, which would mean such a strengthening of the position of the USSR that he could not even dream of in the 1920s and 1930s. Thus, Stalin, apparently, chose the agreement with Germany as more beneficial and liege, not caring about the ' The author shows that, since the the issue of Germany was a clear conclusion of the pact with the legal and moral aspects of expectation for the Soviet leadership (it does not depend on who actually first came up with the very idea of "spheres of interest" ), a plan for its implementation, including a new position in relation to the Baltic countries, had to be developed literally "on the go", in the conditions of starting "

the war in Europe. On the other hand, in the autumn of 1939, Moscow did not yet plan to carry out the sovietization of the Baltic republics, considering the conclusion of mutual assistance agreements with them to be sufficient: And a measure for their involvement in the orbit of Soviet politics. The author notes, however, that already during this period, negotiations with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were carried out in an ultimatum tone, from a position of strength, without regard for their own partners in these countries. It is interesting that a scenario similar to the one in the Baltic region was apparently planned to be implemented in Finland, which was a good idea, because the latter, as Chubar'ai notes, was in a much better position than Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; As a result of this, as well as the hatred mood that prevailed in the Kremlin: Yes, the Winter War began, which not only resulted in great global casualties, but also (which, obviously, was more important for the Stalinist leadership) significantly undermined the prestige of the Soviet Union, exclusion from the League of Nations and serious difficulties in relations with France and Great Britain. Analyzing the course and results of the Soviet-German negotiations on September 27-28, 1939, which ended with the signing of the Friendship and Border Treaty on September 28, the author comes to the conclusion that "Stalin, a month after the signing of the non-aggression treaty with Germany, clearly crossed the path of purely diplomatic relations. <.> Moscow's congratulations on the occasion of the capture of Warsaw by the Germans and the joint military parade in Brest testified to the going beyond the necessary formalities and the course towards "rapprochement with the Nazi leadership" (p. 107). Describing further the Soviet-German relations in October 1939-February 1940, Chubaryan states that both sides acted extremely pragmatically, to the point of cynicism. Hitler sought to prevent the entry of the USSR into the war, to achieve more active anti-British actions from his side, and to receive large military supplies from him in the shortest possible time. Stalin pursued similar goals - to receive deliveries of German equipment and weapons in the shortest possible time and, if possible, to maintain his neutrality. At the same time, the German side could afford hints that the Soviet Union had already received quite a lot from cooperation with the Reich (meaning the Baltic States and before that Poland, in the war with which the Red Army almost did not participate, although the USSR received the Western Ukraine and Western Belarus), and reminders that Germany is at war and its economic opportunities

nothing; in fact, in this way, the Germans several times "put in their place" the Soviet lipomatists, and quite harshly, the USSR, for its part, no less severely pressed any attempts of the ger. Mansky intervention in the Baltic and Finnish Lela, relying

ya the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Nevertheless, according to Greekism, both sides were interested in helping each other and for the time being found compromising solutions.

In the final chapter of the first part, the author analyzes the changes in Soviet IDSologin and propaganda in the first half of 1940. whom course, it was not accompanied by a rejection of anti-fascist propaganda. However, at the end of August - beginning of September, the official ideology was radically revised, moreover, as noted. Often the author, in the current situation, Stalin chose the most extreme of the possible options, which suggested not only the field curtailment of anti-fascist and anti-German propaganda, but also the beginning of the actual justification of Nazi ideology, as well as the reorientation of the activities of foreign communist parties to the "struggle not against fascism, but against social -democracy, which crossed out all the achievements of the 1930s in the field of countering fascism jointly with the Social Democrats within the framework of the popular fronts. The author specifically notes that "such tactics, in addition to defamation of the Nitorss and the position of the Communist Parties, were to some extent also devoid of common sense, removing those forces in European countries that Moscow, on occasion, could use for its Nitores as a counterweight to Germany" (© .234). He is no less harshly criticized by the vengeful tendency to justify and defend the Nazi regime and its ideology, "Take on. to defend Hitlerism as an ideology," Chubaryn emphasizes, "was not only senseless and incomprehensible, but also extremely predictable for the Soviet Union itself" (p. 237),

The second part of the monograph is devoted to the events of May 1940-June 1941. The rapid defeat of France in May-June 19407 radically changed the situation in Soviet-Terman relations. In the current situation, Germany had to determine on.

management of further efforts: either the invasion of the British Isles, or the establishment of control over the Balkans, or war © the USSR, the crushing of which was still one of

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evil pslei of the Nazi regime. The Soviet side, on the other hand, found itself in a difficult position, since Stalin's previous idea of being "above the fray" and taking advantage of the war between the two goats of the capitalist countries could no longer be realized. Germany thus gained the opportunity to pursue a more decisive policy on in the east and south-east of Europe, regardless of the position of the USSR. This was understood by Moscow as well. According to the author, the decision of the Stalinist leadership on the final annexation of the Baltic states to the Soviet Union, as well as on rejection from Rumania, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, apparently, in the new conditions, the Soviet side sought to finally realize all the possibilities arising from the Molotov-Rieben Pact as quickly as possible, out of fear that in the future such steps might run into opposition from Germany. As subsequent events showed, However, as the introduction of German troops into Finland, which belonged to the Soviet "sphere of interest", these fears were not without foundation. The first chapter of the second part is devoted to the accession of the Baltic republics to the USSR. Further, the author examines in detail the development of tenseness in Soviet-German relations in the second half of 1940 - the first half of 1941, in particular, analyzes the results of Molotov's trip to Berlin, which determined the increase in the Kremlin's tension in Germany's tensions. It also describes the maneuvers in Londovo and Moscow's reaction to the prospects for Soviet-Ashglian relations. Considerable attention is paid to the confrontation between the great powers from the Balkans, where the belligerents' interests are increasingly mixed up.



sides. The concluding chapters discuss the major political efforts of the Soviet leadership and measures taken inside the country in connection with the parasitic threat of war with Germany. to the English Channel, and ended two months later: on July 21-22, the newly elected parliaments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania decided to ask the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. include spon countries in the Soviet Union as a union. republics, and on August 1-6, at a meeting of the 2nd session of the Supreme Council, this request was granted. Thus, the circulation of the three republics into the USSR was formalized as a voluntary

the initiative © of their own side, although it is obvious that such an outcome was in fact predetermined, since the elections on 14 July followed the Soviet model, on a non-alternative basis. At the same time, one cannot but admit that the positions of the left in the Baltics were quite strong during this period and part of the population was more sympathetic to the Soviet Union due to the difficult economic and political situation in the Baltic republics themselves. Germany in the summer of 1940 began to prepare an attack on the USSR; The Nazi leadership refused to invade the British Isles, limiting themselves only to massive air raids. Under these conditions, Berlin's policy towards Moscow was aimed primarily at "irritating Stalin's vigilance and squeezing everything that was possible out of cooperation with him" (©. 346). "As for Stalin and his entourage," the author continues, "perhaps they understood the real purpose of Hitler, but in practical terms right up to the end of 1940. approach relations with Germany more flexibly" (p. 346),

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Only the unsuccessful trip of Molotov to Berlin in November 1940, vol. report. clearly showed that the possibilities of further cooperation © Reich have been exhausted.

In the summer of 1940, Germany intensified its efforts in the Balkans, seeking to put this strategically important region under its control, ousting Great Britain and the USSR from it. Soviet diplomacy, from its heels, also tried to expand

After the defeat of Yugoslavia, the Balkash countries only came under the control of Germany, which thus secured a southern strategic flank in the future war of the USSR Rotis Great Britain's attempts to improve relations by the Soviet Union, during 1940 ^ the first half of 1941, ended in failure Moscow was clearly afraid of tearing up Berlin, and Stalin's pseudo-Anglophobia also showed. Tem. At the same time, Russian-Soviet contacts continued, and the next day after Germany's fall into the USSR, Churchill spoke of cooperation with him in the common struggle against Nazism. Mali is essentially a wait-and-see attitude. Soviet-Japanese

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Russian contacts were increased by the signing of the treaty on neutrality in April 1941; this gave Japan the opportunity to move to the south and made it easier to prepare for war against the United States, while the USSR ensured the relative security of its far eastern borders. At the turn of 1940-1941, the Soviet leadership, according to the author's mission, made a decision on mediocre preparations for a big war with Germany, while continuing to try to delay the conflict in order to complete the planned measures to rearm and reorganize the Red Army. However, the necessary measures to deploy troops and put them on alert were taken "about a significant delay; the author explains this by Stalin's confidence that in 1941 the war will be able to run.

Thus, in Chubaryan's opinion, throughout 1939 the USSR was pursuing, with \_ first half of 1941 certain reservations, a "real" political course, those. strove to realize his own imperial songs, not considering shi © international law, neither with morality, nor with the interests of other countries, nor with public opinion. Soviet-German

a non-aggression pact, moreover, accompanied by a secret protocol about times. "to serve interests" in Eastern Europe, and was not due to objective necessity: Stalin decided to improve relations with Germany at the turn of 1938-1939. Under the influence of Ribbentrop, and in August 1939. Hitler offered much more favorable conditions than could suggest London and Paris. The turning point in Soviet-German relations came after the defeat of France: now the Soviet Union could no longer take advantage of its former position "above the fray", and Germany could afford to act, not counting the Soviet Germans. Negotiations in Berlin in November 1940: they showed that the possibilities for peaceful relations finally exhausted, the Soviet leadership switched to some medium preparation for war until a very favorable moment. From fascism, and did not undertake any

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efforts to ensure that the partnership with Third Reich with constructive relations with Western democracies.

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Meltyukhov M.I.

STALIN'S MISSED CHANCE: BATTLE FOR EUROPE, 1939-1941 vols. (DOCUMENTS, FACTS, JUDGMENTS) - 3rd  
pl. correct and additional, - M.: VECHE, 2008, \_ 539 S.G. ill.

(Abstract)

'Fuplameital monograph M.I. Meltyukhova, who has gone through three editions over the past few years, is devoted to the foreign and military policy of the Soviet Union in 1939-1941. It is predominantly at the initial stage and, moreover, is complicated by the inertia of the theoretical half-moves that dominated the Soviet goals. Therefore, the main goal of the book is not so much the introduction of new documents into circulation as an unbiased analysis and comprehensive understanding of already known sources. For the same purpose, Meltyukhov tries to refrain from evaluative judgments, confining himself only to purely analytical tasks (reconstruction of the events themselves and their involved mechanics) and giving the reader the opportunity to determine his own assessments on his own. Considerable attention in the monograph is paid to the analysis of the points of view existing in science on various issues of interest to the author; thus, the study is at the junction of specific historical and historiographic genres,

The source base of the work was the documents of the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA), the Russian State Archive of Economics (RGAE) and the Russian State Archive in history (RGANI), as well as

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numerous documentary publications and memoirs of participants in the events.

The monograph consists of an introduction, 12 essays (chapter) describing various aspects of Soviet foreign and military policy in 1939-1941, and a conclusion. Each of the essays is a relatively independent work devoted to a specific problem. Melpokhov notes that, thus, "an attempt to consider different aspects of the history of this period predetermined some mosaicity of the study, which, as the author believes, will not interfere with a holistic perception of the problems considered in it" (p. 1). Kinga is supplied with rather voluminous appendices containing reference information about the Soviet armed forces during the 1930s - early 1940s and some others.

The first essay, "On the Road to War," describes the general development of international relations during the 1920s and 1930s. The author traces in detail the process of evolution of the Versailles-Washington system and its gradual disintegration, analyzes "these reasons. By the end of the 1930s, as a result of a number of serious foreign policy crises in Europe and Asia, this system actually ceased to exist, which, according to Meltyukhov, inevitably led to a global world war, since numerous conflicts of interest between the great powers made it impossible to reach a mutually acceptable compromise and build a new system of international relations through

'negotiations. The author does not touch upon the ideological, cultural and value foundations of foreign policy, limiting himself to an analysis of economic processes and geopolitical mechanisms.

In the second essay - "The Political Crisis of 1939" — the rapid aggravation of the international situation in the last pre-war months is considered, the process of formation of the Anglo-French-Polish and German-Italian coalitions is analyzed, among other things, the course of the unsuccessful Anglo-Franco-Ovstian

negotiations, as well as the Soviet-German rapprochement, culminating on August 23, 1939, with the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact,

The next three essays - "September 1939", "The Soviet Union and the struggle for the Scandinavian bridgehead" and "Building up the Soviet military presence in the Baltics" - are devoted to the Soviet Union. 'sky expansion in Eastern Europe in the autumn of 1939 - in the summer of 1940. based on this pact. The author focuses on the parallel

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In particular, only Soviet-Terman contacts during the Terman-Polish war, Soviet-Finnish negotiations in the autumn of 1939 in the spring of 1940, negotiations between the USSR and the Baltic republics, which culminated in the deployment of Soviet troops on their territory in 19397. and annex these countries to the Soviet Union in 1940. but also the fighting leistans of the Krasnaya Aryn in Poland and Filzhidia, as well as the preparatory measures of the Soviet side in case of war with the Baltic countries. The prehistory and history of the Soviet-Fiilaid (Winter) War and the subsequent development of Soviet-Finnish relations are considered against the general background of the struggle of the great powers for the strategically important Shanzitav region, including

It also includes the capture by the Germans of Danny and Norway and, in fact, the transition of Sweden to the zone of influence of Germany while formally maintaining neutrality.

The theme of Russian expansion will be explored in the essay "The Soviet Union and the Struggle for the Balkans". With the outbreak of World War II, the southeast of Eurola became the scene of fierce diplomatic and then armed confrontation between the Anglo-French, Termaio-Alyava coalitions and the USSR for influence in the retina. In this case, taking into account the general promise in the Eastern Mediterranean, the author to the Council. to whom the Union of Bessarabia and subsequent attempts by the Soviet di. diplomacy to expand its influence in the Balkan countries. Although these

washed and were not successful, Germany's attack on Yugoslavia, according to Meltokhov, was generally out of Mosk's hand, since it made reconciliation between the Third Reich and Great Britain practically possible. - the creation "of Germany, but rather, a hundred by the desire to contribute to the development of the alliance in the development of the German-Anglo conflict

The following essay, "Soviet Alliance between England and Germany," shows the development of relations in the triangle London: London = Berlin in the second half of 1939 - the first half of 1941 but Melpokhova, the Soviet higher policy in this period can be considered a complete success. howl: the USSR managed to quite effectively use the counter-reaction between the Anglo-French bloc and Germany to satisfactorily

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in the framework of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and at the same time continued to maintain, albeit very limited, contacts with London, which could be useful in case of war © Germany. In the late 1940s, the Soviet Union and Germany launched post-recent years preparations for a war between themselves; under these conditions, the activities of both Soviet and German diplomacy were aimed at "creating the most profitable leads to a settlement. initiative from the very beginning of the war" (p. 2210).

Four essays are devoted to the military policy of the USSR in the Pre-Democratic period. The essay "Soviet intelligence and the problem of a sudden attack" describes the activities of Soviet intelligence in 1939-1941. The author, in particular, shows that those who entered the information about the German military preparations was rather fragmentary and far from being so clear-cut about Hitler's intentions to commit aggression against the USSR, as is commonly believed. The Nazi disinformation campaign also played its part. Under these conditions, Stalin found more reliable those intelligence reports, from which it followed that in 1941 a German attack was unlikely. The essay "The Red Army Before the War: Organization and Personnel" gives a detailed overview of Soviet construction in the pre-war years. In the essay "Soviet military planning in 1940-1941," the author carefully analyzes the strategic, operational, mobilization plans and plans for covering the border that have been published to date, developed by the Makanutse of the war with Germany. His analysis shows that these plans © from the very beginning 'were sustained in a progressive spirit and are designed not to repulse an enemy attack, but to start a war on the initiative of the USSR. various materials are analyzed, mainly of a propaganda nature, which make it possible to understand how Moscow assessed the international situation, the situation on the fronts of the outbreak of World War II, transl. prospects for its further development, the possibilities of the belligerent states. According to Meltyukhov, these materials indicate that the Soviet leadership, contrary to the ideas widespread in

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Motto Germany and was quite confident in the capabilities of the Red Army. In recent months, followed by an Ismi attack, Soviet propaganda gradually began to prepare the population for a possible big fight with the Third Reich.

The last essay examines the motives of the Nazi leadership in preparing an attack from the USSR, briefly describes the development of plans for aggression and the subsequent deployment

sk, analyzes the balance of forces between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army from the Eastern Front by the morning of June 22, 1941.

Summing up the general results of his research, the author notes that "a consideration of the military and political problems of the eve of the Great Patriotic War against a broad background, taking into account the latest historiography and documents that have become available to researchers, shows that the concept of events created in the Soviet period 1939-1941 t.

modernization. First of all, I must get rid of the absolutely fantastic tale about a certain pathological peace-loving USSR "(©. 36), covered by Soviet propaganda. Meltyukhov insists that in the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet Union, under the slogan of "world revolution," actually pursued an imperialist foreign policy, seeking to regain the status of a great power and restore the positions lost by Russia as a result of the revolution and the Civil War. In the conditions of the spring of summer 1939, an agreement with Germany seemed to Stalin more profitable and reliable than an alliance with Great Britain and France, which led to the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, contained in the Convention on the Definition of Aggression of 1933 proposed names by the Soviet side (p. 371). The Baltic countries have agreements on

past help in 1939, as well as their final accession to the Soviet Union in 1940, were actually imposed by force, although Lelo did not come to an armed clash and formally the last word in both cases remained with the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which made it possible to declare their consent to Soviet conditions voluntary.

The author agrees with the existing point of view, according to which in 1939 Stalin hoped to use Germany to weaken Great Britain and France, so that under

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to find favorable conditions for the post-semi-Soviet invasion of Europe. From the second half of 1939, the Soviet armed forces and the economy actually began covert mobilization deployment, which, according to Melchon, can be considered as the official start of preparations for a future war with the Third Reich. Development strategic plans for a better war with Germany also began already in the autumn of 1939. The unexpectedly fast French armistice in 1940 frustrated the initial plans of the Soviet leadership. Germany received a dominant position in Western Europe, which significantly increased the likelihood of a military conflict between it and the USSR. Both sides launched immediate preparations for the war at the turn of 1940-1941, after the November negotiations in Berlin showed the impossibility of a new Soviet German compromise. From the fact that the war with Germany is being waged according to the USSR's policy. April in March. The event was scheduled on June 12th, might have been tolerably late, no earlier than May 15th. Meltyukhov suggested that the Soviet leadership decide to wait for the results to come. sleep, since the Soviet intelligence never managed to make a confident conclusion about what Hitler was going for. fall of the USSR already in 1941. Stalin was dead before 22 June, then the next few months of aggression from Germany should follow, those. time to prepare an attack on the enemy side is still enough. As a consequence, by June 22, 1941, the Soviet troops, still not strategically unfolded: they were not ready for either the offensive or the defense. About the readiness of the USSR to fall on Germany, according to the author, it is useless to argue, since it never took place, although it can be assumed: to assume a sufficient degree of probability that they would have sat down but not. The question of the timing of the attack from November 12 to July is it really possible for the Soviet Union to win the war already? was proposed by the Soviet side, the German attack on Yugoslavia was, on the whole, into the hands of the USSR. because it proved the impossibility of a zigzag compromise

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isso. Contrary to the historical misapprehension, Meltyukhov shows that in the event of the fall of the Soviet Union from Germany, reconciliation. The connection between it and the emerging Anglo-American coalition was practically ruled out, so the city of London and Washington was certainly not recognized as a smooth enemy in that moment to the Third Reich. At the same time, in March 1941. Somewhat, the side really counted on the possibility of new negotiations with Berlin (the crowbar was facilitated by

and conducted by the Nazis delsh. formation campaign); such negotiations would have made it possible to fully probe the intentions of the Hitlerite leadership and give more time to prepare for the war, and their disruption could be a good thing. as a pretext for attacking Germany

"The author polcherkivast that the Nirkian appeal against the USSR cannot be considered a preventive war, since in Berlin they did not expect an attack © this side in 1941 7. In Moscow, they also did not expect an attack by the Germans in the coming months, therefore, the composition of the kis vociferous preparations is equally un can be considered as preparation for a pre-emptive ular with a pellet to thwart the Terman zpressii Since the Soviet side, not halfway through the true intentions of the future, the enemy postponed the beginning of the zone to July, then the National Stokos leadership had already appointed the start of operations "Barbarossa" at 22 naa, the Islamics managed to get ahead of the USSR The storonic nature of the Soviet command 21 22 in the face of German aggression only makes it worse that the USSR simply had no plans for a defensive war

1 kingo also contained some conclusions of a purely evaluative nature, contrary to the intention of the WHO declared in the introduction. hold and such. In general, they boil down to justifying Ag. texi politics of the Soviet Union and the first goals, Eco. Pensionism and military aggression seem to the author to be a leafy form of rivalry of arts in the international arena. oh arena, Thus, concludes Melpohoya, a Soviet ex. pasnolyzes, including the Molotov Pact = Ribbentrop, also, however, should consider it reprehensible: "Consequently, Moscow was zanterkhovana, I was a retaliator of my pitos, I, including the Niteresov set, subsided, so, in general, it is an absolute rule of the political strategy of the evil state. Why The face of Sovthom Soyup is blamed for such actions" (© 220-221, 310)

Hathor categorically denies any responsibility of the USSR for the outbreak of the Second World War: not he, but

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France and Great Britain are to blame for the breakdown of the Anglo-Praico-Soviet negotiations in the summer of 1939, just as not the USSR, but France and Great Britain, with their passive policy, encouraged Germany to attack Poland (p. 370)

Meltyukhov agrees © that the Soviet Union had the legal rights of the territory attached to it in 1939-1940, since the borders that existed by 1939 were "imposed on it in 1920-1921." (6.370), and a significant part of these lands was part of the rapeseed and part of the Russian Empire "and was lost during the Civil War as a result of the Visas aggression" (p. 371) "The use of the term" Soviet aggression "to the territory of Bessarabia occupied by Romania, continues the author, - in general, it is possible that the entry of the Red Army into the territory of Northern Bukovina was predicted by diplomatic negotiations, which ended with the consent of the Romanian side © the Soviet version of the solution of the Bessarabian issue. <...> In this sense, it is possible not to join the mission of NM Karamzin : "Let the hypothems condemn the spread of Poland: we have taken our own" (p. 371).

Finally, an attack on Germany in 1941 would have given the USSR "an opportunity to defeat the most powerful European power and, by reaching the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, eliminate the age-old Western threat to our country" (p. 385). In addition, victory in such a war, in the opinion of the author, would be a boon for the whole world, since it would most likely lead to the creation of a Soviet superstate in a significant part of the Old World (and possibly the New), which would open up rather wide opportunities for further development, including in order to surpass America in terms of living standards in the future. "Today it is quite obvious," Meltyukhov concludes, "that the creation of such a State based on the Russian Soviet tradition of unity and equality of different peoples, to a much greater extent, met the interests of the vast majority of people, rather than the currently racist, essentially racist, model of a "new world order" to ensure the interests of the "golden billion?" (p. 382).

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Murphy DE.

WHAT STALIN KNEW: THE MYSTERY OF "BARBAROSSA"

(Abstract)

Mityu RE. ANAT ZTAIM KMEM, TIE EMYUM OR VAVVAKOZZA. — Mal Natev. Ua onÿ ree, 2005. - Chi, 10 p.

In his book, David E. Morphy, a career intelligence officer, former head of the CIA station in West Berlin in some of the 1950s and early 1960s, a specialist in Germany and the Soviet Union, analyzes the work of Soviet intelligence on the eve of World War II and the reaction of the Stalinist leadership to incoming information about the military preparations of Germany. The author seeks, first of all, to find an answer to the questions why the Soviet Union, despite its military power and the beginning of the militarization of the economy, was not ready for Nazi aggression and why Stalin refused to believe his intelligence reports about the preparation of the Third Reich for an attack on the certain that Hitler would not dare to take such a step. Of all the Russian archives, Morphy managed to work only in the RGVA - with the personal file of I.I. Proskurova, All other archives, including not only the Central Archive of the SVR and the Central Archive of the FSB, but also the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, turned out to be closed to foreigners; moreover, the author was faced © with the fact that a number of documents have already been published. Likovains in the 1990s were subsequently classified for the second time. Because of the complex work described in the book, Morphy was forced to confine himself mainly to published mothers. King consists of i) introductions. 22 glories and four applications. Numerous archival documents, reports from different residencies allow us to see how well the council worked

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's intelligence, how accurate information it possessed and to what extent this information was ignored. The author emphasizes that during the entire pre-war period, Intelligence sent Stalin personally about Hitler's upcoming plans, who received information from many, completely from each other.

tsikh, sources, however, the received information did not inspire confidence. The author suggests that if Stalin had listened to his intelligence, he would have been able to take in advance all the necessary measures that would have made it possible to repel German aggression © with much less losses or even prevent it. But in a system where everything depended on one person, this person, even having enormous power and the broadest possibilities, could not cope with the wave of sometimes contradictory data, involuntarily giving preference to his own subactive prejudices.

The monograph is largely constructed as an analysis of the careers of three officers of the Soviet air force: Ivan Iosifovich Proskurov and Filipp Ivanovich Golikov (chiefs of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff in 1939-1940 and 1940-1941, respectively) and Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin (head of the Foreign Department of the GUGB NKVD - 1st Directorate of the NKGB in 1939-1946). This allows Murphy to show a detailed picture of the work of various structures in obtaining intelligence information.

Apalizing the career of I.I. Proskurov, a hero of the war in Spain, a talented military pilot, the author characterizes him as a person distinguished by independence of judgments and actions. Until 1939 Proskurov had no experience in intelligence activities; his appointment as head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army was motivated to a large extent by the desire to increase combat: the howling spirit of the army intelligence officers, undermined by the purges, "The lack of ties with anyone from the" old guard "also made the hundred capillaries very attractive, however,

the fact that Proskurov never concealed his pride in his lossenii was not always appreciated by the leadership of the USSR. It was Proskurov who, on May 17, 1939, sent Stalin the famous six-page note "I will

cis aggressive plans of fascist Germany according to the official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kleist, compiled thanks to the work of the Warsaw residency. Peter Kleist, who was Minister Ribbentrop's head of the Eastern Department, speaking before

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the highest ranks of the German embassy in Warsaw, said that "the strengthening of Germany's positions in the east should be dos. crushed by any means" (p. 15). This meant an imminent attack on Poland, which was supposed to include, in addition to its own measures, also the pressure on world public opinion (it was supposed to achieve non-intervention by the USA and the USSR). After the destruction of the Polish state, Great Britain and France were to become the next military opponents of Germany, and only after that - the USSR. Murphy will state that Stalin paid great attention to this note, as he considered the situation favorable for concluding an agreement with Hitler.

The author does not agree with the widespread point of view, according to which the policy of appeasement of Germany was aimed at directing Nazi aggression to the east: in one hundred opinion, the states of Western Europe only sought to avoid a new world war. However, blinded by the ilsology of Marxism" Leninism and the covspirolothic mentality of his mind, the leader could hardly judge questions of foreign policy" (p. 95). In this situation, according to Murphy, he was characterized by a pathological sympathy for the future allies in the Ziti-Hitler coalition, based on their common irreconcilable hostility towards the USSR. The isolation of the General Secretary from European realities, his suspicion and credulity colored the entire period from September 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941

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Briefly describing the foreign policy development of Europe in the 1930s, Morphy draws attention to the fact that Germany and Russia, defeated in the First World War, suffered most of all in the AD. In the 1920s-1930s, Stalin, in the conditions of a capitalist encirclement, consolidated his power: Hitler, having come to power, gradually got rid of the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. The agreement between them in 1939 made a new world

wallpaper.

Hitler was influenced by the policy of appeasement, counted on the neutrality of Great Britain and France in the upcoming Torman-Polish war, and also sought to ensure the neutrality of the USSR. In turn, Stalin, who himself had no sympathy for the Polish state, feared that they had sat down trying to prevent Germany from conquering Poland. the Western European powers may not support him. At the same time the attack

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Germany over Poland could provoke a big war between the Reich and Western lemcracies, which, according to Marxism in the Stalinist sense, could, in turn, create a revolutionary situation in Europe and thereby prepare the necessary conditions for expanding the sphere of influence of the USSR. It is precisely the desire to make the German attack on Poland inevitable that Murphy considers one of the main motivations of the Soviet dictator when he denounced the Molotov = Ribbentrop pact. Stalin's negotiations with Aigaia and France were nothing more than a means of putting pressure on Berlin in order to obtain additional territorial concessions from Hitler.

In this regard, it is worth noting that, as the author himself admits, the characterization of Stalin given in his book "is in conflict with the one advocated by many American, European and Russian historians" (p. 254). Murphy does not agree © to imagine that Stalin was not



a revolutionary, but a pragmatic politician, and insists that the "leader of the Narolas", while remaining a staunch communist, somewhat weakened the revolutionary rhetoric for tactical reasons. The author considers the dictator's intention to "achieve the exhaustion of the capitalists/imperialists in wars" as a manifestation of the Lennist ideology, and not nationalism or stateism (p. 24). From these positions, it seems to him that for Stalin, the annexation of new territories was primarily "expanding the boundaries of socialism" (p. 29).

At the same time, in all respects, the treaty with Germany did not strengthen as much as weakened Soviet Soki: in the newly captured territories, new fortifications had to be urgently built. military infrastructure, additional difficulties arose with transport and supplies, which was especially important for the Soviet military-political leadership in connection with the

At the same time, the USSR received a direct border with the Third Reich, and German observers - a convenient opportunity to hotel the construction of Soviet fortifications.

The well-known benevolence with which the inhabitants of the territories newly annexed to the USSR greeted the Red Army soldiers, the author explains by the tense relations between the Poles and local

village; moreover, the inhabitants of Western Ukraine had no experience of relations not only with the Soviet, but also with the tsarist government, since these lands belonged to Austria from 1772 to 1919. However, the accelerated sovietization of the "liberated" regions

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Tei quickly led to the growth of anti-Soviet and pro-German parsonage, which the Nakists were not slow to take advantage of: both before the war and after the beginning, the use of agents from among the local residents was an important part of their strategy,

The author also addresses the topic of the Winter War with Finland. The course of the Soviet-Finnish negotiations in the autumn of 1939 is described in some detail, with the emphasis on the constant growth of requests (Stalin - from a simple desire to move the castle away from Leshigrad to attempts to create a pro-Soviet Finnish Democratic Republic. The unsuccessful move of the vosins actions perchsriul plans Sovietizatsii Finland. Morphy specifically notes that the Finnish war not only undermined the reputation of the USSR in the international arena, but also had a strong impact on the assessment of the German generals of its military power. "Scapegoat" was appointed among others and Proskurov, which was connected, among other things, © to the differences in views between him and Stalin regarding the essence of entertainment and the nature of the fir trees. front, which destroyed the previous plans of the Soviet dictator, who hoped to take advantage of a protracted war in Europe; Under these conditions, the Secretary General considered it premature to remove a person who could still find out Hitler's further intentions.

DE. Murphy points out that, in general, the main intelligence and state security agencies provided the top leadership with enough data about the aggression planned by the Germans, although the Germans themselves were sure that Moscow did not notice their war songs or, in any case, did not take them into account. attention. He is mistaken by Soviet agents who worked fruitfully in Burley Helsinki, Lond,

Warsaw, and analyzing that the intelligence reports received by Stalin, although n. were written in "Marxist-Leninist jargon" (ÿ. 12) nevertheless somehow reflected reality. In addition, in addition to the search for secret information, the study of the foreign press, the public of his mission abroad, military-political and military literature from Germany and other countries was carried out. In this way, among other things, a German-Russian phrasebook with phrases

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it is clearly not a tourist destination. The results of the interrogations of German intelligence agents also indicated the inevitability of an imminent war. However, as Murphy shows, only a few professionals were ready to talk openly about the feasibility of a paper room, much less in writing. Wash out the fear. Stalin's olstvo and bring on the obvmisin in pamixrstas at. led to the manipulation of information in the reports, so that the final conclusions were not too contradictory of the representative of the Secretary General and this environment of the actions of the agents of the transfer was absent. suggests that this may have been a year of lack of professionalism on the part of Soviet officials

The author's particular viimanis attracts the figure of Richard Zorge, an agent in Tokyo, with a rather sculpted role in the intelligence system. Good. giving his deztelneti to the USSR, information was received not only about the German-Japanese contradictions, but also about the Nazi plans and under the tovsans, an accurate estimate of the number of German troops located on the borders with the Soviet Union of German troops and the date of the probable attack. niya the little that Sorge managed to achieve in the conditions of p0d01. A zealous attitude towards him in Moscow and a decrease in the fishaishiro-Bann, Although in the fall of 1941 he handed over to Moscow materials that Japan was not going to enter the war against the "USSR", which made it possible to transfer significant forces © Dalniy

(Oskve in the midst of Operation Typhoon, he was deserving of his services after death. Stalin refused to exchange, arrested and sentenced to death, execution Sorge.

"In addition to the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, the top political leadership of the country also received information through the NKVD. Morphy, willingly, dwells in detail on the work of the Foreign Department of the GUGB of the NKVD, which was headed by P.M. Fitin. A feature of the blue intelligence of the state security agencies was the absence of their own analytical unit - Intelligence reported the required information, leaving the recipient the opportunity to niteriretize himself independently.

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unlike Proskurov, Fitin never had direct access to Stalin.

Information also flowed along the counterintelligence line as a by-product of the search for foreign agents, usually as a result of persecution of messages and wiretapping of communications, as well as from the recruitment of embassy employees. The main targets were the German and allied embassies, but work was also carried out in the American, British and other embassies. In addition, the analysis of the activities of the German foreign intelligence = Abwehr = in key frontier areas also led to some reflections. Interestingly, neither German intelligence nor foreign diplomats noticed any significant military preparations in the USSR itself, even in the last days before the start of the Nazi aggression; only the spread of rumors about the possibility of war was noted. The Soviet leadership did not attach any importance even to such circumstances as the departure of German specialists from the country and the ear of the German "catch from Soviet ports.

Some information came from the border troops, mainly reports about the arrival of trains with equipment and equipment at the border and about the improvement of the roadbed. Even though the Germans observed a high level of "camouflage: howling discipline", some actions could not be hidden, such as the concentration of troops, which took place under the guise of redeployment, rest and re-formation. The guardsmen also noted the delivery of equipment for crossing water barriers, necessary for the offensive. results

Interrogations of detained German agents, many of whom were recruited from local residents, rightly pointed to active preparations for military operations.

The main transport department of the NKVD was also engaged in "borrowing information. Already in 1939, the attention of the Chekists was attracted by sabotage on the railways. Although the perpetrators were never found, the investigation into the circumstances of these incidents increased the vindication of the NKVD agents to the station personnel and train crews, especially since the autumn of 1939 in connection with the inclusion of additional lines in new territories in the USSR railway network. They mainly provided information about the concentration of German troops and their relationship with the local population, as well as about conversations about an imminent war between the Soviet Union and Germany. At the same time, the reports noted serious shortcomings in trans-

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portation system of the USSR - starting with the lack of the People's Commissariat of Railways mobilization plans and transportation plans for wartime and ending with the unsuitability of some types of cargo platforms for the transportation of oxen cargo and the general deterioration of the mobile composition.

In these difficult conditions in July 1940. Stalin considered able to replace the "uncomfortable" Proskurov with F.I. Golikov, personally fed to him by a man who served in the Krasnaya Raznitsa war, but who had no experience in intelligence. And the author draws attention to the fact that the new head of the Intelligence Directorate was not inclined to give direct instructions in order to be able to shift the blame from subordinates in case of Stalin's displeasure, the main goal of the directorate's work was to provide the leader with information that would suit him. It was Golikov, who became responsible for According to Murphy, the transfer of "field" information and periodic apathetic reviews to the Secretary General strengthened Stalin's conviction that Hitler would not dare to attack the USSR until he ended the war on the Western Front.

According to Murphy, on March 1, 1941, Hitler had at his disposal 221 infantry divisions, 22 tank divisions and 20 motorized divisions. At the same time, 40% of them were in the west, which allowed Stalin to count on the fact that Great Britain was still the Fuhrer's primary goal. It is precisely because of this position of the leader, the author believes, that the threat from the threatening concentration of German troops in East Prussia and on the territory of Lithuania

and the Polish state and numerous others. Because of the approaching war, Golikov allowed himself in a report on March 07, 20, sent to the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, to assert that "most of the reports of the Agsites regarding the possibility of a war against the USSR in the spring of 1941 are based on Anglo-American sources, whose goal is currently moment, undoubtedly, consists in the deterioration of relations between the USSR and Germany" (quoted, op. cit. 156) "The main point of the report was that a war between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich is possible only after assurances of hostilities in the West, and all reports claiming 'the opposite are disinformation.' The author notes that this report 'was,

the worst intelligence document that op [Golikov] prepared during his service as head of the RU. It [the report] had nothing to do with reality" (p. 158) and was

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designed only to please Stalin and confirm the correctness of one hundred views.

In his monograph, Murphy repeatedly dwells on the topic of Stalin's delay with the beginning of bringing the troops into full readiness and his unwillingness to accept and calculate the missions of professional military men, both at the highest and lower levels. He considers one of the leader's biggest mistakes to be the decision not to impede the reconnaissance of all the top leadership of the army, which already took on importance in modern warfare. It is curious that, according to the author, the Germans were sure that the "Soviets" did not notice anything, while in fact the Soviet troops were simply forbidden to shoot down "German aircraft.

1940 clearly prescribed in the event of a violation of Soviet airspace by the Germans not to open fire, but to limit themselves to filing a protest and compiling a report on what had happened. Even though the German pilots were taking pictures of fortifications, positions of troops, airfields, stores, communication centers and other military objects, the country's leadership upheld this order. Such a "pathetic rebuttal to German provocations" (p. 170) was combined with a lack of air defense forces and the impossibility of pursuit across the border. As a result, between March 27 and April 18, 1941, 0 cases of violation of the USSR airspace were recorded, between April 19 and July 19 - already 180, 11 cases were recorded on July 19 and 36 cases - on June 20. Moreover, in the last months before the start of the war, the Germans sent not only individual reconnaissance aircraft, but also entire corps of bombers, who were actually conducting a rehearsal of their future raids. When, a few days before the start of hostilities, a decision was nevertheless made to start masking the airdromes and railway stations, these measures turned out to be insufficient and, moreover,

| since German aviation had already carried out all the necessary observations, and the poor condition and the limited positioning of important objects in the border areas (often at a distance of only 10-30 km from the border) made it much easier for the enemy to destroy the main targets.

DE. Murphy devotes considerable attention to the study of German efforts to camouflage their military intentions, including the demonstrative preparations for the invasion of the British Isles, as well as the building of fortifications to the east.

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on the frontiers of the Reich with a spruce to create the impression that the plans of the German command is assigned an exclusively defensive character. In addition, the idea was widespread in the expert community of that time that the concentration of German troops

Russian troops on Soviet borders are carried out with the aim of intimidating Moscow on the eve of an ultimatum on new concessions. Stalin

while all new units of the Wehrmacht were being transferred to the Soviet borders.

Analyzing the version of the "preventive war", the author insists that at the time of the outbreak of hostilities, Stalin did not have enough exactly the forces to carry out a large-scale offensive. Despite the popular notion among the inhabitants of the USSR that the state was prepared for war, even taking into account the deployment of additional forces by Stalin along the border, the general low level of military and political preparation of the Red Army, which manifested itself during the Finnish campaign and in 1941 according to Murphy, it sufficiently convincingly testified to the impossibility of attacking Germany with the forces that Stalin had at that moment.

In connection with the question of Stalin's and Hitler's personal ties, Murphy also addresses the subject of their possible secret correspondence, suggesting that the Soviet dictator's confidence that a war with Germany could be avoided could be based on some assurances he received directly from Fuhrer. However, the author notes that there is no documentary evidence of such

No correspondence has yet been found, and this version itself appeared only in the 1980s. At the same time, according to his message, if they sat down not to admit that Stalin had some convincing evidence that Hitler would not attack the USSR (for example, received from him personally), then the order of the Secretary General would look completely gratifying

silly, because it's a whole thing to be deceived, and quite another thing is "shaking stubbornly, risking Simka's supremacy Sovetsk

The final chapters of the monograph describe the activities of the Soviet leadership in the last months before the Nazi aggression and its reaction to the outbreak of hostilities.

Considerable attention is paid to the next waves of repressions in the armed forces: purges in the leadership of the Red Army Air Force and the arrests of war veterans.

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in Spain before the war, arrests and executions of commanders of various ranks in the first months of the war. The future fate of I.I., Proskurov, F.I. Golikov and P.M. Fitina.

Answering the main question: how could it happen that, despite the well-known suspicion of Stalin, the Soviet leadership did not take the necessary measures in advance in case of German aggression, the author points out that Stalin actually saw only what he wanted to see, and even the "lords" showed him for the most part only what they wanted to see. As a result, although information about the impending attack came to the USSR in sufficient quantities, the Secretary General essentially refused to accept it, regardless of the source. On the contrary, the opinion was popular that the rumors about the upcoming war were either a British provocation with the aim of pushing the Soviet Union against the Third Reich, or were spread by the German secret services with the aim of intimidating the Soviet side into an ultimatum about new concessions. As a result, Stalin believed at the last minute that Hitler would not dare to attack the USSR until he had completed the war with Great Britain. "Only the arrival of a German deserter on the evening of June 21, 1941 indicates Murphy," the Kremlin was seriously alarmed, but it was too late (216). The author notes that in history this is not the only example of how only those intelligence data that correspond to the plans of the political elite are taken into account. In a system locked on one person, this was unavoidable.

Concluding the study, the author notes that the figure of Stalin still attracts the attention of a large number of researchers and will probably remain the center of bitter controversy for a long time to come. This idea is prompted not only by the attempts of some researchers to "whitewash" the figure of the "leader", but, to the other extreme, by the desire to blame Stalin alone for the catastrophe of 1941, without affecting the essence of the political system that had developed by that time. Murphy will challenge readers to consider whether the future will not be a repetition of the past.

CB Bushings

Lukacs J. JUNE 1941: HITLER AND STALIN. (Abstract)

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LE 1941: NITZEK AMO TASHA: - Mem Nauey: 1. aye shÿh, 2006. 169 p.

The personal relationship between Stalin and Hitler has more than once become the object of study. John A. Lukács (USA), in his research reflection (by his own definition, a historical essay) will also address this topic. The author tries to show how the specific decisions made by two different Czechs changed the past century, based on the fact that history is the result of a specific choice of specific people, and not faceless forces.

These ideas are developed in the first chapter, "The Historical Perspective." According to Lukacs, all the main decisions that predetermined the course and results of the Soviet-German confrontation depended personally on Hitler and Stalin. This does not coincide with the point of view in the social sciences, according to which history is controlled by the economy and other material phases, but the author insists that the Second World War, which entered a new stage on June 22, 1941, was not only noted, but not. determined by the inclinations and decisions of Stalin, Hitler, Churchill and Roosevelt.

At the very beginning of the second chapter, "Hitler" = Lukács notes that most people, including historians, consider it definitively established that the German aggression against the USSR that began on June 22, 1941 was inevitable, that the idea of a war with Russia was nurtured by Hitler from the very beginning of his political way, However, the author believes that in this case we see not the implementation of inevitable and predictable plans, but the will of Hitler himself,

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Indeed, Hitler claimed that Germany's main yard was in the east, that the Germans needed living space, at least as far as the Urals. Anti-communism and Yulophobia were also characteristic of his political, social, ideological and strategic views. However, from the author's point of view, the notion that Hitler was a fanatic driven by ideology to the detriment of political, diplomatic, and military common sense = an oversimplification. According to Lukács himself, Hitler is a talented politician and statesman who has turned to evil.

As for Zitiommunism, the author suggests that the Fuhrer was primarily trying to capitalize on its prevalence and popularity. The image of the main fighter against communism made it possible, when he came to power, to intimidate the German leadership and justify the need for terror, and after coming to power to find more and more allies around the world. As early as June 1934, he declared that the defense of Europe from Bolshevism was Germany's main task for the next decade. It was the image of Germany as a barrier to barbarism and Russian-sponsored communism that allowed Hitler to achieve a policy of appeasement, the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the opportunity to provide assistance to Franco, and also gave the Reich hundreds of thousands of volunteers of non-German origin, ready to fight "against Asian swereist-Bolshevik communism" .

Even in November 1937. preparing for a possible war with Czechoslovakia, Hitler, in the author's opinion, did not consider the USSR as an imminent danger. During the Munich crisis, he also did not express serious concerns about the possibility of Stalin's entry into the war. The goal of the Fuhrer at that moment was the domination of Germany in Eastern Europe, which could lead to war with the Soviet Union. At the same time, Hitler fully allowed for himself the possibility of rapprochement with Stalin in the event of active resistance by the Western powers to his aggressive plans. According to me, I drink the author, this was largely due to the fact that Germany and the USSR had a common enemy - Polysa. Polish foreign policy was never fully subdued by Germany. The Soviet Union, which in the event of a German-Polish conflict would have found itself behind the rear of the Polish army, strove for territorial acquisitions. This largely predetermined the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which, according to the

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essentially a personal agreement between Hitler and Stalin, since in the end it was on them that the content depended.

However, the signing of the non-aggression pact and the additional secret protocol on the division of the north-eastern part of Europe had different consequences for its participants: if they settled in the USSR, this led to the exit of a certain number of people from the party and a decrease in faith in communist internationalism, then in Germany, , the people as a whole were inspired by the "queue" to "see the genius of the Fuhrer" (p. 21). From the author's point of view, it is local that the position of Hitler, who believed that the power of the state is more important than ideological consistency, corresponded to the structure of the population.

J. Lukács draws attention to the fact that in the period from 1918 to 1933, the Weimar Republic, which was generally anti-communist, nevertheless maintained favorable relations with Soviet Russia, where pemsic officers were trained and weapons prohibited for Germany were developed. Cooperation continued under the Nazis, and after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the relationship between Stalin and Hitler did not seem cloudy at all. Soviet-German trade was constantly growing, and the necessary raw materials were supplied to the Reich. In the future, the occupation by the Nazis in the spring of 1940. Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, France met with congratulations from Molotov. Odizko, when in the summer of `1940. The USSR ivexed the Baltic states and took Bessarabia from Romania, Hitler began to look on an ally, but as an opponent.

Nevertheless, in the summer of 1940, Hitler, according to the author, considered the USSR and not Great Britain, but the USA as his main potential adversary. Even the alliance of Japan, Germany and Italy was directed not against the Soviet Union, but

Grotiv of the United States, approaching Great Britain. The latter, in turn, counted on the help of the USSR and the USA. Thus, the removal of Russia from the political arena could prevent America from participating in the European war. In this case, Britain would no longer have any chances. According to the author, at the end of his life, Hitler thought about why he had to fight with Russia, and regretted that he had to fight with the USA - but it was too late.

"The third chapter of Stalin is devoted to the perceptions and motivations of the Soviet dictator. Lukács suggests that in the first

half of 1941, the secretary general sought to avoid war © Germanis, but wonders if he planned to Sovietize

ron later, under more favorable conditions, for example, after the Syropean states have exhausted each other in a protracted war. He answers this question in the affirmative: Stali hoped to take advantage of the outbreak of the war in Europe and further expand the territory of the USSR, but he tried to maintain neutrality as long as possible, assuming that time was working for him. But this, Lukacs emphasizes, is the decision of a pragmatist, which makes it possible to consider Stalin not so much a radical Marxist fanatic as a traditionalist ruler, embodying in his activity the image of a despot tsar, characteristic of the Russian-Austian, including Caucasian , political culture. Possessive, cunning, rude, reading a lot, but knowing little about the world, almost not believing in the world revolution, he defeated the more educated, well-wishing world and Marx Trotsky, who supported the whole world revolution. The crackdowns and purges, apart from everything else, can be seen as an attempt to replace the party bureaucracy with a state one subordinated personally to Stalin. Standing for the all-round strengthening of the power of the state (although, according to Marx, it should have gradually weakened until complete extinction), Stalin turned into and) Re. from a ninternationalist volitionalist to a nationalist politician. By 19391: the "state" was the "sacred territory" of the official press. 49). The cult of the state soon also highlighted the importance of painopolism as an integral element of statehood" (which was still a further departure from Marxism). According to Lukács, under these conditions, Stalin, following Hitler and Mussolini, saw that the "miraz" of international socialism was not as effective as

From the author's point of view, when in 1938-1939 Western democracies were looking for an alliance with Stalin against Hitler, they believed that the Third Reich was a common prag, while Staly, on the contrary, respected Germany and admired this, senarol, and himself fure: rum, believing that together they can be invincible. He was particularly impressed by the Night of the Long Knives in 1934 and how quickly Hitler rebuilt Germany, eliminated his enemies and won the support of all classes of society.

The author recalls that in Soviet Russia it was quite often possible to observe a fair discrepancy between external and

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internal politics, between diplomacy and official ideology. One can recall, for example, the purges of the 1930s, which took place simultaneously with the promotion of the ideas of collective security and international cooperation in the fight against the aggressor, or the entry of the USSR in 1934. I am the League of Nations, which has hitherto been denounced as an imperialist organization. Moreover, Stalin, as the news, proclaimed toasts to the health of the Fuhrer, when thousands of communists and their storotsiiks, including those in the Nazi camps, admired the Soviet. Great Britain and France in negotiations in Moscow, while the partnership proposed by Hitler allowed the USSR to benefit from the massacre

nal Polysh, ideological differences between Bolshevism and Nazism receded into the background. The text of the non-aggression pact, which was completely suitable for the Germans, was written by Stalin and Molotov, as well as the secret protocol on the division of the spheres of the Germans in Eastern Europe (Stalin was ready to split South-Eastern Europe, but this no longer fit into Hitler's plans). The purpose of the pact was not only to liberate the USSR from a war "which would help the cause of world communism on a war-ravaged continent" (p. 43), but also to return "the former territories of the Russian Empire once lost by Lenin" (p. 57). Taking advantage of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, Stalin already settled in 1939. placed garrisons in the Baltic States, acquired part of Poland and unleashed a war with Finland, although the successful actions of the Red Army did not allow me to set up "people's equalization" there. In the summer of 1940, the final annexation of the Baltic states and territorial claims to Romania followed. Similar interpretation by the Soviet Union of the concept of spheres of interest caused Hitler concern, but the general secretary continued the same policy. Churchill was wary of Berlin's aggressive intentions, "Stalin ordered Molotov to inform the Germans that he would not go for a rapprochement with Great Britain. quarrel between the USSR and Germany.

lenin gonska to a large extent corresponded to the bolshevik stereotype of a hostile imperialist power,

Stalin expected an imminent German invasion of the British Isles, but instead, German troops appeared in Finland in August 1940, and in August-September in Romania. Gerns' proposals regarding the future division of Europe, Asia and Africa remained unanswered. The author notes that intelligence about the concentration of German troops on the Soviet borders knocked on Moscow from a variety of sources, especially since it was impossible to hide the equipment and the masses of people from the Polish rabbis, but Stalin still perceived these messages as a provocation with the aim of drawing the USSR into a war with the Reich. This, according to Lucan, also explains "his actions in the spring - early June 1941, aimed at not provoking Germany into a conflict: a conflict with the Soviet Union, which became one of the causes of the catastrophe in the summer of 1941".

The fourth chapter - "Berlin" - shows the reaction of the population of Germany at the beginning of the war with the USSR. The official prelude—that there was an invasion by the Red Army—completely suited the conservatives, who welcomed the start of the campaign. The level of confidence in the Führer still remained quite high. Nevertheless, the news of the beginning of the war in the east, despite the continued confidence in the fighting qualities of the Wehrmacht, aroused mixed feelings among the Germans. Among other things, many were sparkingly surprised by this turn of events and could not understand why Germany needed this war, if the "vans" were already ready to supply the Reich with everything necessary. Doge Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, according to his own statements, regretted that he had to announce the beginning of the war to the Soviet ambassador. The author considers this as a confirmation that aggression against the USSR was not always included in Hitler's military-political program and was due to the specific situation of 1940-1941. above all by the Führer's desire to force Great Britain to peace and keep the USA from entering the war, eliminate their last potential ally in Europe. In addition, according to Lukacsler, he was aware that the war with Russia would not be easy, and, being confident in the final victory, he nevertheless showed a little optimism if the generals did.

Pataya head \_ "Moscow" is dedicated to the reaction in the USSR to the beginning of the war, primarily the reaction Soviet political leadership

volstva, headed by Stalin, who, despite the information about the impending aggression, was shocked by the sudden attack of the Germans, which was not preceded by any negotiations, or even an ultimatum. The author was fortunate that all morning on the 22nd of Nyush the usual broadcasts were broadcast on the Soviet radio, so that the majority of Soviet citizens learned about the outbreak of war only from Molotov's belated speech.



The sixth chapter, "London," examines the reaction of Great Britain. Despite strong opposition to the Sopetsky Soyuu and the expectation of a new agreement between Germany and Germany, the sudden news of the German invasion of Russia gave the British the relief that they were not alone in their opposition to Hitler. At the same time, the possibility of the Soviet Union raised doubts. Churchill, for example, believed for a long time that the Red Army would lose the war. Analyzing his attitude towards the Soviet Union, Lukács comes to the conclusion that his policy was quite consistent, despite his anti-communist position. The Union © of Bolshevik Russia was conditioned both by the community of interests in the current situation (Churchill, according to the author, by that time had already made a firm decision to destroy the Hitler regime), and by a quite explicable desire to help the country and people faced with Nazi aggression. As for the division of Europe with Stalin, then

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In another case, Churchill, according to Lukács, was guided by pragmatic considerations, believing that giving Eastern Europe for some and hardly a long time to the sphere of influence of the USSR would be a lesser evil than accepting the capture of all continental Europe by Hitler as soon as possible. put, much longer term.

"The seventh chapter - "Washington - and around the world" - briefly describes the reaction from the United States, as well as the position of persons who were not statesmen of the countries directly involved in the action. As the zitor points out, the inhabitants of the United States received information about the German attack on the USSR from

(to the editors of American correspondents in London and Berlin; commentators on local radio stations also paid significant attention to the new \$ thunder war. However, despite the negative attitude of most Americans to Hitler, there was also a strong tendency towards isolationism in the United States, based both on distrust of Great Britain and France ,

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and on the dislike for Stalin of the nationalists and some Americans. socialist socialists, Although the notion that "communism

the foam of national socialism? did not fit well with society. in all opinion, but still was a factor that had to be taken into account. Not only did many Republicans refuse to "fight under the red flag," but the former President of the United States, H. Hoover himself, declared that America should refrain from participating in the war , since all help will only play into the hands of Stalin. Despite the fact that Churchill still wrote to Roosevelt on June 22, 1941 about the security of the Soviet-Termai war and convinced him of the need to help the USSR in view of the fact that Hitler was a general rotor romeo, so be it, Roosevelt did not make a special statement on June 22,

no policy.

A few words Lukács also cherishes the reactions to the beginning of the Patriotic War in the rest of the world, including the mood in the countries of Germany's compatriots, as well as the position of a part of the population of the USSR, who perceived the Germans as liberated. It is also briefly described: there are calculations by the participants of the Resistance in the occupied countries that this time Germany has finally got into serious goodwill" (p. 13). and formed at com. Mushists present about Stazisha kah about the savior of mankind

The eighth chapter "Immediate Crisis" is devoted to opis. aso the first days after 22 shea, and before. and after the outbreak of Nazi aggression against the Soviet Union, the best military experts in the world on both sides of the Atlantic (including people who knew the situation in Moscow well) predicted the defeat of the Red Army in those. within a few weeks or, at the most, in a couple of months, and the seizure of the prizes of at least the European part of the USSR. Similar assumptions were not without foundation: the course and results of the Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland made a strong impression on the world community and the expert community;

reprise I Red Armin in 1937. 138 tons: the unpreparedness of the USSR for war seemed obvious. Churchill assumed that the entry of the Soviet Union into the war would bring "only temporary relief. The author agrees that the Stalinist leadership and the geisek himself bear a significant responsibility for the catastrophic outbreak of the war. He also cites the opinion of the German ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, that at the very beginning of the war, Stalni and some members of the Politburo were still

counted on the possibility of an agreement with Hitler and expressed it. willingness to sacrifice the Baltic States and Ukraine, thereby repeating the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty 191% m. jul 1941 v. instead of the usual communist rhetoric about

an inspiring patriotic appeal sounded, In the ninth, final, chapter = consequences" = in a peculiar style of analysis

the results, including long-term ones, of German attacks on the USSR, the offensive of which in the future was not obvious © from the point of view of the situation in the world in the summer of 1941 , when the rezilization of plans for the "final solution of ev. the Ray Question. The Red Army, despite a number of crushing defeats, managed to avoid collapse in the first months of the war, and the political leadership of the USSR resisted capitulation to Germany. Hitler turned out to be right in his own way, predicting the inevitable collapse of the unnatural, in one hundred opinion, coalitions of Great Britain, the USSR and the USA, or this collapse came after the collapse of the Third Reich. If in 1941 Stalin's excessive confidence almost turned out to be fatal for the Soviet Union. in relation to Germany, then in 1945. the geisek was summed up by distrust of the USA; The establishment of pro-Soviet communist regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe became one of the causes of the Cold War, the end result of which was the collapse of the USSR itself. Interestingly, the author writes, and one more circumstance. To Yatso

In 1941, when discussing possible scenarios for entering the Second World War, a proposal was also made to attack Soviet Soya in spite of the neutrality treaty concluded shortly before; this would have made it possible to avoid involvement in the war "by the United States and would have put the USSR in front of the possibility of sleeping on two fronts. Nevertheless, it was decided to attack the United States" (p. 130), which ultimately led to their entry into the war against Germany in December 1941. Curious

also unexpected in its own way, the author notes that in the long term, the defeat of Japan in World War II brought the greatest benefit not to the USSR or America, but to China.

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Glani DM.

"BARBAROSSA": HITLER'S INVASION. TO RUSSIA, 1941

(Abstract)

See ohm. VAKVAKOSSA: NITEK: \$ PUUAZYUM OR VISA, 1941. - oz (b1onskhiste); Svaeyaot (Osh Sagoyta) Tetra "Early, 2001. 256 ý: #1

David M. Haaitz's referenced motto is entirely devoted to the first "round" of the Soviet-German confrontation - the anniversary-autumn campaign of 1941 and the beginning of the counter-offensive near Moscow. Using newly declassified Soviet archival materials, the author shows how the Soviet troops managed to frustrate the plans of the pacist command, despite the fact that the peacetime Red Army was practically annihilated in the initial period of the war and the offensive of the Wehrmacht, led by four powerful tank groups and covert `permeable "umbrella" of aviation support, for a long time it seemed

unstoppable. Glantz also disputes the prevailing notion that the main reasons for Barbarosa's failure were bad weather, difficult terrain, and Hitler's faulty strategic thinking.

The book consists of a preface, nine chapters and a conclusion, with a bibliography and an index. The appendix contains some documents of the Soviet and German Commands related to Operation Barbarossa and the repulse of the Nazi invasion by Soviet troops, as well as the detailed composition of the troops of the opposing sides on the Eastern Front as of 22 April 1941.

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As a reminder of the preface, Western historians, not having access to Soviet sources, for a long time were forced to confine themselves to survey studies of the war on the Eastern Front, as a result of which, in the literature, they emphasized the well-known and dramatic plots of the summer and autumn of 1941 ... While many of the more prosaic events, which nonetheless constituted the backdrop against which more devastating battles and operations unfolded, remained mostly unstudied, a comprehensive study of the main activities of the Soviet leadership during the first six months of the Patriotic War, as well as truly deep understanding of their motives and goals became possible only in the post-soviet years based on the study of newly declassified Soviet and more in-depth analysis of German sources.

In the first chapter of the monograph, the author briefly examines the state of the Soviet and German armed forces before the start of Operation Barbarossa, as well as Soviet and Russian plans. Glantz refrains from a detailed analysis of Soviet plans, but notes what was laid down - an attempt to solve defensive tasks by offensive means. In them, this attempt to solve defensive tasks by offensive means, there is a contradiction, a hesitating spirit, the result of which was a misunderstanding of the role of defense in modern warfare, was characteristic of Soviet military thinking on the whole.

drink initiative. The author notes a curious paradox: despite the scientific, rationalistic approach to war and military science declared in the USSR, which became the basis for the true flowering of Soviet military thought in the 1920s and early 1930s, in the second half of the same 1930s in Stalin's follower arose: an alley of dogmatism and bureaucratic higher leadership. This sharply distinguished the Red Army from the Wehrmacht, on the contrary, the initiative was cultivated.

thinking inside the officer corps, allowing the initiative commander to be sure that the decisions he makes do not contradict the plan of the chief, since his chief in the current situation would have acted in a similar way. Among other problems of the pre-war Red Army, the author singles out an inefficient organizational structure (lack of independent tank armies and corps, bulky mechanized corps,

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the division of a significant part of aviation between individual armies, etc.), difficulties in the acquisition of all weapons and military equipment, and a lack of experienced commanders. An analysis of the state of the Soviet armed forces before the start of the war will allow the author to conclude that the outcome of the border battles was not only strategic or tactical, but rather institutional foreignness: the Soviet troops met the enemy and the transitional state, not being able to complete the started measures. - Persvooruzheshn (p.31). Hitler, voluntarily or unwittingly, chose the best moment to attack the USSR: had he done so four years earlier or even a year later, the Wehrmacht's successes on the Eastern Front could have been much more modest (pp. 31-32). At the same time, the author notes that the Red Army had to rise to its own territory; this greatly facilitated the situation, as well as

the established habit of Soviet fighters and commanders to operate in conditions of far more meager supplies than in Western armies.

As for the Nazi leadership, Glantz considers his most significant mistakes to be the underestimation of supply problems (German industry actually worked in peacetime in 1941, which made it extremely intelligence missed the concentration of armies of the second strategic echelon, and the military plans of the Wehrmacht did not take into account significant forces stationed in the inner military districts and in the Far East) and, finally, presumptuous military plans that assumed a simultaneous offensive in several divergent directions.

Describing the reasons why the Soviet leadership did not take timely measures to prepare for repelling Nazi aggression: Glantz especially emphasizes Stalin's belief that Hitler, like any other politician, was a rationalist and pragmatist; it was this confidence that led the Soviet dictator to the idea that Germany could not attack the USSR until the SS war with Great Britain was completed. "The year 1941," notes Glantz, "is often cited as a classic example of how a liler ignores an adversary's ability to attack because he is intent on attacking" (p. 28). Ohm also mentions Stalin's fears that the incoming information about Germany's preparations for aggression against

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The USSR may be a provocation by the British or the Polish government in exile © with the aim of dragging the Soviet Union into the war © by the Third Reich. Discussions about the possible aggressive intentions of Stalin himself Glantz does not touch.

The second loka is devoted to border battles and June - early July 1941. According to Gzanz, the Soviet command of a. this pernod tried to put into practice the pre-war "shun of state defense" (apparently, the March strategic play of 1941 is meant). The author traces in detail the battle of the Western Front in Belorussia, the offensives of Army Group North in the Baltic states, and the earlier battles in Ukraine, including the tank battle near Brody. At the same time, he emphasizes that

look at the beginning of the catastrophic war for the USSR, after the first white-bearing operations of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, the first difficulties were revealed. Despite the huge number of killed and captured, the soldiers of the Red Army were able to fight © with fapatism, which stupefied the soldiers. The Wehrmacht succeeded in encircling and destroying the main forces of the Western Front in Belarus. 'ii, but on the Leningrad and especially Kiev directions the Germans. simply pushed the Soviet troops to the east. As a result, the offensive took on an asymmetric character: Belo was occupied. Russia and the Baltic states, Army Groups "Ceitr" and "North" broke out much further ahead, rather than the pear of the "Yur" armies, which was pushed forward by the stubborn interrogation of the troops of the 10th Western Front. Among the officers, the first signs of dissatisfaction with the work of intelligence, © with labor, revealed the blow:

nye gruzhki Soviet troops (for example, by the beginning of the war, German intelligence managed to establish only three of the 16 mechanized corps concentrated in personal military districts. N

moms and a server of perobs with smbiziis in the conditions of the fruit of a developed road network. "German commanders," writes Glantz, "began 'to realize that a 'Russian kilometer' means much more than a kilometer in the West" (p. 56). The author, in particular, describes the following measures, such as the formation of emergency authorities and new bodies of strategic management, the reorganization of the Red Army, the formation of new units and formations, the evacuation of mentality. Heavy casualties in frontier battles and a severe shortage of qualified commanders © skills

management of large formations and associations forced the Soviet command to abolish the corps link and increase the number of armies, reducing their strength. The mechanized corps were disbanded, instead of them, the formation of tank brigades supported by infantry began. The staff and strength of the rifle divisions were significantly reduced; in addition, the formation of even more compact rifle brigades began past the divisions. "In the best Soviet traditions" was nossta

institute of military commissars. Unfortunately, it notes that the optimization of the organizational structure of the Red Army, which on the whole met the requirements of the current situation, was not accompanied by the same significant shifts in tactical and operational-strategic thinking; serious changes in this area will occur much later = in 1942-1943. Returning to the question of the first misses of the tytler intelligence on the eve and at the beginning of the war, the author notes that "the greatest mistake of german intelligence was the non-loopsy of the ability of the USSR to restore the defeated units and unite and form new forces from scratch" (©.6). And although in terms of their fighting qualities the newly formed divisions and brigades were significantly inferior to the pre-war divisions, despite all the shortcomings of the latter (as Glapts puts it, in the newly formed units they often "didn't have enough of everything except rifles and political officers." - p. 71), namely this continuous flow of new formations in many ways allowed the Soviet command to stop the Pemetsk offensive, compensating for the lack of quality with quantity. At the same time, the evacuation of industrial enterprises to the east and the destruction of enterprises that were not subject to evacuation, although they were not carried out with the same success in different regions, fundamentally undermined the plans of the Nazi leadership to use the resources of the occupied territories for the further waging of the war.

"The fourth chapter is devoted to the Battle of Smolensk and covers the period from July 10 to September 10, 1941 7. The author describes in detail both the German attack on Smolensk in early July and the numerous counterattacks undertaken by the Soviet command in the following weeks, including the liquidation of the Yely salient and the Roslavl-Povozybkovskaya operation of the Bryansk Front in order to disrupt the offensive of the 2-4th tank troupe of G.V. Guderiz in the rear of the Southwestern Front, as well as a number of other, less than 19-known battles. Glantz rates as

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contradictory, On the one hand, there was a pesomine success of the Red Army Under Elpsi, the Soviet troops for the first time © at the beginning of the war managed to break through the prepared defenses of the Germans, which would conditionally increase their morale and confidence and their strength, it became extremely unpleasant waiting for the company, not expecting you to meet east of Minsk how many serious resistance. In addition, the troops of the Wehrmacht as a result of victorious operations in the border regions. The lyakhs had already moved a little far into the depths of the Soviet territory, which caused serious problems with the air traffic, since the rear services did not have time to organize the transport of everything needed to such a depth, lasak in conditions of poorly developed road traffic. Due to the difficulties that arose, Hitler at the end of the New World was forced to reconsider his further strategy and suspend the flow of supplies to the Eastern Front, concentrating his main efforts on the Leningrad and Kisvian pas. boards, which allowed the Soviet command to win time barking to strengthen the defense east of Smolensk. But at the same time, the vicious "offensive" stratum still made itself felt. you of the Soviet side. Overestimation of one's own capabilities and underestimation of the capabilities of the enemy led to God's attempts at counterattacks, often with unforgiving targets, which only undermined the strength of Zaladiogo, Tselprallogi and Bra. As a result, the Soviet troops failed to stop Guderian's push to the south. At the beginning of the new German shepherd's march on Moscow, the troops of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts were weaker than at the beginning of August.

The fifth chapter describes in detail the booms on the distant and biyuzhiy approaches to Leningrad from 0000 to September 10. pass 250 km lo Leninral < the same speed. The Soviet troops opposing the turmoil of the 10th nui were half a dozen of the newly formed Glatno-maplovaity of the North-West direction, headed by © K.E. Voro

pov, who was instructed to coordinate the actions of Xie. loyal and North-Western fronts, the Northern and Baltic "fleets. By the beginning of August, German troops reached the Soviet fortifications on the Luga River. The transition of the Germans to the defense of the Muscovites

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direction in the second half of July allowed them to use the released forces for a further offensive against Leningrad and the defeat of Soviet troops in the Ukraine. The 3rd Panzer Group of the Guards Commander-Colonel Hermap Goth was assigned to the pears of the "North" armies. In early August, the Germans resumed their offensive. In September, units of the 20th motorized and 12th tank divisions of the Wehrmacht broke through to Lake Ladoga, cutting off Leningrad from land. the composition of the pear armies "Center" for the attack on Moscow. At the end of September, the troops of the army troupe "North" were forced to go on the defensive. Events on the South-Western directed,

the bank of the Dnieper and the grand offensive of the 1st and 2nd tank groups of the Wehrmacht, which ended in the encirclement and destruction of the main forces of the Southwestern Front east of Kyiv. Among historians, there is still no unanimous opinion at once on several debatable issues related to the military actions in Ukraine in August September 1941. crushing Guderian bypassing Kisva, and about the reasons for the defeat of the Southwestern Front, including Stalin's fault. Based on the results of his own research, Glantz disputes both the conclusions of a number of German historians and memuzrists who are inclined to accuse Hitler of the fact that his refusal to continue the attack on Moscow at the end of July caused the failure of Barbarosa, and the attempts of Soviet historians to justify In hindsight, the catastrophe near Kiev was asserted that Bulto stubbornly stubbornly resisted the Soviet troops in Ukraine, weakened the troops of the enemy and allowed the Soviet command to gain time to strengthen the defense near Moscow. In fact, Glantz insists, as a result of the successful actions of the Wehrmacht in Ukraine, the southern flank of the Red Army was actually destroyed, which not only opened the way for the Germans to the Donbass and Rostov, but also forced the Soviet command to urgently transfer to Yuto-Zapalnoe direction

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troops from other sectors of the front, including those from the Moscow offensive. Thus, there is no need to talk about any strengthening of the defense near Moscow, especially since the troops of the Western Front were already significantly weakened by endless attempts to go over to counter-pastoralization, and the forces of the Bryansk Front - by a unsuccessful attempt to stop the offensive of the 2nd tank pear around Kiev. The author also notes another curious circumstance: Stalin's stubborn desire to keep Kien with any whole. was dictated solely by political considerations, and by the expectation of a new offensive by the enemy against Moscow (in this case, Soviet troops in the Ukraine could pose a serious threat to the right flash of Army Group Center) - the very offensive that the German generals needed at the end of July they tried in vain to persuade Hitler.

The most severe trials awaited the Red Army in October 1941; these events are dealt with in the next chapter. According to the author, "the disasters that the Stavka observed and the Red Army endured in October surpassed those of June, August and September in almost every aspect. Even worse, since it happened at the gates of Leningrad, Moscow, Rostov and the Caucasus, at the Stavka

there was almost no room for maneuver. The fact that the three fronts operating in the Moscow direction at the end of September were five times greater than the troops that Zhukov had on the same direction in the voyabri box shows the full scale of the defeats of the Red Army near Vizma and Bryansk "(©. 157- 15). On the central sector of the Eastern Front, Soviet troops were practically destroyed at the first stage of the German offensive against Moscow, on the northern flank of the pear formations of the "North" armies continued to keep Leningrad under siege and, having captured Tikhvia, broke through towards the Fip units, in the south - the troops of the Army Group "South" "captured the Crimea and approached Rostov, trying to break through to the Caucasus. Nevertheless, the enemy failed to take advantage of the results of their victories. There was plenty of reason for that. Thus, the unforeseen long (7-14 days) and stubborn resistance of the encircled Soviet troops in the Bryansk and Vyazemsky "cauldrons" forced the Germans to allocate 48 of the 75 divisions of the Army Group "Center" for their destruction, which significantly weakened their forces advancing on Moscow. Moreover, the commander of the troupe of the armies, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, confident in advance of his victory, further aggravated the situation by turning part of his

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forces (9th Army and 3rd Panzer Group) on the side of Kalinin. The weather conditions also played their part (the word "thaw" has no equivalent in English). The troops of the Army Group "South" were forced to stand up on an extended front, far off their rears. Meanwhile, reserves from the depths of the country began to approach Moscow's defenses, which later

in November 1941, the author describes in the eighth mania the events in Moscow, where the Germans, who went on the defensive at the end of October due to mudslides, resumed the offensive in mid-November, with the first frosts; in early December, the enemy was left behind. rebuilt by Soviet troops on short flights to Moscow, after the forces of the advancing German armies were completely exhausted. The booms on the flanks of the Sovstek-Terman front are described separately, after the liberation of Rostov at the end of November and Tikhvin on December 8. Thus, about five and a half months after the start of the war, the German offensive died down on the Leningrad Moscow Rostov line, which deprived the Wehrmacht. hope to achieve the set goals before the end of the year meant the final failure of the Barbarossa plan. But the success of the Soviet troops was achieved at too high a price: only the official losses of the Red Army on the Soviet-Terman front from October 1 to December 31, 1941 amounted to 1,656,517 people, including 636,383 killed, captured and missing lead, but the real losses, according to the author, approach 2 man. killed, wounded, captured and missing, of which about 1 million, the Soviet troops lost near Bryansk and Vyazma (p, 182). If we add to this the losses in the first three months of the war (about 2,800,000 people), then we have to admit that the peacetime army was practically destroyed by the end of the goal. For the final victory over Germany, the Soviet Union had to create a new army from poorly trained reservists, who were forced to master military affairs directly in battle, which made excessive losses penizbezhny in the future. The final, ninth, chapter of the monograph is devoted to the first ten days of the counteroffensive near Moscow. Despite the fact that in early December the offensive capabilities of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, including the pears of the Center armies, were

completely exhausted, the presence of enemy troops in the incomparably close proximity to the capital was in itself extremely dangerous, which, in turn, created an objective need to push the Yemshev away from Moscow, and, if possible, before they had time to equip defensive positions. Preparing for a counteroffensive began in November, after the Soviet troops managed to temporarily stop the advance of the enemy on Moscow. The armies of the Kaliiii Front went on the offensive at dawn on December 5, and on December 6-8 formations of the Western Front joined them. By December 16, the Soviet troops advanced 100-125 miles to the west. Following the Barbaros plan, the concept of blitzkrieg collapsed, along with the myth of the invincibility of the Wehrmacht. It is not surprising, the author notes, that soon after the failure of the "blitzkrieg" against the USSR, the first heads of its organizers also rolled (among others, in December, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces of the General

fels. Marshal Walter von Brauchin, Commander of the Jupe Army Troupe, General Fellmarnal Hera von Runitelt, Commander of the Terrorist Center von Bock, Commander of the 2nd Panzer Army Guderian).

"Summing up the results of his research, the author will first of all consider the question of the reasons for the failures of the Red Army in the autumn-autumn campaign of 1941. To the most important ones, he lists several factors. border, in fact, a peacetime army, since the Soviet troops did not have time to complete their mobilization and deployment. In addition, before the start of the war with Germany, Krasna Zryiya experienced a wave of repressions in 1937-1938, which continued, although on a smaller scale, also in 1939-1941, this gave rise to an atmosphere of fear in the troops, killing the initiative. The army experienced an acute shortage of qualified commanders = partly also due to repressions, but before that it was not due to the continuous parativation of the number of numbers in 1939-1941. that in the summer of 1941, the large-scale measures begun a year earlier to rearm and reorganize the Red Army, which, thus, met the war in a transitional state, were still ongoing. Finally, Glantz considers the vicious "osh stushtelnaya" strategy, which resulted in endless suicidal counterattacks and belated

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orders to retreat, the author also traces out the very effective organization of Soviet units and formations before the war and the negative consequences of the often hasty and insufficiently thought out. puff measures for this restructuring, prsloriiimaknksya already after the beginning of military operations. The constant personnel changes also did not contribute to the stability and effectiveness of howling the howl. kami: Significant problems were caused by the underestimation of the Rosie Artillery, the Izhszer troops and communications in the modern war. As a trace it subsided, although the Red Army managed to stop the offensive of the German troops in certain sectors of the front, cos. The avenue of stable strategic defense for a long time remained a meteorological task for it, and the advance of the Wehrmacht to the east continued until the end of the 19417. compounds. The Stalinist political leadership, therefore, bears a psalo share of responsibility for the fact that only five months after the start of the war, the German troops found themselves under seyuy Moscow.

In turn, speaking about the reasons for the failure of Barbarossa, Haa first of all notes the strategic mistakes of the German command, the most important and which he considers to be self-confidence and the insatiable Ashetite "Hitler, who was carried away by the attack on the rata-putious front © by vulnerable Faashgs, the Pemshy were able to stop in time, although the Soviet counter-offensive at Tikhvip and Rostov should be seen as an important warning signal. In light of this, the author in particular, he disputes the widely spread point of view, according to which Hitler's August decision to suspend military operations was of fatal importance for the Wehrmacht.

Moscow government and the transfer of the main wuxi. gi of the Soviet-Terman front According to Glants, in August the conditions for an attack on Moscow were less favorable than in October, when the Soviet troops, covering the Muscovite force, were weakened by the transfer of part of the forces to other sectors of the front in the wake of the heavy defeats of the Red Armin near Leningrad and especially near Kiev. December, if the Pemtsvm would have been able to capture Moscow in August-September, the author insists, nm. there would have been a similar winter hut in the ruined city and strikes by the Sozet troops on their unprotected flanks (pp. 212-213). Another reason for the failure of the German blitzkrieg Glantz considers enough

competent actions of the Soviet command during the battle of Moscow: this time the Opo managed not only to form new units and formations from the newly mobilized reservists, but also secretly prepare strategic reserves from several armies, and also successfully chose momsit to start a second offensive, ie



enough time was given to the enemy to gain a foothold on the achieved lines. The fact that by November 1941 the Termai troops were already significantly weakened by many months of heavy fighting played a role, and Germany's brutal repressive policy in the occupied territories only contributed to the further growth of resistance. In addition, despite the commitment of both the Soviet and German leadership to the idea of total war, the Soviet side turned out to be much stronger. consistent in their implementation in practice, having carried out in 1941 a genuine mobilization of all the country's resources for the needs.

war, then the Nazis were not able to send it until 1944. MM. Mini

`Abaturov V.V.

1941: ON THE WESTERN DIRECTION. — M.: YAUZA: EKSMO, 2007.-448 p.

(Abstract)

The book under review consists of five chapters describing the first months of the Great Patriotic War. In the first chapter - "The Tragic Beginning" of VV. Abaturov analyzes in detail the causes and origins of the defeat of the Soviet troops. He is sure that they should be sought in Stalin's pre-war policy, in the outdated views of his entourage and top military leadership on the nature and methods of commanding war, in the velociological view of the material and technical security and preparation of the enemy, in erroneous approaches to the formation of the armed forces and troop deployments

"The Soviet government believed that at the initial stage of the war, hostilities would be provided by covering armies, which were tasked with ensuring conditions for the deployment of the main forces. There was also confidence that the Soviet troops

to military operations on one hundred territories "The main provisions of the military policy of the USSR were reflected in a number of documents, among them the author will especially highlight the volume adopted in March 1941. "An updated plan for strategic deployment

of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and in the East", This plan "led to grave consequences in preparation for the war, which, as it turned out later, was only three months away" (p. 17). The plan was based on provisions, some of which turned out to be erroneous. First of all, the direction of the main attack was incorrectly determined. It was assumed that Germany would deploy its main forces in the southwest, from Sedlec to Hungary, in order to seize Ukraine with a blow to Kyiv and Berdichev. Accordingly, the most suitable for deployment

the main forces of the Soviet

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The troops were considered to be the area south of the Pripyat River, and the first strategic targets were Lublin, Krakow, and Radom. The main forces of the German troops were to be defeated there, and Germany was cut off from the economically necessary Balkan countries. Therefore, the strongest grouping in the Red Army was in the Kisva Special Military District.

There were no fewer mistakes in the plans developed for the military. yyh districts and zryy. The author considers their inconsistency to be their common shortcoming: "On the one hand, the possibility of a sudden outbreak of war and greenery by the parties in highly maneuverable hostilities was recognized. In this regard, it was necessary to have a strong first operational echelon. On the other hand, all calculations proceeded from the fact that even the covering armies would be given time to mobilize during the threatened period. The real situation, which was characterized by a complete one, was ignored. the strength of the strategic and operational groups of the Wehrmacht to

step and incomplete deployment of Soviet troops. Who underestimated the power of the armed forces of Germany" (6.23). Abaturov also denies the widespread myth about the suddenness of Germany's attack on the USSR, he writes that by the spring of 1941. The Soviet leadership had sufficient intelligence information about Germany's preparations for the war.

By the beginning of the war in the Western Special Military District, under the command of the now army, the DG. Pavlov's troops were deployed as follows: formations and units of the first and second echelons of the covering armies were in places of constant action; combat-ready formations of the 10th army were also located in the barracks in the Bialystok ledge: the 2nd, 211th, 44th, 47th rifle corps were advanced to the state border; the directorate of the 13th Army, which was intended to coordinate the actions of the 49-4th and 113th rifle divisions of the mechanized corps, was located in Mogilev; The 30th Panzer Division was conducting tactical exercises, and the 42nd Rifle and 22nd Panzer Divisions were preparing for the exercises; artillery units of the 10th Army and anti-aircraft units of the 4th Army were in the district camp near Minsk; The vast majority of the aviation regiments were stationed at stationary zoodromes, which were known to enemy reconnaissance. The frontier troops were located directly on the border, as well as unarmed engineering troops and parts of other units involved in the construction of fortified areas. Back to top

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No physical action, writes Abaturon, was made eye-to-eye - "I didn't carry out a flight of mobilization and blindly put the full combat readiness of the covering armies, we didn't summon the able-bodied trouppironkas to drink (29)

"The author describes in detail the beginning of the war, carefully analyzes the nature and movements of the Germans and Soviet troops. He cites the following data: during the fighting, 4 m walkers were part of the Zladiion Front, 24 estuaries (yat rifle, eight tank, four motorization, and a drop : risks) were defeated, the remaining 20 lost from 30 to 909 saps and means. Total casualties amounted to 417,790 caps, of which 341,073 died, were captured or went missing; the front lined 9427 guns and mortars, 4700 tanks, 1777 30% of the front's ammunition, 50% of fuel, 50% of food supplies, and 90% of luggage were lost (p. 111).

"Dialysis of the combat lobes shows, writes Abaturon, that the defeat of the Soviet troops was due to the unpreparedness of the ZAPOVO to repel the tetatnyl and mono tank attacks of the enemy. Poolan. military lolitic accommodation and presi of the southern pichala voiyy "(with PZ)

The vlora chapter "Battle of Smolensk" analyzes the zod. battle, which took place from July 10 to October 10, 1941 on a vast territory: 600-650 km along the front, 209-230 km in depth from Se. sides and Velikiye Luki in modern Losva n Novgorod. Ssvsrskogo oe, from Polotsk, Vitebsk and Zhlobin in the west to Torot, Yartsala Trublevsk in the east At different times, four Soviet fronts participated in the battle: Zapalny. Roerany, Central and wounded, Against them fought the silent troupe of the armies "Center" (29 divisions, 12 infantry, nine armored, seven motorized: one cavalry, 1040 tanks, more than 680 guns and mortars), which was supported by all KIM aircraft. The German command planned break through the defenses of the Western Front, encircle and smash the Pekelsk, Smolensk and Mogiel trap and postulate without difficulty" to Moscow.

"The author will cancel that in the Stestian historiography the Smolensk sraasin was pseudo-estimated as successful, because it was possible to stop the advance of the German troops to Moscow.

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poured out, while the art of the enemy was applied or hushed up" (p. 116).

VV Abaturon emphasizes the significant superiority in both people and technology from the side of the Wehrmacht. It should also be taken into account that the battle began in extremely unfavorable conditions for the Western Front, the defense was not well prepared, there were not enough tankons, artillery, and air defense systems. But most importantly, the morale of Soviet soldiers was negatively affected

the defeat of the beginning of the war, the rapid advance of the enemy. the unconditional dominance in the air and in tank attacks

It was at the height of the Smolensk battle in August 1941 that Order No. 270 was adopted. signed by I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, SM. Bulen fishing, SK, Timoshenko, BM. Sholoshnikov, GK. Baturov writes that the author of this order was Stalin: "Having lost hope of being able to 'stabilize the front line and prevent defeat, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief resorted, largely due to the strength of the Cree. tic circumstances, to our tried and tested method of harsh punitive measures. <. > Thus, already in the first months of the war was finally formed attitude towards their own vosn-mozepnym, In the course of the bosses, there was no time to understand the bile, and under this at. both rightists and vishovatys fell into the kaz "(©. 146).

At the first stage, the enemy managed to break through the defenses of the 3a-palp front and sell almost ca 200 ka, capture Yartsevo, Smolensk, Elypo, Krichev By the beginning of August 1941 On September 6, the Soviet armies launched a counterattack, and on September 6 they succeeded in attacking the enemy, destroying the strategically important Yelnip salient. But, emphasizes Aba. tours, the main task - the encirclement and complete destruction of the enemy in the region was not completed. In this opinion, several factors led to failures in the battle of Smolensk, and before that the situation was difficult on the fronts, and in July from October 1041, Ru the beginning of the war, skillful actions against. incorrect assessment of the situation with one hundred:

you are the Soviet command, accepting unreasonable decisions. leadership of the country and used cruel methods of management

operations, they had little experience. "In addition, the troops were short of weapons, transport and often ammunition. Once in a difficult boss situation, they showed a lot of heroism, perseverance and courage, but they lacked the strength, means and ability to conduct an offensive in those special conditions that developed in the summer of 1941 "(©. 192). During the Battle of Smolensk, the Red Army irretrievably lost more than 486,000 people, more than 273,000 wounded, [348 tanks, 9290 guns and mortars, 903 aircraft.

In the next chapter = "Disasters near Vyazma and Bryansk", the aator analyzes the reasons for the unsuccessful actions of the Soviet troops at the first stage of the battle for Moscow. After the Battle of Smolensk, there was a short lull in the western direction, during which strategic plans were refined, the military capability of the troops was restored. As early as September 6, 1941, Hitler signed a directive on a major offensive on the Eastern Front. The commander of the troupe of the armies "Center", General von Bock, on September 16 sent an order to launch an offensive operation code-named "Typhoon". As at the beginning of the war, the Germans used large tank formations supported by massive air strikes. The enemy delivered the main blow from three areas: Dukhovshina, Roslavl and Shostka; after breaking through the linin defense of the Soviet. Russian troops were planned to be surrounded and destroyed in the areas of Vazma and Bryansk. It was one of the most grandiose operations of German mailing. By the end of September, Army Group Center had 1,800,000 men, 14,000 guns and mortars, 1,700 tanks, and 1,390 aircraft. The troops of the Western, Rezeran and Bryansk fronts had 1,250,000 men, 10,309 guns and mortars, 1,044 tanks, and 545 aircraft.

The Soviet Headquarters failed to correctly predict plans against Minsk Moscow, at that time the enemy's superiority on the troops of the Western Front was not overwhelming (591 tanks against 486, 5651 guns and mortars against 4029), but the commander of the troops of the Western Front, I.S. Konev failed to properly manage the available resources even at the stage of preparing the operation. This also affected the choice of the location of the main forces of the front, although there was fairly accurate information about the enemy groupings. The troops were positioned in such a way that the Headquarters, or rather, Stalin, was in power. As a result, the main forces of the Soviet troops were concentrated on the Smolensk

board. Thus, out of the directions of the enemy's main attack, one hundred superiority was: 4.1:1 for men, 6:1 for artillery, and 31:1 for tanks (pp. 198-199). "The low densities of artillery, such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, the utter depth and focal nature of the defense made the entire system of enemy fire destruction, the fight against enemy tanks and the air defense of troops ineffective. These 06-

consequences for the Soviet troops" (p. 203). The strategic defense of the Soviet troops was torn apart (for the third time), they had to retreat from 250 to 390 km, the front line now ran 100-110 km from Moscow. The Soviet troops suffered heavy losses, and there is still no exact information about them. According to some sources, only in October, half of Moscow's losses amounted to more than 1 million battle: pov and commanders.

Defensive battles lasted 67 days, only by December 5, 1941, the Red Army stopped the enemy in the Moscow direction. The events of the counter-offensive near Moscow in December and the subsequent Rzheso-Vyazemsky offensive operation (01-20.04.1942) are described in the fourth chapter - "The Winter Offensive of the Red Army". By December 1941, the German troops of the Army Troupe "Center" were stretched over more than 1000 km, all divisions participated in the battles. Already by December 1, Fop Bock reported to his command about the impossibility of conducting offensive battles. The Soviet command correctly assessed the balance of forces on the front and chose the right place and time to start a counteroffensive. It was supposed to simultaneously strike at

mku with the forces of three fronts - the Western, Kalinin and the right wing of the Southwestern Front, to defeat the Germans north and south of Moscow and prevent the threat of its capture. Unexpectedly for the enemy, early in the morning of December 5, the troops of the Kalinin Front began to attack, on the next laziness, the troupes of the Western and Southwestern Fronts joined them.

During the Rzhev-Vizsm operation, the Soviets moved 250 km with the Pzhatek and Yukhnovsky, Moscow, Tula, and some areas of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions were liberated. But put out. the main task is to encircle and destroy the Rzhe-Vyazma pear

roving of the German troops - was not carried out. In the course of the battle in this direction, the Red Army suffered heavy losses - 776,889 men, of which 272,320 men were irretrievably lost, as well as 957 tanks, 7,296 guns and mortars, and 550 combat aircraft. According to German data, the losses of the army group "Celtr" in January-March 19427 amounted to about 55,800 people killed and missing, about 120 thousand wounded (c: 258),

"The final lama of the kinai is dedicated to the battles of the Vyazemsky bridgehead. The author considers the course of the 1st Rzhsvsko-Sychev offensive operation and the Mare opsration, which Soviet historiography rarely mentioned. This operation (such is known as the 2nd Raevsko-Sychevskaya) was developed simultaneously with Operation "Uranus" to defeat the pomeska troops near Stalingrad; with the aim of encircling and destroying the 9-4 pomeska army in the Rzhevsky ledge by the forces of the Zapalny and Kalinin frosht. During this operation, the Kaliishikiy and Western fronts irretrievably lost 70,400 men, 1,363 tanks, According to the official version, the decisive actions of the Soviet troops in the Varlevok-Yizemek direction did not give the enemy the opportunity to transfer troops to Stalingrad. losses The success of Operation Mare was the key to a further large-scale offensive, in particular, Operation Jupiter, during which the complete destruction of the Center troupe was plagued. "But the extreme ambitions of ambition overshadowed sober calculation and scrupulousness in assessing the situation. Mistakes made when planning the operation, he [G.K. Zhukov] tried to correct in its course due to the ruthless, and sometimes shameless, sulpous sacrifice of his troops not so much to Mars, but to Jupiter shining in the distance with glory "(p. 444)

SE Danube

Khazanov D.B.

FIGHT FOR AIR DOMINATION. M. YAUZA: EKSMO, 2008. - 607 p.: ill.

(Abstract)

King DB. Khazna, based on the material Ometsky and Pernerokh Prhivoe, in the task of the pilgrimages of the participants in the events, will appear very scrupulously pssadovanno: Years of sottopits and the first places of the Patriotic War (up to the description of individual volushiy bosses and sums of virtuous people). Amor Tast will look into the causes of the defeats of the Red Army Air Force, will evaluate the results of the battle for the sky, the monograph is never beaten often, is supplied with applications and includes rare photographs.

The first part of the inip is erased by the chapter devoted to the "Soton zone of the Soviet joint military forces and the aviation industry, petite stages of the formation and development of Soviet aviation and military doctrine, although this in the 1920-5 years of the Soviet Union, the development of zizstrosiya lagged behind the muzzle of world powers and even from Germany, which, according to the Vorsalsky Treaty, was banned from whining for a visa, by the end of the 1930s the USSR managed to oocyte, ovvastroitetnaya industrial equipment, and establish a bunch of personnel. The socket bot is an advanced theory applied by the sem, utah into service in that chicle and pacific germany. Tech no less successfully repel the strikes of the Luftwaffe in the VO of the Savat Air Force is not Ulalos. venno bah weakly osiznnost joking institutions, insufficient torment of pilots and commanders, Lack of accomodation, for the design of aircraft was widely used ork; there were enough of such overlaid and compact rallys and

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feeding equipment. The experience of the Civil War in Spain remained unaccounted for and was not widely discussed even in Eastern circles, therefore, with the tactics of German pilots, with their manner of conducting air combat, Soviet aviators were practically pessimistic. ispriate airfields. Air combat was considered the main method, and some aviation socialists argued that the battles unfolded near the practical height ceilings of aircraft. In real life, German aviation operated at low, and sometimes > extremely low altitudes" (p. 114). In addition to the above, which began in 1940. The formation of a large number of commercial aviation formations significantly reduced the readiness and sluggishness of the old, well-knitted units, where the most experienced personnel were twisted from. The heaviest blow to the wait for aviation and the aviation industry was also repressed in 1937-1938.

The second chapter of the book tells in detail about the first day of the war against the entire front of the German invasion. By June 22, 1941, the Soviet front-line avnatsnya had in the suburbs. in the zone of 9917 combat aircraft (except for auxiliary aircraft. dshsh), but for the most part they were beaten by obsolete machines, the mouth of the Germans in terms of survivability and speed, and often just nimusheshshy. However, there were 1317 new appeals. But these planes were just starting to arrive from the troops, they had a lot of arbitrary defects and design flaws, there were practically no spare parts for them, and the main thing was that the number of pilots who mastered them was too small. "18 II-2s, which were sent to the Baltic, Western and Kisvsky districts before the war," the author writes. - they had practically no combat value, but the first pear of the pilots who mastered armored attack aircraft at the Voronezh Plant No. 18, apparently, did not have time to arrive at the unit by the fateful hour. known" (33-34)

There were a little more than 2000 aircraft in the German squadrons for the destruction of capable aircraft, about the ability to counterforce forces in the directions of major strikes, excellent work on splitting, in advance

the location of Soviet airfields, the suddenness of the attack allowed the Luftwaffe to operate in the air with almost impunity. A poorly developed airfield network in the western recently

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The districts attached to the USSR also played into the hands of the Nazis - pam = excessive crowding of line-up planes on the available zorodromes made it possible for me to successfully camouflage and maneuver. One of the reasons for the linear arrangement of aircraft at airfields was the banal lack of tankers and vitotorters: chaotically located aircraft are difficult to quickly

prepare for departure. As for camouflage, although as early as December 27, 1940, the NPO had issued an order demanding that by July 1, 1941, the camouflage of all airfields located in the 500-kilometer border zone be finished, by the beginning of the war this work was far from complete.

From the first minutes of the war, Soviet aviators encountered the unexpected tactics of German pilots in the fall: small and medium-sized pears of bombers and fighters alternated, creating a kind of carousel, and hit the same airfield three or four times, almost completely destroying. The planes that took off on the first alarm "ovstekis" either returned to the already Broken airfields, or fell on the ground, after landing, under a new enemy blow. The lack of reliable communication did not allow either to effectively manage their air forces or to withdraw them from the reserve airfields in time. In addition, the Soviet command did not have a common parade ground for withdrawing units from under attack. Things were catastrophic in the Western Special Military District, whose troops covered the border for a length of 470 km from Grodno to Brest, inclusive.

stay to the border (15-20 km). "As follows from the German documents, on June 22 the Luftwaffe suffered heavy losses in Ukraine (where some of our aviation divisions were based at a remote

ÿThe author believes that on June 22, the Red Army aircraft lost at least 2,000 aircraft (shot down, destroyed at airfields, bropepnys). According to the materials of the German archives, the irretrievable losses (combat and non-combat) of the Luftwaffe amounted to 78 vehicles. Summing up the first line of the raging war, Khazanov writes: "It would not be a mistake to assert that the situation of confusion, the absence of firm leadership, brought more damage than immediate bombing and shelling by German aircraft" (p. 5).

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The third chapter describes the raids of the Soviet Air Force on Flandia at the end of June 1941. Formally, it remained neutral, but pledged to enter the war against the USSR 14 days after the start of the German invasion. Since Finland was considered in Moscow as an ally of Germany, the Soviet Stamka decided to launch a series of air strikes on Finnish airfields, starting on June 25, in which about 300 aircraft of the Air Forces of the Northern and North-Western fronts, the Baltic and Northern fleets took part. This was the only example of pre-emptive actions by the Soviet Air Force in 1941. It is also interesting that the plan of operation, apparently, was developed even before the start of the war, since "it was unlikely that in one night it was possible to prepare and ensure the military actions of several forces (with 139). Although less intense, raids on Finnish airfields continued until the 1st of July. Comparison of Soviet documents with Finnish ones, however, shows that the results of this operation were quite modest. This was facilitated by the fact that the Finnish airfields were located quite far from the border and were not carefully reconnoitered by Soviet aviation. Khazanov pays great attention to the description of the air war between Moscow and Moscow in the summer of 1941. He analyzes the construction and functioning of the air defense of the capital, provides information about the losses of the parties, about the dead and injured during the bombing, about the destruction in the city. During the summer raids on Moscow, the Nazi command

expected, in addition to the bombing of military facilities, also to sow panic among Muscovites, to suppress their will to resist. Aude: paco very strong anti-air defense of the city turned out

tardt, "the anti-aircraft defense of Moscow was so strong and well organized that the German pilots considered raids on the Russian capital more dangerous and risky than raids on Lonloi" (quoted from: ©. 220). According to the German aces, they "managed relatively easy to evade the interception of Russian night fighters, but the powerful anti-aircraft fire on the stagnation of the prsi, matoi zawie" (thus: according to estimates, they managed to illuminate from 29 to 33% of enemy aircraft who took part in the raids. The lorostatic barrier forced the Germans to raise the flight altitude to 5000 m, but "unfortunately

from

niyu, in the summer of 1941, many of their fighters suffered from blows against cables "(p. 214).

The first raid on Moscow took place on the night of July 22 by forces. 195 self-propelled guns (according to Soviet data, there were 220) and continued. four o'clock. During it, the German planes flew in an intermittent stream of small pears (from two to a dsakhti per group), operating from altitudes from 1000 to 4000 m, dropped 104 tons of high-explosive bombs and more than 46,00 pieces of small lighters. This raid brought the greatest damage to Moscow: "792 people were injured, 130 of whom died, 1166 fires broke out in the city, with 36 fires at military facilities, and \$ on the railway trans:

German crews were able to carry out the attack, Stalin, in a special decree on July 22, "declared gratitude to the participants in the raid. This was the first order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for encouragement since the beginning of the war" (p. 193). 81 defenders of Moscow were awarded. The Soviet command reported that 22 enemy bombers were shot down, 12 of them were destroyers. German documents confirm the loss of no more than seven aircraft.

The next night, "the Moscow metro was seriously damaged. One avizbomba pierced the ceiling of the pa tunnel. the Smolenskaya-Arbat crossing, another hit the overpass of the metro bridge nearby, and the third exploded at the entrance to the lobby near Arbatskaya Square. More than 100 people were injured, of which 60 died. The panic that arose on the stairs of the helator caused the greatest casualties. On the same night, no more than 76 air bombs of various types fell in the Kremlin and on Red Square "(p. 197). Subsequently, the number of aircraft was reduced, and ulars began to be delivered from a greater height. When the pear of the armies "Center" on July 30 was forced to go on the defensive, raids on Moscow continued in small groups and single aircraft, © in order to keep the forces of the Soviet air defense in constant tension. The last large pallet took place on the night of 11 August. It involved about 100 bombers in two waves. During the next raid on the night of August 12, a half-ton bomb completely destroyed the building of the Arsenal of the Moscow Kremlin. However, photographs taken by reconnaissance aircraft

show not too high

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how effective the German bombing was: most of the bombs hit parks, squares, stadiums.

In total, "as a result of the bombing © July 22 to 22, 1941, 736 Muscovites were killed and 3,513 people were injured. <..> Several large metropolitan enterprises, bridges, railway stations, urban and railway transport facilities suffered

220). The author believes that out of every German aircraft shot down at the end of June = the beginning of August, there was one lost Soviet one. In total, in 1941, the Pemts made 76 raids on Moscow.

The last chapter of the first part tells about the patrols carried out by the forces of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet and long-range bombers: surveillance aircraft on the oil fields of Romania and its naval base Constanta, the first strike on which took place on the night of June 23, was well organized and turned out to be for the enemy suddenly new, these raids did not have a decisive impact on the course of the war, however, they forced the Germans and the Romanians to keep significant air defense forces in constant readiness.

The second part of the book is devoted to military operations on the Southwestern Front and the defense of Kiev. In three months, the enemy managed to advance in this direction more than 600 km deep into Soviet territory, capturing huge trophies. By the beginning of the war, the Air Force of the Kyiv Special Military District was the most numerous of all the border districts, including almost 30% of the offshore aviation, concentrated in the Western Theater. "The KVO aviation was 2.3 times superior to the Shemetsky one, besides, its main forces were not defeated at the battles in the first days of the war. Describing in detail the actions of the air forces of the parties from June 22 to September 26, when the Kiev defensive operation ended in the defeat of the Red Army, the author shows how the inability to lead the troops, the lack of communications, the dispersal of aviation forces along the entire front eventually led to a catastrophe." To this, Khazanov notes, one should add such a situation when all (1) positions of the commanders of the Air Force of the armies remained vacant, and the pilots were recruited often random officers who had no operational training" (p. 302),

The division of aviation into army and front-line aviation complicated its management and thereby reduced the effectiveness of supporting ground forces. The absence of representatives of the Air Force at the combined-arms checkpoints led to a large loss of time between the adoption of a decision and the rise of aircraft into the air. As a result, the situation

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beforehand, she had time to change the carnality, so that "the Krasnovodsk-mys fired at me, and sometimes they shot down planes with beautiful cars. on board, and bombs fell on the positions of their troops" (9.304). In the absence of a close connection, "the aviators used the exact line of combat contact, the lack of designation by ground troops with special signals of the front line forced the crews, for fear of hitting their positions, to choose targets located in the depths of enemy defenses" (©. 387). Op. The loss of communications and the lack of intelligence also affected the 6-4 and 12-4 armies, supported by aviation, semicircled by Uman, and then, when the encirclement stake closed, the impossibility of establishing an air bridge. Despite the fact that about half of all sorties were spent in the struggle for a state permit into the water, the Germans were completely incapable of fighting dive-bombers and, moreover, "the silhouettes of many of your planes were badly called Yaks, Pe-2. Su-2. by, it happened to be shot down and well out. chevy SV and DZ "(304)

In August, the work of headquarters improved, the issues of interaction between ground troops and the Air Force were worked out, but there was no real cooperation on airplanes did not make it possible to establish control over the parts of the earth. In practice, control consisted of an orgasm. take-off and landing in the air, the pilots acted independently. The night work of bombing aircraft was established. There was a way to reduce losses. However, the Germans believed that the Soviet bombardment had little effect on the battle. There were not even signs of any system or concept. Concentration of effort, in short, it was desirable at all times to constantly keep patrols on duty over the battle field. There were zones (like Kiev) of purely defensive actions by fighters, and which planes almost constantly patrolled at a thousand from 1000 to 4500 m.

Almost until the very last moment, the Soviet leadership believed that the encirclement of the capital of Ukraine would not happen, that "our air force sat down with their strikes and would not stop, then, in any case,



represses the rapid advance of the enemy's motorized mechanized corps. During the negotiations © front commander

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on the night of September 11, the chief of the General Staff of the BM. Shaposhenikov stated, referring to aviation intelligence data, that only small enemy corps had leaked into the rear, which had already been partially destroyed by aviation" (p. 475). But already on the evening of September 14, the Germans waved the encirclement. The author places the blame for the tragedy erupting from Ukraine on the top military and political leaders of the country, headed by Stalin.

In the third part, the monograph tells about the German aviation's missions to Leningrad and Kroishtadt. Initially, the Pemtsy had only 78 aircraft of various types in this direction, the activities of which were mainly limited to laying sea mines and reconnaissance. Already during the first air alert announced in Leningrad on the night of June 23, anti-aircraft gunners managed to shoot down one of the 12 enemy aircraft, and "take the crew prisoner. By July 23, Soviet searchlighters had organized the first light field with an area of 25 by 30 km over the area where enemy scouts were passing, and by 30 Aesol, the Leningrad region was covered by 297 outpost posts. From the first day of the war, air defense fighters began combat duty; The author notes that for

th 40 days of combat "97% of sorties were made for the performance of tasks directly air defense" (e.507). The creation of ambushes of fighters at a distance of 70-150 kilometers from Leningrad at the airfields of Chudovo, Malaya Vishera, Lyuban turned out to be very effective, which led to a number of unexpected attacks on fascist bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. Moreover, the air formations of the front managed to save you. high combat capability, and their losses were much less than on other fronts.

The strength of German aviation increased significantly after the Germans, in accordance with Hitler's directive No. 34 of July 30, went over to the defensive in the Moscow direction and transferred the main efforts to the phalanxes of the Eastern Front. By \$ August, when the troops of the Army Group "Sevsr" took the offensive, With about 750 aircraft (without military and transport aviation), the Air Force of the Northern Front consisted of a little more than 1000 aircraft: Comrade, and approximately 20% of them were machines of a new type and level their mastery of personnel increased significantly, but the forces of the aviation were again dispersed along the entire front. When the Soviet command succeeded in concentrating at least part of its forces on the most dangerous sector, the actions of our pilots

willows

seriously hampered the life of the fascists, as, for example, on the King-Ep direction, demolition bons took on the character of real battles. However, the front was approaching Levin. On the 4th of April, the city was hit for the first time by a ranged artillery barrage. the opposite, and Yo sitabr began massive German raids. 20th of the end of the month, when the ra went out and the near ones approached the mountain, it became practically impossible to effectively fight it with the forces of the remaining aviation of the British Air Force. . mipyavshichsya peposreletately Stava. mm mish

Migarlji Ji.

WAR OF DESTRUCTION: COMBAT AND GENOCIDE ON THE EASTERN FRONT,  
1941

(Abstract)

Meras © MAK OR AMMINP.ATIOX: SOMBAT AHR SEMOSTE OM TNE BAZTEVM RLOMT, 1941. - apat  
(Maguzhap) sÿs: Kozutat & shee, 2006. - KhU, 177 p. #1.

The reference monograph by Jeffrey P. Migarji (American Holocaust Memorial Museum) is devoted to the crimes of the Nazis in the occupied Soviet territory - primarily repressions against the local population, the genocide of Jews, etc. ill-treatment of Soviet soldiers. In addition, the author seeks to explore and show the relationship between the occupation policy of the Germans and the situation at the front. The theme of the atrocities of the "war of annihilation" has been riveting the attention of historians for quite a long time. In this case, as the author himself admits, we are dealing not with independent research, but rather with an attempt to generalize the extensive material available.

The author considers the mythologization of the Pems military shadow, especially in terms of the alleged moral correctness of the Wehrmacht military personnel, to be an important obstacle to the study of the war between St. and Germany. In addition, he will note the problems of accessibility of sources and the opportunistic use of the memoirs of the defeated generals for anti-communist purposes, as well as the artificial, in his opinion, separation of military operations and war crimes. Migarji insists on the ground of a certain connection between the "military" and genocidal "aspects of war and sets himself the task of "connecting both of these aspects within the framework of a brief essay on the beginning of the campaign" (p. XIII),

willows

In his work, the author seeks to find answers to questions about what the ideas of the German leadership were and how much they influenced the overall command; why the Nazi leadership decided to go to war with the Soviet Union and what was the basis of its conviction in the future whiteness of Germany; the wear of enemies on and off the battlefield and how those goals and expectations have changed over time. To answer these questions, the author conducted an analysis of the long-term cultural and social trends in Germany, which led to the war about what is necessary for victory; military development of the occupied territories, as well as their implementation in the first. the most important months of the Patriotic War (before the beginning of 1942, when the failure of the blitzkrieg plans became obvious), the monograph consists of an introduction, six chapters, a conclusion and two appendices

In the first chapter - "The Roots of the War of Annihilation" - the author points out that by the beginning of the 20th century. they felt their general superiority to other peoples, as well as the threats that seemed to them coming from all sides. The unexpected defeat in the First World War, when the German troops were still fighting on the territory of the enemy, gave rise to the opinion of a "stab in the back", as if by izessin by the sours and the communists, which was accompanied by an increase in hostility to both. The cruelty and destruction of the war period made violence habitual in the nation, and right-wingers considered it a hack quite well.

a feasible means to achieve their goals Philosophical "conservative revolutionaries", revanchism

The era of purification, the forging of a new man, as well as the spreading doctrine of social Darwinism also greatly influenced the idea of war as the main tool for global transformation and conflict resolution. more than once stated that the purpose of the war > not to achieve any milestone and the complete destruction of the enemy. We must not forget about the understanding of Sebe. tap, "the necessary living space", the spread of ideas about which the author connects with the fact that during the war there was contact between the Pem people and the whiter rural population  
pa.

Thus, the struggle © by the Jews, the struggle © by the USSR (we present ourselves as an expansionist "Jewish-Bolshevik state") and the struggle for "living space" determined the course

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the Nazis in repulsion of "Russia and all vassal border countries" (4).

All this was accompanied by the development of a new concept of total war, which was based both on the idea of confiscating all resources to achieve victory, and on the admissibility (or even desirability) of using in one's own interests or destroying any source of enemy power: military necessity will write off everything, including the same hostile attitude towards both the military and civilians of the enemy. In addition, the new concept required the achievement of unity in society in order to avoid being stabbed in the back. The notion that the "Great War" (in the Social Darwinist sense, not just like World War I) is not over, led to the idea of the need for "re-armament", the reorganization of society, the Czech, military, economic, and scientific spheres. To combat weakness and disunity, it was supposed to develop a social state, carry out cultural modernization, fight corruption and militarize society. The most important element of such a system became the "Führer principle", which, in particular, assumed the literal execution of orders (which the losing generals would later point out to). However, the author notes that there was no tradition of automatic obedience in the German army; moreover, there was a tendency to independent thinking. However, back in the nineteenth century, there was an idea that the commander should give orders that reflect the mood of his subordinates, and in order to remove social barriers between the commander and his people, indoctrination is necessary - the introduction of a common ideological concept to form certain moods,

Of course, the existence of these tendencies did not yet mean the inevitability of the subsequent development of events, especially since they did not concern the majority of the population. However, according to Mitarski, the belief in one's own racial superiority and "necessary living space", hatred of the Jewish Bolshevism, faith in the inescapable struggle of peoples and the right of Germ

and to use any means to win, the active desire to be sure that it would be total - all this led in the end to the "onslaught to the east."

The author believes that already in the German-Polish war of 1939 it is possible to detect an ideological conflict, although not too

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explicit. In addition, it was during the Polish campaign that the rapid offensive of the Wehrmacht army units was first accompanied by the use of special SS units - Einsatzkommandos - to control vast areas in the rear of the army in the field, as well. also for repressions against the civilian population in the occupied territories. As the author notes, c) there were contradictions between the Wehrmacht and the SS, but rather of a tactical nature: the military did not approve of the mass executions of civilians for the purpose of intimidation. At the same time, they were worried not so much about the lack of morale, but about possible problems with discipline, which could affect the fighting qualities of the Wehrmacht. There was also a natural desire to move away from possible cruelties,

Don't get your hands dirty. However, in general, the situation was quite acceptable: my level of cooperation between the army, the SS and the police. The army itself next time will be better prepared for a "racial" war.

In the second chapter - "Plans and preparations, 1940-1941" - the author emphasizes that the war between Germany and the Soviet Union was not spontaneous and required more than a bare preparation. Stalin's position in the same period was determined by the expectation of mutual exhaustion of the Europeans, the desire not to provoke Hitler and the readiness to continue cooperation with the Reich. The shockingly 'quick defeat of France showed that no one among the German leadership would take the next step in the global confrontation.

in ready. Germany did not have a way to quickly defeat the Soviet Union, but she was incapable of revolting actions at the moment, which made it possible for Germany to open a second front on

east of Europe. Under these conditions, aspirations turned in favor of the USSR, a victory over which would not only deprive England of Moshe

rin, new resources (food, raw materials, trul). which could be used against England and, in the end, in the opinion of the author, against the United States, which, as a result, would have no chance of resisting.

The author emphasizes that Hitler often based his assessments of other nations on unreliable information and simplifying concepts. Hence his self-confidence in the results of the French campaign on the technical, moral, intellectual and racial superiority of the Reich, the belief that the struggle for survival justifies everything, by that. more in the face of such a perverted and malevolent force,

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like the Soviet Union. From a similar position, the USSR, presented as a "state of the Slavs under the rule of the svresv" (p. 24), that © from the point of view of racial soria meant ineffective leadership, having discontented minorities on its territory, having undergone "purges reflecting political instability" (e. 24), was considered to be a weak enemy, which, in turn, made it possible to hope for a quick victory. In fact, the invasion plan initially contained the seeds of its own failure. military plans were developed, and only then, in conditions of uncertainty and conflict of priorities, with a significant variety of landscapes and a large number of supplies, the logistics of supply were worked out, turning the whole campaign into a whirlwind, Miki noted that, in the wake of the sowing aggression against the USSR, the generals shared the attitude Hitler to the "Chevrey-Bolshevik" state, recognized the conflict as necessary and inevitable and also counted on a quick and easy victory, which pushed the Fuhrer to his decision. The author also points to the impossibility of separating, as researchers did in the past, economic and military plans and ill intentions. Not only racism and the concept of total

stink

strategic and political-economic goals, but also the difficulties of securing and guarding, coupled with the desire for a quick victory = all this greatly affected the degree of cruelty of the war.

The Nazi leadership was aware that its

Slunze of "active or passive resistance, attempted rebellion or flight." The matter was not limited to a kind of "remission of sins" for special pears in the army's zone of action, orders and instructions were also issued demanding ruthlessness towards the enemy, which was justified by his special Bolshevik nature.

Due to their belief in a quick victory, the German leadership was not ready for the influx of a large number of prisoners, which, in turn, caused their insufficient supply.

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food, medicines, housing, transportation, work. The disdainful attitude towards the prisoners was justified by the fact that the USSR did not sign the Geneva Convention. The author indignantly describes the movement of prisoners on foot to the camps, which, as the front moved eastward, found themselves farther and farther behind the lines. In addition, there were not enough camps, which is why the prisoners had to build them on their own, often in the absence of materials and tools. cops, and as a result, the front camp consisted of a wire fence, towers and primitive shelters or even pores in the ground. A sufficient level of supply was associated not only with organizational problems, when the needs of the front did not allow taking prisoners, but also to a large extent with indifference ki fate caused by orders

"keep your distance" at 06: value with them and a sense of your own superiority. Perhaps this was also due to the fact that initially the representatives of the Aumei command did not plan to play a significant role in the occupation policy. Their calculation was based on defeating the Soviet government, and then ceding control of new territories to representatives of political power. In this connection, the security forces were not trained to control large areas in the event of widespread resistance. In addition, an additional load fell on the spzbbktsia system due to the need to ensure the activities of the "teams to restore order".

The local population, according to Migarji, was at first quite friendly towards the Germans, which made it possible to appoint local authorities from local residents, thereby somewhat reducing the burden on the Reich forces. In relation to the inhabitants of the USSR on the part of the Germans, there was a certain kind of property: on the one hand, he was on the other - they were simultaneously recorded in dirty, dishonest, racially unvaluable, hostile. So arrogance and lack of faith turned out to be "stronger than friendliness, and the manifestation of tolerance was not a change in the general repressive policy, but selective application, for example, "accusing Russians, svresv, communes of using takhtiha of scorched earth and sabotage" (p. 66) . Most of the officers believed that the only way to weaken or suppress resistance was to show maximum cruelty. Hitler emphasized in this regard that guerrilla warfare had its advantages, in particular, zet

opportunity

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to eradicate everything that opposes the Reich, Terror was seen as a walking tool to break the wolf of Prague to the resistance. all the more so since, according to the leadership of Germany, "the Russians are accustomed to cruel measures (p. 65)

audit, including the collective response system. By

nose behavior was in sharp contrast with the old people's stories about the occupation of the First World War. when the Germans behaved more correctly and were more likely to reform and improve the zagins of the local residents, according to the Torah, the wordless nature of the papistek occupation caused a deep prick among the population and led to an ever-growing support for the party, despite the strong Zitnstamn sentiments Only the Hitler regime, the abolition of Migordzhi, could with their leistals to convince people that life is better under Stalin

As a result, by the end of another 1941 7, six infantry divisions, as well as security guards, auxiliary local forces, and allied detachments, were involved in guarding the lines of defense. Death relied on pthionium, sabolai aid to the partisans, early weapons Ralio, communisines. hoy, literature, The logical connection to sweat "partavi" - "Balyashka - "svrsno" was especially common. Blyba < saroi, within the framework of the ideology of Nazism, was not only self-sufficient, but also perceived as a maple for the destruction of the USSR, as well as a way to reduce the number of extra mouths. ranged from timid humility to zhutazism and support for the Einsatzkommandos of the SNB. Janem, ammunition, transport, interference. In the best light, the army remained neutral As the author notes. a 19417. Teperals sceco understood the scale of death and torment with which. The third chapter is devoted to the events of June Amusta 19411. Av.

The initial defeat achieved by the Germans in the first weeks of the war was nevertheless limited, the Wehrmacht was superior to the enemy in terms of these parameters, but for a similar offensive against the refueling tankers, the forces of the East were not enough. Despite the ponssn. heavy losses, the Red Army continued to stubbornly resist, the activity of the Soviet troops was undermined by bad roads

the power of the Wehrmacht's transport system, which led to interruptions in the delivery. Soviet stocks of food, fuel and equipment, captured by the Germans in the border areas, also turned out to be insufficient and, moreover, of poor quality. In addition, shortly after the start of the campaigns, disagreements between the political and military leadership on how to proceed

Under these conditions, the leadership of the Reich was forced to combine

solution. As shown by dashed issues, there was also no unity between the military and the political leadership: the army rather stood for the protection of the rear, a solid supply of lilies of salvation and freedom to use the local zhonomka, the tolahah napnst elite laid the main emphasis on the fight against their political and "racial" opposing forks = formerly only communists and svrsy, Serious contradictions between the euphemists and izshiists. however, not yet. no one because the immediate task and she and the other vili ele. At the same time, the belief in an easy outcome of the confrontation gave rise to a disregard for peaceful pastoralism, and faith in the effectiveness of cruelty only led to the unwinding of the Nasaa spiral.

Chapter 1 deals with the events of August "Eptabr 1941. The author describes the arrogance between Hitler and the military leadership on the issue of further latitudes (haat of Ukraine and the Donboss or the attack on Moscow), and analyzes from. the wear of researchers to the Führer's Decision will make a paste. lash on the central section of the dandy, noting, however, at the same time that at that moment nothing could guarantee the victory of Ger. mania. In other words. Between the generals, faith began to spread that one last successful attack, which the guarantor would be able to. Rawat, victory n thereby injure supply problems

The load on the Wehrmacht's rear departments continued to increase, both due to the lengthening of the supply line as they moved deeper into the Soviet territory, and in the media with an increase in the number of prisoners. At once, serious contradictions between ideological and practical considerations about the former volinkalo

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The conviction of the Germans at the quick end of the war contributed to the dismissive attitude of the prisoners of war; camps for their maintenance were not built in sufficient numbers and were not prepared for the winter. Foot marches of prisoners to the rear were a frequent occurrence. Their provision with food was actually carried out on the basis of residual income.

In August-September there is an escalation of violence, especially among the Jews. Simultaneously with the mass executions, the genocide mistrumeites, including mobile gas chambers, were sacked, more "effectively". With their help, it was supposed only to hide the traces of direct German participation in the assassination and to help cope with the stress that had died down on the perpetrators. According to: the policy of genocide at this stage met with understanding at any level and easily found justification according to the already familiar scheme of "Jewren-Communists-Partisans". The army organized supplies, provided transport, registered weapons, guarded them and transported them. Mostly the vosins held dis. dance from direct participation in the killings, but sometimes this happened.

The author notes that the Soviet leadership was clearly not up to the task of losing such vast territories and organizing armed resistance on them, and was forced to improvise. In the first months of the war, the support of the partisans by the local population was rather limited. On the contrary, this pernod was characterized by the appearance of a large number of hollaboraciocysts. The inhabitants of the occupied regions found themselves in a difficult situation, being forced to choose between the danger from the partisans, who demanded food, shelter, work and sometimes threatened death, and the Germans, who also demanded food (from collective farms), work, information about partisans and also

threatened with death. However, the repressive policy of the invaders convinced the population of the impossibility of cooperation with them, which led to an increase in resistance.

The fifth chapter is "The last rush to Moscow and the systemic collapse, October-December 1941." Posyakiya operation "Typhoon" and its failure. The author notes that the existing technical and tactical superiority of the Wehrmacht made it possible to fight even greater successes than expected at the first stage of the offensive, but this was not enough for a complete victory. There were several reasons for this. Weather conditions also played their role: the German offensive coincided in time with the beginning of the thaw, following

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which was severely cold. However, the deputy actor, Kras, under these conditions experienced the same problems as Ver. macht, i.e., the main reason for the failure of the Typhoon operation was not the weather, but the planning, the consequences of which were. interruptions in supply, problems with the replenishment of active troops, separation of mobile formations from infantry. In addition, the net number of the Soviet armed forces exceeded the German calculations by 1.5 times, in the autumn of TE. Soviet commanders okpovyvazhsya on received information about Zosya's plans Yapo: in, transferred half of Moscow to political forces © Dalykto of the East. The German leadership clearly did not realize all the grayness of the current situation; at the beginning of October, Hitler announced that they had finally laid down, "the conditions for the" aftermath of colossal force "(from 9), which will allow crushing the raga before winter, the planned rates of income were at times overestimated so much that in the long run to fulfill the return. if orders were received on time, it was possible even if they were absent. twin resistance) By the beginning of December, it became clear that the war was a protracted one, because Varmant had no effective attack or effective defense, the Germans still had time to defend themselves, steal. There were more positions, there were not enough living quarters, Winter clothes, fuel, building materials, ammunition, all finds ® deep. oh rear. In these conditions, polcherklvast Migarlvi, on the first parade ground, the economic and moral factors of the rear were put forward, and this is industrial, the author points out. cynical manipulation, deliberate neglect and murderous cruelty "(from 015), which rather strengthened the resistance than reduced it. Continued to insult the position of the prisoners, who, as a result of the Red Army's tactics of wading the land, had nothing to feed The author" Kiroch notes that in accordance © international law, the impossibility for the Wehrmacht pocket to feed the Germans was the reason for starving them. The supply situation began to improve from the end of October: it became clear that the war was a drag. slya, and permanskos leadership expected to use pasi. As a labor force, by the end of the observation, the cessation of foot crossings of prisoners and the prohibition of their transfer in open wagons (mortality during transportation, however, still ranged from 25 to 7555) Approximately at the same arena

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Prisoners began to be divided into categories according to the level of working capacity. Fully functional (first category) false

cool, warm barracks, medical assistance. The fate of those unable to work (the third category) was not clearly spelled out, but, as the author points out, it was easy to predict

Having found prisoners after the capture of Kisva, Vizma, Bryansk by the Wehrmacht, there were more than 1,300,000 people. Even understanding their prices. As a labor force, the army was unable to feed them, like the villages. A project for a special "Russian bread" containing 50% rye flour, 20% sugar beet mulch, 20% cellulosic mixture, and 10% straw or leaves was discussed, but food delivery difficulties created obstacles to even this kind of ration increase.

Prolotzhalsya and gepocil svresv; One of the reasons for the failure to supply the army was the detachment of a significant number of ambassadors for their transportation to the places of destruction - and this despite the fact that, according to some estimates, about 1,500,000 svres managed to escape to the east in a timely manner. From that

the circumstances that the German reports of this period are characterized by the desire of their authors to describe things with their own imeds, including the use of such, according to the author, explicit names such as "Jewish communists", "Jewish clogs pazhiiki", "Jewish marauders", Migirlzhi concludes that the organizers of the massacres were aware that what they were doing lay outside the bounds of generally accepted moral norms.

In the last, sixth chapter - "Failure and its consequences, until

beginning of 1942", the author examines the situation that developed in the late autumn - early winter of 1941. The position of the Wehrmacht during this period deteriorated to the limit. The German troops were stretched out on a front of about 1800 km and were forced to conduct boom in bad weather, in snowdrifts and in the cold. It was necessary to spend the winter right on the front line, while the army had neither winter clothes, nor positions that could give defense, neither on the front lines, nor in the rear. It was also impossible to equip such positions: saying: "the lack of manpower in the front line (where only troops were at the disposal of the German command) and material resources (all transport was involved in the transport of ammunition and fuel to ensure the continuation of the - quenching). People could be taken from the guard units and sizb

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zheniya, but then the goods would get stuck at the bases or fall under the blow of the partisans. With heavy losses, in the conditions of a lack of supplies and a shortage of reservists, the grmli did not have the opportunity to rest and gather strength. Bosovoy spirit fell. As the author points out, "rosheins to attack to the end came to the end" (p. 130)

At the same time, Migarji emphasizes, the Red Army continued to resist and the collapse of the Soviet regime will never happen. Moreover, the military fire grew: © December 11, Germany was at war © USA. Hitler, according to the author, knew that sooner or later this would happen, however, the military for the most part underestimated the potential of the new enemy and were sure that even under the worst scenarios in 1942, there would be no decisive battles © by the Americans. Under these conditions, it was planned that troops. located on the Eastern Front, should rest and gather strength during the winter, and in 1942 attack Murmansk in order to prevent sea supplies of strategic resources to the USSR, and the Caucasus for subsequent access to the Middle East. A German victory in these areas would deprive its opponents of economically and strategically important areas, which, coupled with Japan's success in the Far East, was supposed to lead to the surrender of Great Britain.

The obvious prolongation of the war gave rise to the idea of a more intensive use of local raw materials, food, labor resources and active assistance to the local population, so that the populace would not help the partisans. However, the policy of "kiut and carrot" in general

the Germans had little to offer, but they were cruel and arrogant in their demands. There were no genuine attempts to respond to the requests of the inhabitants of the occupied territories, just as, as the author emphasizes, there was no growth of freedom or se. shallow reform. Instead, there were requisitions and labor service. Disappointment, hunger, infringement of rights led to open hostility of the local population. The growth of partisan activity continued even in winter conditions, including due to the fact that significant forces of the SS, police, Wehrmacht were deployed at the front. Under these conditions, often the maximum that opposed the partisans was the protection of convoys and key points.

Under the conditions of a protracted war, the final solution of the Snrey question, in the opinion of the Nazis, shifted from the scope of long-term goals to priority ones. In connection with the slow advance on the flank, a second

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paradise, a more elaborate "cleansing", The construction of death camps began. During 1942, more than 50% of the total number of victims of the Holocaust died in them.

In conclusion, the author sums up the results of the analysis and makes a number of conclusions about the essence of the war that took place. According to the mission, the German invasion in 1941 (and the preparations for it) is very instructive in highlighting the relationship of ideology, culture, politics, economics and military. no matter. To the question of what brought the Germans to the USSR and to destroy civilizational norms, the author answers: the First World War had no consequences, anti-Marxism, racial theory. Some of the Wehrmacht soldiers shared the goals declared by the Nazis, some were simply confident in an easy victory, the Red Army was considered weakened after Stalin's purges Dvina and Dnieper will lead to the inevitable collapse of the Stalinist regime. The initial phase of the campaign seemed to confirm these predictions and was so successful that it forced the German leadership to consider the whitewash already achieved and make plans for the post-war use of soldiers. However, as the author shows, nothing could guarantee victory in this campaign,

ÖOsioviöy reason for the defeat of Hitler in the war was, according to the author. the very setting of such an overly ambitious goal from a major point of view as the victory over the fall of the USSR, and as a result = poor planning, during which the size of the Soviet Union, the quality of roads, the harsh climate, and the strength of the Stalinist regime were not taken into account (the author makes a special emphasis on the fact that the German leadership did not take into account the degree of devotion of the population to Stalin, although the Germans themselves lived in a totalitarian state), nor the size of the Red Army, as well as the significant human and industrial resources of the USSR. The cruelty of the occupiers played its role In the face of the failure of the Barbarossa plan and the absence of an alternative plan in the event of a protracted war, especially after the US entered the war, a miracle was needed for the victory of Germany, in its aftermath.

The Red Army and the Soviet state were not defeated in 1941 even after a series of severe defeats. By the end of 1941, 1. Leningrad was only under siege, Moscow continued to defend itself, and Soviet troops were also destroyed in the oge. According to av

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But the victory of the Wehrmacht was lost precisely in the snows near Moscow, and the defeat that took place near Staligrad was only an emotional turning point.

Initially, it was supposed to end the war by the beginning of September, which corresponded to the German traditions of quick victories beginning in the 19th century. With such plans, local residents were not important and were not even considered as temporary allies against the Stalinist regime. On the contrary, the author cites data on special planning for hunger and labor duties and on disdain for prisoners. The army, which controls the occupying territories, deliberately allowed the commission of crimes, and even more than that, inspired the soldiers not at all.

The occupation policy, in the opinion of the author, was not only unacceptable, but also highly effective, since it aroused the indignation of the local residents. in the opinion of the author, it was the course of the genocide of the Svrsev in the occupied Soviet territory that had a strong influence on the final solution of the Serey question "on an all-Iranian scale. The ongoing war made it possible to resettle more and more remote areas. Under these conditions, the pacist leadership decided to wait, so Moreover, the events held in the "eastern territories" showed that the mass extermination of people using the latest technology and organizational means (gas chambers and death camps) is a completely feasible task.

Concluding the study, the author acknowledges that the policy of Germany was certainly aimed at the conquest and colonization of new territories, and thus sentenced millions to hunger, labor duties, and death. Iyeno the inhumanity of politics, but the zitor sees only the flashbacks as the main reasons

Germany's defeat in the war

St. Wtuakin

11

THE WEHRMACHT IN THE WAR IN THE EAST: FRONT AND REAR, 1941-1942 v.

(Abstract)

I \MENEMASNT IM OSTKEÿE: HERE IS HR MISHTAKISSNES NIMTEVGAMO, 194142. - Mapssp: V, OMspÿomte spar, 2009. USh, 928 5:13

Quite a voluminous monograph by Christian Hartmann (Institute of Contemporary History, Munich) is devoted to the everyday life of German soldiers on the Eastern Front in 1941-1942. Kimg consists of a prologue, an introduction, five chapters and a conclusion; The appendix contains reference information about the divisions of the Wehrmacht, from the material of which the study was carried out, as well as about the punitive units operating in their rear.

In the introduction, the author gives a general description of the problem under study, the sources and methods used, and also describes and substantiates a selection of Wehrmacht compounds under study.

Hartmann notes that the history of the Wehrmacht, and above all the problem, is one hundred

man, so the question of responsibility

ÿfor many Germans, he grew up in a different way about the possible personal responsibility of their own fathers and grandfathers. The history of military crimes as such, including those committed by Wehrmacht military personnel, has already been studied in sufficient detail, but the study  
their origins

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and prerequisites, according to the author, the steppe of the initial stage is plowed up. A necessary condition in order to truly deeply understand these origins and prerequisites, the historian considers the study of the everyday life of a simple soldier, his self-awareness, mycenium, mentality, attitude to the Nazi ideology.

"The indicated considerations determine the temporal, strategic and organizational framework of the study: the author is interested in the situation on the Eastern Front (the main land type

armament of the first year of the Soviet-German confrontation (June 1941-June 1942). , which he and a hundred servicemen pursued in this murderous, as well as suicide, operation "(p. 16-17). The author also believes that a thorough study is best done on material from the highest level of the division. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, as Hartman notes, the divisional level is still extremely poorly studied, since the "traditional" military history is interested in larger combat units (corps, arym and groups of arym), while the history of divisions has long been remained the lot of "war veterans and apologists." Secondly, the study of the history of divisions presents miteres from a methodological point of view.

view, since the division, as the smallest formation, having a permanent composition (unlike a corps or an army) and at the same time capable of performing independent tasks (unlike smaller units), is a kind of intersection point between the operational level and the level tactical, where there are teams of smaller size (regiment, battalion, company), which are characterized by fairly close relations between servicemen. Finally, thirdly, the study of the history of Libyas allows us to explore. the idea of using a huge number of the most diverse sources, among which the author singles out three main corpses - official documentation of divisional headquarters (lonessia, combat logs, various reports, etc.); sources of personal

(descent (letters, diaries, memoirs); personal files and court cases, including materials from post-war trials in cases of war crimes.

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Hartmann's research is based on the material of five Germanic ones. formations that have risen on the Eastern Front in similar conditions: the 4th tank, 45th and 296th infantry and 221st security divisions, as well as the 580th commandant's office of the army rear area. The author specifically chose the unity, the maximum diversity in terms of its organization and places of formation. Thus, the 4th Panzer Division, formed in November 1938, belonged to the most technically advanced military branch of the Wehrmacht, had experience of fighting in Poland and in France by the nucture of 1941 it was considered an elite one. The 45th Infantry Division, formed in April 1938, was one of the most capable formations that made up the combat core of the German army, while the 296th Infantry Division was formed in February 1940. and Lo Jun EAT. did not participate in boh. At the same time, the 45th Infantry Division was formed in Austria after the Anschluss on the basis of units of the former Austrian army, which could not have affected the mentality and command of the personnel. The 4th Panzer Division, in the words of the author, "technically and politically, a product of the latest times, remained true to the feudal traditions of the cavalry regiments", which made it difficult to assimilate such a Nazi ideologeme as a racial war on destruction (23). The 221st security division will represent the occupying troops, as well as the 80th commandant's office of the army rear area. The latter (German Kopshapbzmi tbsileikivez Apiseveje 580, abbreviated as Codec 580), strictly speaking, was not a division m', it was a special unit designed to maintain order in the rear of one of the armies, however, it was comparable to a division in terms of organization and strength. The author emphasizes that up to 90% of the Wehrmacht divisions that fought on the Eastern Front in 1941-1942 vols. belonged to the same types as the salts) collected by him for his study (©. 25).

The first chapter of the monograph is devoted to the organizational structure of the German divisions. Hartmann notes that any army strives for the maximum suppression of human individu- ality: in particular, this applied to the Reichswehr Wehrmacht © with the motto "Officers of the General Staff have no names." As a consequence, in order to really deep understand the behavior of specific military personnel, it is necessary to know well the organization of the army under study and the place of individual soldiers and officers in this complex organism. In most detail the author, as

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For example, he analyzes the organization, as well as the armament of the Wehrmacht infantry division, since more than half of the German divisions that took part in the Second World War belonged to this type. The features of the talk and security divisions and commandant's offices of the army's rear areas are also described. The chapter also contains some information directly about those formations, the history of which is analyzed in the kimge.

The second chapter describes the individual composition of these compounds. The author examines their officer corps in the most detailed way: the chapter provides a statistical and sociocultural analysis of the biographies of several hundred officers. Features of origin, education, career, mentality of several generations are compared. Describing the rank and file

of intersectorial relations, Hartman analyzes the surviving statistical data, and also describes the places where five divisions were formed and deployed in peacetime. In Germany, in contrast to the Soviet Soyu, the extraterritorial principle of recruiting BP was not adopted. missions, and a significant part of the rank and file of each formation was recruited in the same region where it was stationed: thus, information about the places of formation and deployment of the formation allows us to draw certain conclusions about the mentality of its soldiers, as well as about their attitude towards Nazi ideas which enjoyed unequal popularity in different parts of the country. I'm trying to get information about the combat capabilities of each division

sha different stages of ce history zet the same statistics of awards. One can, for example, trace how the 296th Infantry Division, formed in wartime and long considered a second-rate formation, already in the spring of 1942 overtook the 45th Infantry Division in terms of the number of Iron Crosses of the 2nd class, the combat capabilities of which were irreversibly torn apart by the campaign of 1941. An analysis of the statistics of losses allows us to draw certain conclusions about the nature of the hostilities that one or another unit had to conduct.

In the third chapter, Hartman analyzes in detail the actual military context in which the divisions of interest to him functioned during the second half of 1941 and the first half of 1942. All five formations operated in osioviom as part of the troupe of the armies "Center" and partially - as part of the army group "South"; The 45th Infantry Division in June-July 1941 besieged the Brest Fortress. The author divides the studied pernod into five stages: sweeps

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the bath of troops in front of the paladinsm from the USSR: border battles (shupmyul 1941); prolongation of the offensive (in August-November 1941); crisis (December 1941 - February 1942) positional warfare (March June 1942). Tracing the path of each non-piti divin, Hartman shows how, depending on the prevailing situation, the mood in the troops changed, as well as the attitude of soldiers and officers to the local population. In addition, in the chapter on error, the participation of the studied compounds in the implementation of the sikushion policy of the Third Reich, including the fight against partisans, the oppression of civilians, the Holocaust, is mentioned.

The fourth chapter gives a brief description of the territory on which these divisions operated, describes the organization of the pnomenko occupation administration. and thus analyzes the differences in the conditions in which the front and rear (occupation) units and formations of the Wehrmacht functioned, and giving rise to these differences in the me- talism of the personnel The author notes that without taking into account the space factor, our understanding of the history of the participation of the Wehrmacht in the war against the Soviet Union will be grossly incomplete.

The most extensive fifth eye is devoted directly to the crimes of the German military on the Eastern Front and in the occupied territories. Hartman is lachining © so pazi- mately the decree on commissioners" of June 6, 1981 1. before. it was possible to destroy the commissars and political workers of the Red Army who fell a pls. Although the total number of spoorts was relatively small, the content of this decree, the history of its application and the evolution of the attitude of soldiers and officers of the Wehrmocht towards it well illustrate the perception of the Nazi leadership and German military servicemen of their opponents in wine pa east. Panboles, the author describes in detail the fate of Soviet prisoners of war: the treatment of them in the zone of military operations and in the rear is analyzed separately. An extensive paragraph is devoted to the participation of army units and unions (formerly the veto of the occupation) ® acts of genocide, including in the murders of sesi. The chapter ends with a description of the Wehrmacht's struggle with the partisans and a brief overview of the German use of zi. my 1041-1942 t scorched earth tactics.

In conclusion, summing up, Hartman states that all five compounds, which are discussed in the book, were involved to one degree or another in Vasya's crimes, as well as in the Nazi police's crimes. To the greatest extent this applies to the 221st oh "

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an early division, which, for a very short period of time, managed to prove itself in almost all "fields", including the military, the mass death of Soviet prisoners of war, the liquidation of the Soviet nomenklatura, the fight against partisans, etc. The only exception was, perhaps, the tactics of scorching the earth: and the devastation of the territories left by the Wehrmacht in the winter of 1941-1942. the division participated only sporadically. The 580th commandant's office of the army rear area has fewer crimes - partly because of the more obscure leadership, partly due to the fact that at the beginning of the war this coincidence was rather weak. However, this Komsilatura took an active part in the fight against the partisans. On account of the 4-0 of the tank division - the killing of prisoners of war, commissars, civilians, including presumably *svrsev*. The 296th Infantry Division also participated in the genocide of the Jews. 45th whether. vision, on the contrary, almost did not go beyond the accepted laws and customs of war. Events on the Eastern Front, therefore, always corresponded to the concept of war on destruction. There were several reasons for this, among which the author highlights the *instatshyunal*, rubbing, *rsi* and bean factors.

By institutional factor he means *organi*. the Wehrmacht's design structure, the specialization of individual units and formations, their armament, combat capabilities and functions. An equally significant role was also played by the area and the circumstances of the formation of a particular division, from which the educational level, mentality and mood of the personnel and command, their attitude to the Nazi ideology, finally, must be taken into account were essentially divided into two non-equal parts: the larger one - the front-line formations, and the smaller one - the occupational ones, the latter were almost exclusively engaged in maintaining order in the occupied territories, including the speech of the occupation policy of the Reich, while the former in this Work almost did not participate. The growing tension in the rear led to a steady build-up of the bare mosh of the security divisions and homeidatures of the army rear areas, which post-

"Ipos have turned into quite strong formations to fight the *Irpoans*. Nevertheless, in their activities, they continued to interact regularly © with various units that had no direct relation to the Wehrmacht proper: collabora

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Zionists, allied troops, SS units, police. The activities of the security junctions were only managed and controlled by the occupation administration, i.e. by the Nazi political leadership, while the Froit divisions were effectively spared from such a role of "patroller.

The degree of his responsibility, including for

ie crimes. Vish of the general, the author emphasizes, is a heavy soldier. Thus, the highest collective responsibility for the crimes of the Wehrmacht during the war lies, therefore, with its top leadership, as a simple soldier should be responsible only for those acts that he personally committed,

The institutional factor was exacerbated by the spatial one. Hartman refers here not only the scale of the theater of operations as such, but the fact that the war on the Eastern Front was conceived from the very beginning as the acquisition of a new "enclosed space", which, in turn, implied large-scale measures to UTB subsequent colonization. The conditions under which the front and occupation formations had to operate also differed. If the soldiers from the front were in close proximity to the armed enemy, then in the rear the soldiers of the security divisions were dealing with peaceful settlements. This affected both the content and nature of war crimes, which differed at the front and in the occupied territories, and their scale - incomparably more crimes were committed in the rear, despite the relative weakness of the occupation formations.

By the time factor, Hartman understands the rapid escalation of violence from the front and in the rear during the first scourges of the Patriotic War. In the autumn of 1941, there was a sharp tightening of the Nazi occupation policy, mass killings of prisoners-in-prisoners began, the genocide was served, in

The battles of the emerging partisan movement were followed by repressions against the local population. This, in turn, gave rise to growing discontent in the occupied territories and contributed to the further unwinding of the spiral of violence. It was only from the beginning of 1942 that the idea began to spread among the occupiers that this war could be won only "together with the Russians, and

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is against the Russians, "but the time for the local population to join their side was already irretrievably lost,

The author also notes that, in accordance with the personnel field of the quiet German command, young soldiers were sent primarily to the front, while the occupation units were staffed with reservists of older generations. Thus, the implementation of the Nazi ideas of "war of annihilation" and colonization

whom space" was in fact entrusted to that command of the military servants, who was least able to support these ideals. Consequently, Hartman concludes, although the Nazi ideology is certainly one of the causes of mass crimes on the Eastern Front, the actions of ordinary soldiers were determined to a greater extent not by personal motives, but rather by external factors: orders from superiors, the place of service, and finally, simply the emerging environment, which often played the role of a catalyst. According to the author, the war itself was by no means a *mens psumolima*, except for the army apparatus or the political leadership (p. 798).

H. Hartmann emphasizes that, although the behavior and crimes of German military personnel on the Eastern Front cannot be explained by objective factors alone, it would also be a mistake to ignore the specific military context in which Wehrmacht soldiers and officers had to live. Thus, the 296th infantry division was involved in killings during the war, grazing in the reserve: the crimes of the military personnel of the 4th tank division in the autumn of 1941 were provoked not only by the ideology of the war of annihilation and the corresponding orders of the command, but also by the fact that just in this period, the elite division was unable to justify the fighters assigned to the dog,

Being in a state of frustration, they began to sweep out their lake. harassment of defenseless civilians; occupation formations in 1942. acted in conditions of fierce struggle © partisans.

The results of the war in the east were catastrophic, "In the Soviet theater of operations," the author writes, "the Wehrmacht lost everything: it lost the war, not only with the Soviet Union, it lost countless of its military servicemen, about 2.7 million people, last but not least, his honor" (p. 800).

Concluding his book, Hartmann once again dwells on the problem of guilt, which is extremely painful for German society.

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Wehrmacht and one hundred services. He draws attention to how many circumstances, Firstly, the conducted research shows that the individual responsibility of individual soldiers and officers could differ quite a lot. Fourthly, the freedom of choice for the officers was often extremely limited.

of the regime as a whole, which in itself bears a serious responsibility for what was going on at the front and in the occupied

years of war. Fourthly, forgings, in many cases, the important role was played not by the criminal intent of specific "odats" and officers, but by orders, circumstances and chance. Thus, one can definitely and unequivocally speak only about the collective responsibility of the servicemen of the Wehrmacht, the more significant the higher the rank of this or that officer or general. The question of individual guilt does not have such a simple solution, Hartman also notes that The massive nature of the war crimes of the Pemshevs on the Eastern Front was to a large extent due to the fact that the command, in fact, granted its soldiers and officers official exemption from any moral or legal restrictions. He emphasizes that the experience of the participation of the German army in World War II illustrates well what happened in the 20th century. warfare too easily took on barbaric forms, despite the existing international constuctions, and also how other classical notions of ovunisian honor and responsibility of sin, how easily the system subjugates the individual. "War has not died," notes the author, "and force has not calmed down. It is only looking for new forms and theaters of military operations. That is why the example of the Wehrmacht will long remain undeniable as one of the most extreme examples of what

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MOSCOW IN 1941: THE CITY AND ITS RESIDENTS DURING THE WAR

(Abstract)

Vtaymaye V.

MOSOMU 1941: ASPU AKHO GG REORE ATMAK, - 1 .: Roy Wax, 2007. 446 p.

The well-known British diplomat, former ambassador of the United Kingdom to the USSR and the Russian Federation, Sir Rodrik Kveitii Braithwaite, in his monograph describes and knows the daily life of the inhabitants of Moscow in the first year of the Patriotic War. Based on new documents as well as personal references, the kishga provides the reader with first-hand information, including the perception of the war at a real level, its "human dimension". As the author himself points out, his hinga is about people who, despite Stalin's paranoia and the incompetence of the army command, united and stopped Hitler.

Kinga consists of an introduction, 17 chapters and a conclusion; chapters devoted to various aspects of the history of everyday life, "are grouped problem-chronologically into three parts: "Slowly approaching a thunderstorm", "Beginning of a storm" and "Typhoon".

At the beginning of the first part, the author is happy that Moscow, in a certain sense, constituted the core and essence of Russia itself. Even from the beginning, it was here that a significant part of the

"cities of opportunity in the "first country of socialism?" (p. 3) were peasants who came here in search of work, or the children of peasants. Broitvoit characterizes Moscow as a "big village" whose population lived in compact communities, St. with mutual aid relations and interdependence, where

"Sunday they know", It made survival easier - as in a peaceful time,

still during the war. However, the majority of the population was aware that a possible war would not affect them, in the extreme case, the Red Army would be able to cope with the enemy.

Stalin, according to the congestion, was not "only optimistic, believing that sooner or later the Smu would have to deal with Hitler, and speaking a lot on this subject, the "genius of all times and peoples" tried to thaw the panorama of war and, in good time, prepare for Pei Krasta's army was armed with tweaks, the Zrtolerian guns themselves climbed no more than all the other armies of the world combined, however, according to the author, its weapons in 1941 1 were on the verge of obsolete, as were the tactics of the Grazhlap war. In addition, Stalin was aware of the mood in the country, including the eagles of the peasants, of their discontent with the collective farm system, so he had reason to save that in the event of a war, the peasants' army, by their simplicity, would not have a special desire to protect the Bolshevik states.

In addition, he could not understand whether Hitler was really going to join the Soviet Union or whether he intended to extract new economic and political concessions from him. Iem persgovorov and intimidation. Since the first option was risky, Staz seemed more likely than the second, which meant that Neo would have enough time to complete the necessary preparations for the impending vobsha. After isol. Hitler's ocratic postponement of the attack on the Soviet dictatorship. tor and completely nanal to consider incoming messages about toto. vice of German aggression as an Angaeen-American provocation

ha Vyusa preparations Gerl did not contradict common sense

mania, the author notes that she is in. meaning and to consider it as stupidity would be a simplification. In London, he recalls, they also believed that there was a war between the USSR and

Germany will begin only after the defeat of Great Britain. Moreover, the British expected that in the near future a new agreement between Hitler and Stalin could follow. No one, therefore, took into account the "event of the convocation" of fiyursra, and if this had almost no effect on the fate of Great Britain, then it turned into a disaster for the Soviet Union (p. 56).

In the second part \_ "The Beginning of the Burn" examines the history of the first months of the war. Although among of the population were very

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The idea that it would end in a month or, at the latest, by the end of the year, and foreigners were greatly surprised by the absence of patriotic demonstrations organized by millions of spontaneous people. The author believes that my poor residents were simply waiting for the government to tell them what they were doing. The "tops" at the same time tried, using the NKVD, to clarify the mood of the "bottoms". Agsitura recorded a significant critical mastery in relation to the government, its course and prospects, "expressed surprisingly cautiously and freely" (©. 77). Many wondered how the government could allow such a "surprise" and why the Red Army was retreating, leaving city after city. Doubts were expressed that anyone would defend the steel state, given that in the 1930s life for many became simply mute: wearable, while during the Civil War people fought for freedom and rights. There was a reluctance to join the army and even calls to fight against the Soviet regime and its leaders. However, the NKVD prepared lists of "terrorists, saboteurs, wreckers, nmschih, Italian, Japanese and others. quiet spies, Trotskyists, former members of anti-Soviet parties, dissenters, sectarians and other anti-Soviet elements" (p. 79). their persuasion. This forced the Soviet leadership to publish as many materials as possible about the brutality of the occupiers in order to reverse such sentiments.

"The popularity of the novel War and Peace increased sharply: readers 'sought to correlate their own behavior and feelings with the heroes of the classic. The author notes that the creation of a folklore



militia (terms of 1612 and 1812 tenge) can also be regarded as a kind of appeal of the authorities to the heroic past.

parallel "The Patriotic War of 1812 began to — Great Patriotic War "with the approach of winter seem even more relevant, Braithwaite cites the mission of K. Simonov, who, being a Froit correspondent, realized that soldiers are fighting not for Stalin or the regime, but for the country and people, and even those who belonged to the pegativio regime, were captured by the general impulse.

Indeed, many thousands of Muscovites volunteered to help the country, although, as the author notes, not all of them understood what really awaited them. Some believed that they would be sent to support work (security, military construction), and were

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unpleasantly surprised by their being sent to the front. There were rumors of "voluntarily forced" raids on the streets. As a result, when on July 4 the State Defense Committee decided to form 25 new volunteer divisions - one from each district of Moscow - with a total number of 200,000 people from 17 to 55 years old, in fact, only about #0,000 volunteers, of whom over 4,000 were subsequently screened out in training camps. In addition, according to eyewitnesses, volunteers who went to the militia experienced abundance: not only food and weapons, but also human relations in general. Postulating that it is possible to feel like a worthy defender of the country only in conditions of good supply, Brabtite superjeant, after three months of training, armed and hastily trained people were essentially sent to certain death due to the incompetence of commanders, although their death and became a symbol of courage and readiness for self-sacrifice.

Under these conditions, despite the fact that, according to the author's mission, the patriotic spirit of the beginning of the war was powerful and sincere, Stalin, realizing that his power was hanging by a thread, again resorted to repression, including in the Aryns. Barrage detachments appeared, and the arrests and porridges of the commanders of the fronts showed that the regime treats the representatives of the generals just as ruthlessly as it treats the rank-and-file Krsiozmeets.

R. Braithwaite emphasizes that the measures taken in themselves, no matter how cruel they were, were not unprecedented; moreover, in the first months of the war, any action that could help stop the Germans seemed justified. Another thing is that the repressions, especially if one takes into account their scale, even from a purely pragmatic point of view, were counterproductive. According to the author, over a million soldiers and officers were convicted during the war years. Of these, at least 135,000 were shot (not counting the shootings on the perelovoy, which took place "without formalities"). more than 400,000 were sent to penal battalions. It was the repressions, notes Bruytuoyt, that sometimes caused the vacillating soldiers to go over to the side of the enemy.

The transition to a description of Moscow's own defense begins with the memoirs of the British journalist Alexander Werth, who arrived in the USSR shortly after the start of the war. According to Werth, Moscow was a surprisingly prosperous city.

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People did not look unhappy, especially since the standard of living has risen over the last great goals. They stood around for lemonade and newspapers, there were cigarettes in abundance. Despite the feeling of ""the importance of every day and every hour for stories" (p. 161) and the significant contrast between the aspen and oxen spirits, the mood at first remained quite calm. But it was the calm in the center of the storm, just an illusion of the pocon.

The offensive of the Wehrmacht, as it moved deep into Soviet territory, began to grow, however, not only because of the losses and growing resistance of the Red Hermitage, but also because, with a rapid advance to the east from the border in the initial period of the war, the German troops

found themselves cut off from their supply bases, while the Red Army did not experience such problems. In addition, having occupied a territory the size of Great Britain, France, Spain and Italy combined, at the beginning of the battle near Moscow the Pempas moved away from the policy of "carrot and stick" and limited themselves to the "stick" skors. Despite the fact that the meetings of Kobo ganos-to pm pottoralkoj zash on pozhtlih to the Soviet regime was missed, and the disseminated information rather confirmed the Soviet propaganda. Under these conditions, according to the author, even the destruction or capture of Moscow, although it would have dealt a severe blow to the military, economic and political system of the USSR, would not have become a turning point in the war. The main problem remained space, stretched supply lines and depletion of resources.

Indeed, as the front approached Moscow, the Luftwaffe raids became more and more frequent, but they took place from improvised bases, while the Soviet Air Force had well-equipped airfields near Moscow, therefore, as the author shows, the bombings did not become for Moscow 'a serious problem.

R. Braithwaite cites some data from the history of the development of air defense in Moscow. Local air defense was established in 1932. From 1933 the construction of shelters began, but by the beginning of the war they were only enough for 400,000 out of 4 million inhabitants of the city. Already by August there were trenches and dugouts for another 250,000 people, and by the end of 1941 - for most of the remaining population. Several air defense rings, created at a significant (more than around London) distance around Moscow, by the time of the first raids, there were

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60,000 personnel - observers, pilots, anti-aircraft gunners, searchlight, zerostat and other fighters. However, due to the lack of effective radars in the USSR, for each downed aircraft, there were 20,000 fired charges, while in the UK 2000.

One of the primary goals of air defense was protection from fires, because, despite the extensive program of high-rise construction, about 70% of residential buildings in Moscow were built of wood, the roofs of myogo factories were also of fuel city stocks of firewood, stored sawmills and other fire hazardous objects. Due to the wide

in the air defense of ill-trained civilians, newspapers began to publish useful advice on how

a thread of incendiary bombs, how to build a shelter, how to distinguish the sound of a falling bomb from an anti-aircraft projectile taking off and the one

As a result, on July 22, the first major air raid on Moscow (127 out of 200 aircraft lost their wings, dropping 1047 high explosives and 46,000 incendiary bombs) a disappointing result for the Germans. The author especially emphasizes that by the standards of the German raids in London, it was a mosquito bite - 130 killed, 660 wounded, 37 buildings destroyed. This was due both to the power of air defense and to the weakness of the fighter cover of the German bombers. The raids continued for several more months (the last major raid took place on July 16, 1942), but there was not much destruction (especially since all traces of damage were quickly removed), although the very threat of bombing forced people to be constantly in suspense, which greatly I'm getting on my nerves. The direct damage from the bombings is not exactly known. According to Soviet data, the German air raids cost Moscow 2,000 dead (6,000 wounded, about 5,600 destroyed or damaged buildings, while during the bombing of London, losses and destruction were an order of magnitude higher (p. 205). The author explains this difference by the fact that in During the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe sang a concentrated attack on the capital of the empire, while in the USSR, German bombers were more likely to provide tactical support to the army in ground battles and strike at railroad stations with reinforcements. zoodromes in France,

located close to the target, and we experienced difficulties in supplying ammunition and new aircraft. For raids on Moscow, they had to use

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call for broken takeoff strips in conditions of systotade and problems with. Logistics, I wonder what, then twisted by the author, effskt from the pronunciation of the mask. Spepepi Tied With Issoner

the accuracy of the bombing was the same as the system of the sight systems of the third part = "Typhoon" - the situation in Moskie is described during the period when the Germans carried out the so-called shepherding operation. When the result of the defeat of the Red Army near Bi. skom and Vizma in the defense of the capital, a gap 300 km wide was formed, the population, despite the lack of official information, I quickly realize. what is happening: In anticipation of a catastrophe, the roads were filled with refugees. The picture, according to the author, was supposed to resemble the biblical Exodus. The sometimes irritating silence of the Soviet Form Bureau in this hearing caused scorse fatalism. Even the collaborators of the British wait a moment did not receive from their Soviet collaborators and what kind of information they had to be content with BBC reports

By this time, the weather had already begun to have a significant influence on the course of hostilities. At the same time, cold weather set in in Moscow itself and a reduction in coal supplies to the syoi with the loss of Ukraine caused difficulties Many houses and carpets were bathed in. The cultivation of lice on bollards and chickens in the yard became widespread. Trade in the grain market expanded under conditional food harvest. Brut records an eight-carat rise in prices before the end of the first goal of the war, as well as a special culture of queues associated © with a scarcity, including drawing numbers by hand.

Pujio notes, writes the author, that mass purchases of buckwheat salt, matches, kossarves, flour and vodka (as currency) began immediately, as soon as the war broke out. , oils, fish meat, consumer goods Cards were issued to workers at the place of work, dependents - at the place of residence Braithvoite notes that in the USSR the card system (and unlike, say, Great Britain) was not just a way of Distributing: between economic efficiency and social justice, but also allowed to divide people into "useful" and "not useful" at their own discretion, establishing differences

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nys rations for different categories of citizens. Together with the cards, new types of crimes appeared, including fraud and robbery of the apartments of evacuees. All this in general evokes associations in the author and his respondents with the Civil War, with the exception of the absence of epidemiological

On October 12, an order was issued by the State Defense Committee on the construction of fortifications around Moscow itself, including along the Boulevard and Garden Rings. About 600,000 people were involved in this construction, only those employed in your industries were exempted from labor service. About 50,000 people were recruited into the militia. Plans were being prepared for the destruction of defense plants, as well as bakeries, meat processing plants, transport parks, and bridges.

By the beginning of the war, the Soviet state already had experience in transporting large masses of people (leportation of dispossessed kulaks) and mobilizing the population for various peaceful needs (subbotniks, patronage assistance to collective farms). On Voips, this experience was useful in the evacuation of industry, plans for which had been developed even since the Vienna of 1941, and were now being vigorously implemented. Under the leadership of the newly created Evacuation Council under the Council of People's Commissars, several million people were evacuated from the western regions of the USSR and thousands of enterprises were relocated; some of them in 1942. with the start of a new Pemetsk offensive, had to be evacuated a second time. The author describes some aspects of evacuation, but focuses on the basic fate of cultural figures. In addition, it concerns the deportation of more than 10,000 Moscow Germans. Interestingly, during the period under review

there was also an increase in the number of marriages, among the reasons for which was the prospect of evacuation of one of the potential spouses.

In this difficult situation, despite restrictions on entry into the city, Muscovites still received some information from the wounded, nurses, as well as from journalists returning from the front. Residents were mentally prepared for the fact that Moscow would have to surrender, as happened in 1812 and how in 1941 Kie was already sent. Therefore, when on the morning of October 16, instead of Levitan, the Nazi anthem "Horst Wessel" sounded on the radio, there were no fresh newspapers in the mailboxes and all public transport stopped going, mass burning of documents began, including party documents (more than 1000 cases) and union tickets. Freely thoughtful talk spread, for which until recently one could have been put on trial, including fantastic rumors about a coup and overthrowing

willows

Stalin's research institute, about the blown up subway it. Soon, the workers, having received their wages on time, began to move from spontaneous attempts to aggravate the departure of the authorities to direct threats of damage to equipment © in order not to omit one hundred evacuations. sausages), captured was openly sold on the streets. The collective farmer tried not to let the cattle go east. The accusations of the Jews were heard in all the defeats and interruptions in the liberation. The militia didn't interfere too much under the pretext of lack of instructions. Unrest and panic ceased only when a state of siege was introduced in Moscow on October 20, when it was officially announced that "provocateurs and ipmons" would be shot on the spot. But even after that, the population of the former did not have confidence that the torod would be surrendered to the enemy.

Analyzing the course of combat operations in 1941, Brunzoit pes dust, including the biographies of Rokossovsky, Zhukov and others. other major military leaders. He comes to the conclusion that the future Soviet marshals had more experience than their British or French counterparts - the First World War, the Civil War, the Soviet-Polish War, the war in Spain, Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, the Finnish campaign. Thus, the reasons for the failures of the first stage of the Patriotic War, in the opinion of the author, were not in uvali. Breitm v considers the army purges to be the main reason for this, during which not only thousands of lols were killed, but also the desire to make independent decisions was destroyed: they also took responsibility. The inability of the generals to convince Stalin also played a role, which resulted in numerous ill-conceived, often inherently suicidal orders from the supreme command. In turn, Stalin himself, as the actual lava of the state, bears personal responsibility for insufficient preparation for war.

As a result, the troops were incapable of effective action under the conditions of modern combat. Loss of control n lane in the past few days, there are big losses in technology and more than 2 mana. prisoners, all this cast doubt on the outcome of the war. Nevertheless, the Red Army retained the ability and will to resist, As a result, the battle for Moscow. which became the largest battle in the history of the war (more than 7 million soldiers and officers from both sides fought over a vast territory for several months.

shŷ

tsv), played a major role in the defeat of the Third Reich. It was near Moscow that the Nazi plans for a lightning war finally collapsed, and the Wehrmacht for the first time temporarily lost its strategic initiative, and the main reason for this was not bad weather conditions, but previously insufficiently thought-out preparations for the eastern campaign and underestimation of the capabilities of the Soviet Union. However, for Stalin, the battle near Moscow, according to the traffic jam, was associated more with the catastrophe of the first months, which is also confirmed by the fact that Moscow received the title of "City-mountain" only in 1965.

St. Vpuin

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